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A b s t r a c t
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is the primary global organization responsi­
ble for implementing rules against doping in sport. A central element of its mission is 
the requirement that elite athletes submit their whereabouts information for every day 
of the year to their relevant Anti-Doping Organization (ADO), in order to facilitate no 
advance notice out-of-competition doping testing. These requirements have attracted 
considerable criticism, including the claim that they invade elite athlete privacy in a 
legally or ethically unacceptable manner.
The validity of these claims is threatened by the contestedness of the concept of pri­
vacy, which arises from the many different uses to which the concept is put, including 
in legal and philosophical contexts. Resolving this conceptual confusion requires tak­
ing an explicit position on various questions of philosophical methodology, themselves 
subject to contention. As an alternative to such abstraction, and particularly given the 
need for a philosophically defensible yet pragmatic policy application, I argue that pri­
vacy is best conceived of as the absence of certain contextually relevant harms to the 
person, which arise in relation to such underlying normative values as fairness between 
competing athletes.
In the specific context of elite athlete whereabouts requirements, I maintain that 
privacy concerns arise principally in relation to surveillance, intrusion, and breaches of 
confidence. Of these, the first and second face legal difficulties in the UK, on the basis 
of European legislation concerning human rights and maximum working time. Ethical 
problems also arise due to WADAs undifferentiated application of the whereabouts 
requirements, which ignores the heterogeneity of different types of sports and their 
respective vulnerabilities to doping. I argue that WADAs whereabouts requirements 
ought therefore to be revised to (a) ensure that they do not conflict with established 
law, and (b) respect the very different sets of circumstances entailed by the heteroge­
neous world of elite sports.
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1In t r o d u c t i o n
Th e  W o r l d  A n t i - D o p i n g  A g e n c y  (WADA) is the primary global organiza­tion responsible for creating, implementing, curating, and monitoring rules against doping in elite sport. A central element of its anti-doping mission is 
the requirement that all elite athletes competing at a sufficiently high level submit their 
location, or “whereabouts,” information, for every day of the year without exception, 
to their relevant Anti-Doping Organization (ADO). This allows ADOs to locate and 
perform no advance notice out-of-competition doping tests on athletes. Many athletes, 
sporting federations, and scholars have, however, raised various legal and ethical objec­
tions to the whereabouts requirements, including the claim that they constitute an un­
acceptable privacy invasion for the affected athletes. In this thesis, I assess the strength 
of these legal and ethical privacy objections to WADAs whereabouts requirements. This 
introductory chapter sets out the background—in addition to the conceptual and topi­
cal limitations—to the investigation, followed by a structural overview of the argument 
I develop in the subsequent chapters.
1.1 Background
Sporting competitions and performance enhancement have, historically, gone hand in 
hand. The last century or so has, however, seen the development of an increasingly 
fraught relation between the two.
On the one hand, the nature of sporting competitions has changed drastically from 
their humble beginnings. Today, elite sporting events are often multi-million dollar
1
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spectacles, involving an army of athletes, coaches, referees, functionaries, officials, dieti­
cians, doctors, scientists, journalists, spectators, and many more. The stakes—in terms 
of social goods like fame, prize money, sporting and commercial contracts, national 
pride, etc.—have increased many times over, to the point where a significant amount of 
professional athletes have attained both significant wealth and super-stardom as a re­
sult of their sporting prowess. And the most high-profile sporting competitions—events 
like the Olympic Games, the World Cup, and the Tour de France—amass an astonish­
ing number of viewers from around the globe (along with a substantial level of potential 
marketing opportunities and brand exposure for sponsors). At no point in the past have 
so many people taken such a big interest in the world of elite sport.
At the same time, these increasing stakes and interest have led to increased calls for 
more detailed and specific regulation of sporting practices. What type of equipment 
is acceptable in a given sport? What sort of dimensional and/or material restrictions 
ought we to impose on it? How are different problem-cases—such as faulty refereeing 
in crucial qualification games—to be appropriately resolved? How ought we to distin­
guish between, say, different genders, or levels of disability, in different sports? As the 
number and salience of such questions have grown, so have the rules and regulations 
determining the specifics of each sport. This development has also, and in particular, af­
fected the regulation of performance-enhancing practices. What constitutes acceptable 
and unacceptable types of performance enhancement, and how ought we to approach 
the latter? Or, to rephrase, what is to be done about doping in elite sport?
As the primary centralized global organization tasked with the responsibility of an­
swering this question, WADA has implemented a number of far-reaching policies to 
seek to attain its goal of doping-free sport. Among these, it has placed particular empha­
sis on the importance of no advance notice out-of-competition doping testing. Insofar 
as certain doping substances retain their performance-enhancing effect even after the 
likelihood of detecting them in an athlete sample has vanished, the only available means 
of monitoring such use is through reliance on tests that occur outside of competition sit­
uations. Importantly, this form of testing is only viable if doping control officials know 
where to find the athletes whom they are tasked with testing. To solve this practical 
problem, WADA introduced athlete whereabouts requirements, stipulating that every 
elite athlete competing at a sufficiently high level must submit their whereabouts infor­
mation in advance, for every day of the year without exception, to their relevant ADO.
2
1.2. Limitations
These requirements, which apply universally to all higher-level elite athletes regardless 
of sport, make it possible for the doping control officials to perform no advance no­
tice out-of-competition doping tests, thereby, WADA maintains, reducing the risk that 
athletes actually dope under such circumstances.
However, various arguments have been raised against WADAs whereabouts require­
ments, including the legally and ethically significant claim that the requirements con­
stitute an unacceptable privacy invasion for those athletes upon whom they are im ­
posed. This claim has been made in different forms, but the general sentiment of it can 
be summed up as follows: “Although doping-free sport is important, and although no 
advance notice out-of-competition doping testing may be a crucial means of achiev­
ing doping-free sport, the current whereabouts requirements constitute an invasion of 
athlete privacy that is out of proportion with the actual risks of wrongdoing, and the 
requirements are therefore themselves wrong.”
This sentiment, thus expressed, constitutes the primary focus for this thesis. The re­
search question to be answered can, therefore, be formulated as follows: In relation to 
elite athlete privacy, are WADAs current whereabouts requirements acceptable? Although 
it would be possible to state the final conclusion already now, proper appreciation of its 
strength, nature, and implications requires a fuller account of the various terms, topics, 
and values involved in reaching it. As with any scholarly inquiry, the first step toward 
such an account consists of a more precise specification and delimitation of the con­
text in which the research question arises, making explicit what falls within and what, 
perhaps more importantly, falls without its boundaries.
1.2 Limitations
Sport is a broad term with indistinct conceptual boundaries. Not only does it range 
over a wide variety of different forms of human behavior and practices, it is also diffi­
cult to clearly and unambiguously distinguish from its near conceptual relatives game 
and play.1 Furthermore, sport is inherently ambiguous, being equally applicable to spe­
cific individual sports (such as rugby), collections of specific individual sports (such as
JFor the central canonical consideration of the definition of game, see Suits, The Grasshopper; for an 
overview of the subsequent sport-focused conceptual discussions emanating from Suits’s work, see the 
various contributions to Morgan and Meier, Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, pt. I; and to McNamee, The 
Ethics of Sports, pt. 1.
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Olympic sports), or something like the phenomenon of sport generally, without any 
particular sport or sports in mind. This latter ambiguity is, however, not usually con­
sidered troubling, as context generally suffices to determine which of the possible in­
terpretations is the valid one in relation to any given instance of use.
Within this thesis, sport is allowed to remain ambiguous in the latter manner (with 
the context signaling the intended use), but is limited to those sports that WADA ac­
tively seeks to regulate, including through the demand that the relevant ADO for a sport 
impose WADAs full whereabouts requirements on its highest echelons of athletes.2 In 
practice, this includes all Olympic sports, as well as the majority of widespread and pop­
ular league sports. It does not, however, include many of the so-called extreme sports, 
or more obscure or local sports, except where WADA actively seeks to regulate them. 
Similarly, although a number of more or less well-established and popular sports— 
particularly those striving for inclusion in future Olympic Games—voluntarily follow at 
least parts of WADAs regulations, they will not come under further consideration here, 
unless their top athletes are currently required, by WADA, to submit their whereabouts 
information in full to their relevant ADO.
It is worth noting that not all sports that WADA actively seeks to regulate have actu­
ally implemented the organizations rules in full. As already mentioned, various sport­
ing federations have objected to the whereabouts requirements, and some have chosen 
to introduce their own derivative (milder) versions of the requirements as an alternative 
to WADAs own. This is, for instance, the case with the International Cricket Council 
(ICC). Elite-level cricket nevertheless falls within the range of sport, as interpreted here, 
insofar as WADA still actively demands that the ICC implement its regulations in full. 
The fact that the ICC chooses not to do so (and to some extent is able to get away with 
not doing so) is a secondary issue of real-world policy, rather than one of conceptual 
boundaries.3
As with sport, there are many possible interpretations of doping.4 In contemporary 
discussions, it primarily refers to the use of those performance-enhancing technologies
2 Athletes are here understood as active competitors in any of the sports thus circumscribed, and elite ath­
letes are understood as those athletes who compete at a sufficiently high level for WADA to consider them 
to be subject to its full whereabouts requirements.
31 discuss the ICC s development of its own whereabouts requirements in further detail in chapter 2.
4 For discussion of some of the various difficulties surrounding the conceptualization of the term, see 
Moller, The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping, 4-12; McNamee and Tarasti, “Ethico-Legal Aspects of 
Anti-Doping Policy,” 9.
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(substances and methods) that are considered inappropriate by WADA, as established 
by their inclusion in its annually reviewed Prohibited List.5 Such use is inherently disap­
proving, to the extent that it identifies as doping only those technologies that are explic­
itly against the rules of sport. Hence doping, thus understood, is always cheating, and 
is therefore in itself bad; mere mention of it tends to preclude ethically non-judgmental 
discussion.
This use can be questioned on various points. First, numerous scholars have objected 
to the negative valence of the term, arguing that doping is not ethically problematic, 
or perhaps even ethically preferable to the current system of anti-doping regulation.6 
The debate on the normative status of doping and anti-doping is large and complex, 
and there is no room to explore these issues here. Instead, I will simply assume that, 
everything else being equal, doping is ethically problematic and that, therefore, there 
are pro tanto reasons to seek to minimize or perhaps even eliminate it. That is to say, 
I agree, for the sake of argument, with the general thrust of WADAs views on doping. 
The issue here is not one of whether or not there can be any justification of anti-doping 
regulation in the first place, but rather of whether or not WADAs current whereabouts 
requirements are acceptable, from a perspective of privacy, despite presumed agreement 
on the ethical preferability of doping-free sport.
Second, the reference of the term is highly contingent, due to the annually amended 
nature of the Prohibited List. This state of affairs gives rise to potential time-indexing 
difficulties. If the use of strychnine by athletes was not banned in the nineteenth century, 
but it is banned today, was it still doping for those nineteenth-century athletes? Or, to 
take a more contemporary example, caffeine was previously banned by WADA, but the 
ban was lifted in 2004 as the result of, among other things, the sheer ubiquity of the 
substance.7 Does this mean that an athlete ingesting a certain dose of caffeine in 2003 
was doping, while the same athlete ingesting the same amount of caffeine in 2005 was 
not? Or that the athlete was not doping in either instance, since caffeine is no longer 
banned?
These sorts of difficulties are not easily resolved. If anti-doping policy strives to­
ward doping-free sport, what, exactly, is the conception of sport in question? Or, to
5 WADA, The 2013 Prohibited List.
illustrative examples of such positions include Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton, “Why We Should Allow 
Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport”; Tamburrini, “Are Doping Sanctions Justified?”
7WADA, Questions and Answers on 2012 Prohibited List.
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rephrase, what precise practices need to be removed in order for a sport to qualify as 
“doping-free”? I have no immediate answer to these questions, but will do little more 
here than note them as potentially problematic for those anti-doping proponents striv­
ing for such an ideal. Within the scope of this thesis, I will limit use of doping to refer to 
that vague and poorly defined phenomenon to which anti-doping proponents object, as 
characterized by WADAs various Prohibited Lists. While hazy at the boundaries, there 
is sufficiently widespread agreement on more central instances of the term—such as 
the use of steroids, erythropoietin (EPO), and blood transfusions—to nevertheless al­
low for meaningful discussion, regardless of ones personal views on the acceptability 
of such practices.8
Both the negative valence and the terminological difficulties can be avoided, to some 
extent, by using the normatively more neutral and referentially more stable term per­
formance enhancement and its cognates; here understood as a broader field of tech­
nologies believed (by athletes and other relevant actors in sport) to enhance sporting 
performance.9 On such an interpretation, doping categorizes a subset of performance- 
enhancing technologies, namely those that WADA considers sufficiently problematic 
to include in its Prohibited Lists. Or, in other words, performance-enhancing includes 
such technologies as caffeine, protein supplements, and weightlifting (not prohibited 
by WADA), as well as amphetamine, EPO, and blood doping (prohibited by WADA). 
Using this terminology, particularly in a historical discussion such as that presented in 
chapter 2, neutralizes ethical prejudgment to at least some extent. While some perform­
ance-enhancing technologies may be ethically problematic, performance-enhancing it­
self is not inherently so, ranging, as it does, over technologies that are both permitted 
and restricted.
Finally, in terms of initial conceptual clarification, it is important to highlight certain 
aspects of the nebulous concept of privacy. Privacy is a controversial term, giving rise to 
numerous conflicting and competing accounts. It suffers from such a range of interpre­
tations and applications as to render it highly difficult to establish, with any certainty,
8Cf. MacGregor and McNamee, “Philosophy on Steroids,” 402-3.
9The notion of performance-enhancing is of course itself subject to various boundary disputes. I will leave 
this issue to the side, as the terms exact conceptual boundaries are not pertinent to the discussion herein. 
No premise in my arguments hinges on any precise distinction between, say, performance-enhancing and 
therapeutic, a highly difficult distinction to successfully maintain. On this latter point, see Morgan, “Ath­
letic Perfection, Performance-Enhancing Drugs, and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction,” 163-66.
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whether any of a number of instances rightly fall within its range or are perhaps better 
treated under the heading of some other closely related concept (such as liberty or au­
tonomy).10 There are many reasons for this conceptual confusion, which I delineate in 
later chapters. At this stage, I will merely note my terminology of choice for describing 
the phenomena surrounding the as-yet undefined concept of privacy.
First and foremost, privacy is something people can have, and something they can 
lose. To lose ones privacy in relation to some situation or other is an ethically neutral 
way of describing what happens; the loss might, for instance, be due to a voluntary 
relinquishing of privacy (I might choose to share a personal secret with others). The sort 
of losses of privacy that interest or concern most people, however, are those that arise 
due to others actions, in some manner that is considered harmful to those who suffer 
the loss. This includes such paradigmatic privacy cases as Peeping Toms and totalitarian 
governments secretly stockpiling sensitive information about their citizens. Where such 
harms are likely, I will say that privacy is threatened; the likelier the harm, the stronger 
the threat. Where such harms are realized, I will say that privacy is invaded.
Often there will be attempted justifications both for and against such harms; po ­
lice might, for instance, be granted access to databases holding extensive information 
about the citizens of a country, on the grounds of working to minimize the risk of ter­
rorism within that country. Where the justifying reasons for such harms are taken to be 
stronger than the justifying reasons against them, the invasion of privacy is acceptable. 
Where they are weaker, it is unacceptable.
There are many potential sources of justification, in relation to these sorts of issues. 
In this thesis, I focus on two: legal justification and ethical justification. Legal justifica­
tion arises in relation to international treaties, legislation, and common law principles 
pertaining to the harms in question; either because they protect against them, or be­
cause they provide a legal rationale for their imposition. Ethical justification arises in 
relation to normative values that may or may not be treated in the law, and that may 
also be relied on to either generate support for or opposition to the harms in question.
Both legal and ethical justification might sometimes take the form of some sort of 
right (usually taken to mean something like a sufficiently strongly justified claim): a 
right to privacy, say, or perhaps a right to live in a country without fear of terrorist acts. 
While it is possible (and in some cases common) to speak of privacy purely within the
10 Cf. Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 479-81.
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language of rights, I aim to keep my discussion unencumbered by any such termino­
logical imposition. Whether or not we can make sense of rights is an important legal 
and ethical issue, but the points I make are largely independent of that discussion, and 
therefore arguably best not forced into those terms.11 In fact, in at least the legal case, 
a violation of a right to privacy and an invasion of privacy need not overlap at all: if an 
international treatise stipulates that a legal right to privacy must be incorporated into 
the law of all signatory countries, then citizens in a country that fails to incorporate that 
right into their law arguably have a valid complaint when they claim that their right to 
privacy is being violated, regardless of whether or not any of them actually suffer inva­
sions of their privacy. I will, therefore, speak in terms of rights only where necessary— 
either because some instance of justification is formulated in terms of rights, or because 
another scholar discusses privacy in terms of rights—and refrain from developing any 
substantial position of my own in relation to the issue. Regardless of whether or not 
we can ultimately talk meaningfully about any legal or ethical right to privacy, I take 
it we can still establish whether a privacy invasion in a given instance is normatively 
acceptable or not.
I turn now to some important topical limitations. This thesis deals with the legal and 
ethical issues arising from the intersection of two broad topics: WADAs whereabouts 
requirements on the one hand, and elite athlete privacy on the other. As my focus lies on 
the intersection itself, any further aspects of these topics will be bracketed for the scope 
of the thesis. I will, in other words, not consider those issues of elite athlete privacy 
that do not directly pertain to the whereabouts requirements, nor those issues arising 
in relation to the whereabouts requirements that do not pertain directly to privacy. A 
few brief illustrations of what I mean, in each case, will have to suffice.
There are serious potential privacy issues arising from the storage and processing of 
the personal athlete data acquired through the analyses of blood and urine (and, possi­
bly in the near future, genetic) samples.12 Although certainly within the ambit of elite 
athlete privacy, these concerns do not arise from the whereabouts requirements them ­
selves, as they concern test samples that are acquired both in and out of competition.
n Cf. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 27, for a similar point.
12See e.g. Teetzel, “Respecting Privacy in Detecting Illegitimate Enhancements in Athletes”; Holm, “The 
36th Meeting of the Pay and Conditions Committee of the Union of Philosophers, Sages and Other 
Luminaries (UK University Branch), or Doping and Proportionality,” esp. 228-30; Schneider, “Privacy 
Rights, Gene Doping, and Ethics.”
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1.2. Limitations
That is, the privacy concerns in such situations would remain even if the whereabouts 
requirements were annulled, and, by the same token, the same privacy concerns could 
be mitigated without any amending of the whereabouts requirements; strictly speaking, 
the whereabouts requirements are neither necessary nor sufficient for these particular 
privacy concerns.
Analogous considerations apply to the requirement that elite athletes provide urine 
samples in full view of a (same-gender) doping control officer where so requested:
The doping control officer shall ensure an unobstructed view of the Sample leaving 
the Athletes body and must continue to observe the Sample after provision until
the Sample is securely sealed In order to ensure a clear and unobstructed view
of the passing of the Sample, the doping control officer shall instruct the Athlete 
to remove or adjust clothing which restricts the clear view of Sample provision.13
The requirement aims to minimize the possibilities of catheterization, urine sub­
stitution, or any other form of tampering with the sample, in order to maximize its 
accuracy. But the potential privacy issues of exposure and shame that such situations 
involve are again only indirectly related to the whereabouts requirements, being neither 
a central aspect nor a direct consequence of the latter.14
Similar restrictions apply to the whereabouts requirements: the potential harms of 
the requirements range over a broader number of instances than just those concerning 
privacy. The requirements are, for instance, demanding on athletes, in terms of the time 
it takes to submit ones whereabouts information. But demands on time are not normally 
considered sufficient to trigger any particular privacy issues. The same sort of reasoning 
applies also to the myriad legal issues that any piece of global regulation is likely to 
encounter in at least some national jurisdictions; where there is no obvious connection 
to some form of privacy concern, it is difficult to maintain that the issue warrants any 
further investigation relative to the focus herein.
Even given such a restriction, however, there are still bound to be far too many po­
tential legal privacy issues with the whereabouts requirements across various different 
national jurisdictions. Insofar as it is near impossible to treat such a broad range of
13WADA, IST3, Annex D, § D.4.9.
14For treatment of the ethical issues surrounding athlete urinalysis, see Thompson, “Privacy and the Uri­
nalysis Testing of Athletes”; Waddington, “Surveillance and Control in Sport,” 266-69; Moller, "One Step 
Too Far,” 189.
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possibilities in any depth, I will restrict my investigations to the context of elite ath­
letes in the UK. The appropriately revised research question then becomes twofold: (a) 
Do WADAs current whereabouts requirements constitute a legally acceptable invasion of 
the privacy o f elite athletes in the UK? (b) Do WADAs current whereabouts requirements 
constitute an ethically acceptable invasion o f the privacy o f elite athletes generally?
As regards the first question, elite athletes in the UK are subject to a variety of sets 
of legal rules stemming from different legal jurisdictions. By way of brief clarification, 
UK parliamentary legislation covers the entire UK, including Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. The countries of the UK differ, however, in their common law traditions, al­
though England and Wales are both covered by English common law. For the simple 
reason that there is more scholarly discussion of English common law developments, I 
have chosen to focus on these exclusively wherever common law is relevant, ignoring 
any Northern Irish and Scottish counterparts.
At the same time, the UK is also a member state of such international organizations 
as the EU and the Council of Europe (CE), each of which imposes certain requirements 
on the development of UK law as a condition of continued membership status. Where, 
for instance, UK parliamentary legislation and EU legal directives conflict, it is not al­
ways obvious which one takes, or ought to take, legal precedence. Not all EU and CE law 
is equally binding on member states, and even where it is, it often leaves some room for 
differing interpretations between different countries. So although the CE’s European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) establishes a qualified human right to private 
and family life, and the UK is bound by its own Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) 
to develop its law in line with the ECHR’s proclamations, the UK has nevertheless re­
frained from legislating any right to privacy as such, choosing instead to interpret and 
apply the ECHR right within its pre-existing framework of common law remedies, none 
of which explicitly protect privacy.
To this complex legal state of affairs can be further added international treaties to 
which the UK is also a signatory. Some of these, such as UNESCO’s International Con­
vention against Doping in Sport, put significant international pressure on the UK to 
comply with WADAs approach to doping in sports, including their insistence on the 
whereabouts requirements in their present form. Where an elite athlete in the UK is sub­
ject to WADAs whereabouts requirements, it is, in other words, far from clear whether 
the requirements infringe any particular legal privacy protection, or which of the mul-
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tiple conflicting national and international legal edicts take precedence over the others, 
and in what manner and under what circumstances.
The ethical question is not restricted in the same manner: wherever the normative 
values relevant to the appraisal of the issue are shared to a sufficient degree, the ethical 
analysis can be considered equally valid. The ethical focus in the thesis therefore need 
not be limited to the context of elite athletes in the UK. This is also in line with WADAs 
(implicit) insistence that the normative values underlying its anti-doping work have 
global merit, given that the organizations anti-doping regulations do not differ between 
countries.
Answering the above research questions concerning the privacy of elite athletes— 
both in regards to the legal state of affairs in the UK, as well as to the ethical state of affairs 
generally—requires significant work sorting out various strands of legal, philosophical, 
and ethical argumentation that impinge on the issue. As a result, the majority of this 
thesis is dedicated to just that, in order to thereby determine more clearly the precise 
contours of the intersection between the whereabouts requirements and elite athlete 
privacy.
1.3 Summary Overview
I begin by providing, in chapter 2, the contextual framework for the overall discussion. 
In it, I chronicle what is known about the use of performance enhancement throughout 
sporting history, in order to demonstrate that reliance on performance enhancement 
constitutes a historically longstanding and prevalent practice among elite athletes. The 
extent to which it has become entrenched in many sporting cultures goes some way to 
explain the substantial practical difficulties the growing anti-doping movement of the 
post-war years has faced. At the same time, and as a part of this growth, many athletes 
have called on their various sporting organizations to do more about the endemic preva­
lence of doping. The social and political momentum provided by this explains, to some 
extent, the lengths to which WADA has at times been willing to go in its fight against 
doping, including through its focus on no advance notice out-of-competition doping 
testing. More specifically, chapter 2 gives an account of the development of WADAs 
whereabouts requirements, through their first to their second and current iteration. In 
doing so, I detail some of the various responses that the requirements have encountered,
11
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with a particular focus on the manner in which privacy objections to them have been 
raised.
Chapter 3 sets the legal contextual framework, by providing an overview of the most 
important national and international legal personal privacy protections, relative to the 
UK context. The UK has no legal right to privacy, as such, in parliamentary legislation 
or in common law. I therefore instead briefly summarize the historical development of 
the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, along with similar privacy-related cur­
rents of development, in addition to looking at several of the more recent failed attempts 
to legislate on the protection of personal privacy in Parliament. Following this, I intro­
duce the three pieces of European privacy law with a direct impact in the UK that are 
most relevant to the whereabouts issue: EU law on data protection, EU law on working 
time, and CE human rights law. The latter, in particular, has influenced the develop­
ment of common law privacy protections in the UK, largely by being incorporated into 
the doctrine of breach of confidence. The point of the chapter is twofold: (a) to give 
a sufficiently broad overview of those parts of the UK legal terrain within which the 
legality of the whereabouts requirements will later be assessed, and (b) to provide the 
historical legal background necessary to, in the subsequent chapter, better appreciate 
the origins of the US legal right to privacy, and its subsequent philosophical and ethical 
developments.
In chapter 4 , 1 turn to the concept of privacy. Because the scholarly philosophical 
and ethical discussion of privacy arose almost exclusively from US legal considerations, 
I begin by charting the development of the legal right to privacy in the US, from the end 
of the nineteenth century onward. Crucially, the 1965 US Supreme Court case Griswold 
v. Connecticut15 established an expansion of this right into new territories. The court 
decision was followed by heated debate—in jurisprudence as well as in philosophy—on 
whether or not the expansion was conceptually defensible. Roughly, privacy scholars 
can still be divided into two general camps on the issue of the proper scope of privacy: 
those who argue for its narrow restriction to personal information and find the Gris­
wold decision conceptually indefensible, and those who are willing to entertain a wider 
range of conceptual reference to include, in addition to cases concerning personal in­
formation, such instances as Griswold. I present the major philosophical accounts in
15381 US 479(1965).
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each of the two camps, and conclude that one of the primary differences between them 
lies in the weight that they accord to common interpretations of privacy
Chapter 5 begins with the acknowledgement that unless one can establish the appro­
priate weights of various elements of a theoretical account of any given phenomenon, 
it will be difficult to determine which of any number of well-developed competing ac­
counts is stronger. For the same reason, resolving the impasse between the proponents 
of narrow and wide accounts of privacy would require some sort of prior methodolog­
ical specification of the weights one ought to accord the various elements of potential 
relevance to those accounts, including reliance on common interpretations of privacy. 
However, this sort of abstraction quickly leads into skeptical self-refutation: by which 
meta-methodological valuations are the relative theoretical element weights themselves 
to be determined? Instead, I propose an ostensibly pragmatic solution: given the diffi­
culty in assessing the strength of different accounts of privacy, and the simultaneous 
need for an account of privacy amenable to policy application, I argue that it is prefer­
able to adopt a view of privacy as an open-ended list of particular sorts of harms to 
the person, of which only a subset will be relevant to any given context invoking pri­
vacy concerns, depending on the underlying values at play in that context. Establishing 
whether or not such contextual privacy harms are acceptable will then depend on an 
appraisal of these underlying values, in order to establish a contextually valid means of 
weighing them against each other.
Chapter 6 seeks to flesh out the sketch of a contextualized account of privacy pro­
vided at the end of chapter 5. More specifically, it consists of a discussion of those pri­
vacy harms and values that pertain directly to the context of elite athlete whereabouts 
requirements (henceforth just “whereabouts context”). While there are a number of po­
tentially relevant harms within the context, the ones that warrant further investigation 
are the harms arising from (a) the unprecedented level of surveillance to which elite 
athletes are subjected; (b) the intrusion suffered by many athletes into their homes and 
personal (non-professional) lives as a direct practical result of the requirements; and 
(c) the potential breaches of confidence of athlete whereabouts information, by ADOs, 
as has been observed in specific instances. As to the underlying values at play in the 
debate on the acceptability or not of the whereabouts requirements, the central con­
tention is identified as one concerning fairness. Proponents of the requirements em ­
phasize fairness between elite athlete competitors, maintaining that the requirements
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are crucial to ensure such fairness, while detractors emphasize fairness between athletes 
and other members of general society, claiming that there are no analogous burdens on 
non-athletes, and that the requirements are therefore not acceptable.
The previous strands of argument are woven together in chapter 7, which answers the 
original research questions: (a) Do WADAs current whereabouts requirements constitute 
a legally acceptable invasion o f the privacy o f elite athletes in the UK? (b) Do WADAs cur­
rent whereabouts requirements constitute an ethically acceptable invasion of the privacy 
of elite athletes generally? In answering the first question, and by looking at those areas 
of UK and European law relevant to the topics of surveillance, intrusion, and breach of 
confidence, I determine the following: (a) the level of surveillance entailed by the where­
abouts requirements directly engages the ECHR right to private and family life, but may 
nevertheless be justifiable in light of international commitments to the importance of 
anti-doping work generally; and (b) the intrusion that the whereabouts requirements 
involve are not compatible with EU law regarding working time restrictions, for those 
athlete to whom the latter applies. Although the issue of breach of confidence would 
be illegal in any instances where it arises, these arguably occur only very rarely at the 
international level, and possibly not yet at all within the UK. In answering the second 
question, I argue that the considerations of different forms of fairness arise to different 
extents in different sports; where there is little or no risk of doping out of competition 
in a certain sport, the justificatory force of fairness between competing athletes is cor­
respondingly low. As a result, I conclude that the whereabouts requirements are not 
ethically acceptable in those instances where the risk of doping out of competition in 
some sport falls below some reasonable threshold value.
Finally, chapter 8 provides a summary overview of the argument presented herein, 
some practical policy recommendations that follow from it, and, finally, a brief account 
of WADAs current and ongoing finalization of its second regulatory review, which will 
ultimately result in a third iteration of its anti-doping rules, to be introduced in 2015. To 
its credit, WADA has seen fit to at least tentatively propose amendments to the where­
abouts requirements that take much of the general thrust of the foregoing into account, 
among other things by allowing less strict whereabouts requirements for those sports 
that do not exhibit a sufficiently high risk of doping out of competition. The exact pro­
cess of the review is, however, not open to scrutiny. As such, although the changes have 
been suggested by WADA itself, it remains to be seen whether or not, or to what extent,
14
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they will actually be implemented in the final version. In the meantime, I point out that 
the current whereabouts requirements remain, at least in specific respects, legally and 
ethically unacceptable.
15
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Pe r f o r m a n c e - e n h a n c i n g  t e c h n o l o g i e s  have a long-standing history of use among humans, within organized sport as well as within other social practices. Over the past century—as sport has grown increasingly popular, widespread, 
and well financed—its various rules and regulations have undergone a significant ex­
pansion in both breadth and depth. Of the many sporting phenomena subject to such 
regulation, few have achieved the same focus, or notoriety, as performance enhance­
ment, particularly in those instances where it is considered illicit, or doping. This drive 
to eliminate doping practices among elite athletes has resulted in the requirement that 
they submit their personal whereabouts information, for every day without exception, 
to their relevant ADOs. While some of the affected athletes consider the requirement to 
be an acceptable burden, as part of the general fight against doping in elite sport, others 
maintain that it constitutes an unacceptable invasion of their privacy.
2.1 The History of Performance Enhancement
The ingestion of various substances to increase strength and aggressiveness, reduce fear, 
and aid in healing and pain relief is widespread in both prehistoric societies and con­
temporary tribal societies.1 This seems to suggest that performance-enhancing tech­
nologies have a history of longstanding and widespread use among humans. Similar
1 For the former, see e.g. Cartmell et al., “The Frequency and Antiquity of Prehistoric Coca-Leaf-Chewing 
Practices in Northern Chile”; Gildenberg, “History of Pain Management,” 439-40; for the latter, see e.g. 
Lehmann and Mihalyi, “Aggression, Bravery, Endurance, and Drugs.”
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indications for those civilizations that offer more complete historical records further 
confirm this conjecture. By the time of the Olympic Games in ancient Greece, for in­
stance, athletes would consume such things as wine, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and 
dried figs, in order to strengthen themselves.2 The gladiators of Rome also relied on 
various substances to fight and recover from injury more efficiently. The Greek-Roman 
physician Galen—whose prominence helped establish humoralism as the dominant 
theory of human physiology for several centuries—for a while treated the injuries of 
gladiators. In his writings, he suggested “Olympic Victors Dark Ointment”—a mixture 
of, among other things, opium, frankincense (containing tetrahydrocannabinol), and 
crocus flowers—for the treatment of pain.3
There are similar claims about various groups from the Middle Ages, such as Viking 
berserkers and medieval knights.4 Although the exact details of some of these state­
ments are questionable,5 the general hypothesis is nevertheless plausible: in warfare, 
as well as in ritualized displays of chivalry and heroism, it was likely commonplace to 
seek to gain an edge against ones opponents by utilizing those performance-enhancing 
technologies available at the time.
2.1.1 Performance Enhancement in the Modern Era
By the time of the first modern high-profile sporting events, during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the practice of relying on performance-enhancing substances 
was standard among athletes. At that time, medical advances had caused widespread 
optimism regarding the possible expansion of human capacities.6 Just prior to the start 
of the century, Edward Jenner successfully utilized cowpox blisters to inoculate patients
2Verroken, “Drug Use and Abuse in Sport,” 1; Moller, The Doping Devil, 30.
3 Bartels, Swaddling, and Harrison, “An Ancient Greek Pain Remedy for Athletes”; Harrison, Hansen, and 
Bartels, “Transdermal Opioid Patches for Pain Treatment in Ancient Greece.”
4For the former, see e.g. Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 91; Parrott et al., Understanding Drugs and Be­
haviour, 3-4; Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in Sport,” 277; for the 
latter, see e.g. Verroken, “Drug Use and Abuse in Sport,” 1; Moller, The Doping Devil, 30; Mazanov and 
McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in Sport,” 277.
5Conclusive evidence for the claim that Viking berserkers ingested armanita muscaria mushrooms to in­
crease their fearlessness and strength is, for instance, altogether lacking; it is instead probably based on 
a popularized myth originating in an entirely hypothetical article: Odman, “Forsok, att utur naturens 
historia forklara de nordiska gamla kampars berserka-gdng.”
6For a general overview of medical development during this period, see Shortt, “Physicians, Science, and 
Status,” esp. 52-54.
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against smallpox. Anesthesia by diethyl ether—at first a source of entertainment at so- 
called ether frolics, where audience members would inhale diethyl ether or nitrous ox­
ide for general amusement—was successfully administered to a patient by US physician 
Crawford Long, for the purpose of a tumor removal, in 1842. Following Louis Pasteurs 
work on micro-organisms and Ignaz Semmelweiss discovery in 1847 that fewer m oth­
ers died of childbed fever if their physicians first cleaned their hands in a chlorinated 
lime solution, Joseph Lister developed the practice of antisepsis, using carbolic acid 
(phenol), in the mid-1860s. These factors, particularly in combination with the devel­
opment of radiology in 1895, helped transform surgery into a credible option for vari­
ous ills. In the years between 1879 and 1884, the bacterial and protist causes of leprosy, 
typhoid, malaria, tuberculosis, diphtheria, cholera, and tetanus were all identified. Ad­
vances of these sorts underlie the gradual move from humoralism to modern cellular 
pathology.7
Within sport, this general medical optimism was reflected in the grueling endurance 
races of the day, including canal swimming and multi-day foot and bicycle races.8 The 
competitors would openly ingest all manner of substances believed to enhance perfor­
mance, ranging from Vtn Mariani—a mixture of wine and coca leaves—through caf­
feine and pure oxygen to ether, nitroglycerine, cocaine, heroin, and strychnine.9 There 
were few concerns about the potentially deleterious side effects; most athletes viewed 
performance-enhancing substances merely as “pharmacological antifatigue therapy.”10 
English cyclist Arthur Linton, protege of infamous cycling manager “Choppy” War- 
burton, is often credited as the first doping fatality. The historical evidence, however, 
seems to indicate that he died of a fever at his own home, in 1886 or 1896 depending 
on the source.11 It has never been determined whether the “magic potions” Warbur- 
ton provided to his racers during competitions were performance-enhancing or merely 
showmanship on his behalf. Other cases are, however, more certain. UK athlete Thomas 
Hicks came close to death after almost collapsing numerous times during the marathon
7Ibid., 53.
8The latter included such feats as racing 585 km in twenty-four hours (Charles Terront in 1891) and com­
pleting 3,073 miles in six days of unlimited riding (Teddy Hale in 1896), as per Moller, The Doping Devil, 
198n4.
9M0ller, The Doping Devil, 30-31; Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in 
Sport,” 277.
10Hoberman, “Putting Doping Into Context,” 11.
n Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 91; Moller, The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping, 34-35.
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race at the 1904 St. Louis Olympics, only to be revived by injections of strychnine from 
his assistants. Although he fainted after crossing the finishing line, he recovered and 
went on to receive a gold medal for his feat.12 Four years later, at the London Olympics, 
Italian athlete Sorando Pietri was less fortunate, losing out on the first place prize as a 
result of being carried over the finishing line by his fans, after collapsing due to strych­
nine ingestion.13
Not all athletes were content with this situation. At the 1923 Tour de France, racing 
brothers Henri and Francis Pelissier complained to the press about the extent of their 
dependence on performance-enhancing substances:
D o you want to see what we run on? Look. ... That’s cocaine for the eyes; that’s 
chloroform for the gums. ...  That is a cream to warm up m y knees. And the pills, 
do you want to see the pills? ... In short, we run on “dynamite.”14
There was also skepticism from some sporting organizations, as reflected in the ar­
guably first prohibition against athlete doping, by the International Association of Ath­
letics Federations (IAAF), from 1928:15
D oping is the use o f  any stimulant not norm ally em ployed to increase the poser o f  
action in athletic com petition above the average. Any person knowingly acting or 
assisting as explained above shall be excluded from any place where these rules are 
in force or, if  he is a competitor, be suspended for a tim e or otherwise from further 
participation in amateur athletics under the jurisdiction o f  this Federation.16
Conceptual weakness apart, this prohibition had little effect on use of performance- 
enhancing substances by athletes, not least because there were no reliable anti-doping 
systems, or corresponding detection procedures, in place at the time.17 And the discov­
eries and syntheses of increasingly efficient substances for performance enhancement 
only compounded this situation.
12 Verroken, “Drug Use and Abuse in Sport,” 2; Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science 
of Drugs in Sport,” 277; Moller, The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping, 35.
13Moller, The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping, 35.
14As quoted in ibid., 36.
15Note however that doping seems to have been banned in horse races, primarily to protect gamblers from 
the uncertainty doping introduced into their betting calculations, as early as 1903, with testing occurring 
from 1910 onwards, as per Verroken, “Drug Use and Abuse in Sport,” 2.
16As quoted in Brown, IAAF Medical Manual, ch. 15, p. 1.
17Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in Sport,” 277.
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The US chemist Fred Koch laid the groundwork in 1927 for the development of syn­
thetic testosterone in 1935.18 The 1930s and 1940s also saw the development and large- 
scale production of amphetamines. Due to their ability to combat fatigue and enhance 
awareness, they were provided to soldiers and pilots among both the Allied Forces and 
the Axis States during World War II, a state of affairs that seems to have normalized 
attitudes toward their use in sport.19 It was not until after the war that the general en­
thusiasm for this sort of pharmacological performance enhancement started coming 
under serious question.
2.1.2 The Rise of Anti-Doping Sentiment
Over the last century, sporting events have attracted increasing commercial interests, 
resulting in, among other things, larger prize rewards and greater publicity for the win­
ners. Where the drive to excel in sport has successively obtained greater spectator in­
terest, corporations have utilized sponsorship opportunities to simultaneously increase 
brand awareness and help fund the means of the sport to reach out to ever larger num ­
bers of spectators. High-profile sporting events are today not only an opportunity for 
athletes to attain or maintain national or local sporting pride, but also a prime mar­
keting opportunity for large corporations. A similar strategy also applies to top-level 
elite athletes, who are commonly seen both inside and outside the sporting context en­
dorsing or using some product or service. Lucrative income from such endorsements 
presumably constitutes a highly attractive opportunity for many athletes, and is likely 
to figure, at least incidentally, as an additional reason to seek to attain sporting glory.20
The increasing goods at stake for the winners—in addition to the increasingly so­
phisticated technological tools that can be utilized to more accurately determine win­
ners in terms of millimeters or milliseconds—have contributed to the development of 
increasingly refined and specific rules and regulations for different sports.21 This de­
velopment is spurred on by the general sentiment that sporting competitions ought to 
be testing certain athlete skills rather than others. Dedication to the sport is, generally,
18Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 92-93.
19Dimeo, “The Origins of Anti-Doping Policy in Sports,” 33-34.
20Cf. Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in Sport, 71-73; as well as the first three contri­
butions to part 6, “Commercialism, Corruption and Exploitation in Sports,” in McNamee, The Ethics of 
Sports.
21 Cf. Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in Sport, 68-71.
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valued higher than access to technological training assistance. Hard work and toil, to 
seek to achieve the composition that makes a win possible, are valued over what might 
be deemed shortcuts to the same goal, such as relying on certain forms of performance- 
enhancing substances.22
As a result, various stipulations are now implemented as to, for instance, the precise 
dimensions and materials allowed for different sorts of sporting equipment. One re­
cent example of this is the decision by the International Swimming Federation (FINA) 
to specify those body parts that may be covered by swimsuits, and the materials permit­
ted in swimsuits at swimming competitions, in addition to stipulating that “all FINA 
approved swimwear ... must be available for all competitors by 1st January of the year 
of the Olympic Games or FINA World Championships.”23
The rules and regulations regarding performance-enhancing technologies have seen 
analogous developments over the past few decades. The perceived need for this is un­
derscored not only by the historical evidence that athletes have long been willing to uti­
lize whatever means were at their disposal to improve performance, but also by more 
contemporary research supporting the view that the will to win is sufficiently powerful 
to be potentially subversive. Many athletes, for instance, express a strong hypothetical 
willingness to trade several years off their life spans in return for significant improve­
ments in their athletic results.24 Such a state of affairs makes it reasonable to assume 
that athletes might be tempted to use whatever performance-enhancing technologies 
they are allowed to, or that they believe they can get away with.
The post-war period provides additional confirmation for such a view. As newer 
performance-enhancing substances like testosterone and amphetamine became more 
widely available, there was a sharp increase in their use among athletes.25 Athletes were 
also quick to begin utilizing Dianabol, the first commercially produced anabolic steroid, 
as soon as it became available on the market in 1958.26
22Waddington and Smith suggest that the traditional English custom of placing wagers on sporting out­
comes may have served as a strong underlying motivation for these sorts of value-judgments, as per 
Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in Sport, 36-38.
23FINA, By Laws 2009-2013, § BL8.
24Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 88-89 ,91-92 .
25Houlihan, Dying to Win, 34-35; Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in 
Sport,” 278.
26Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 93-94.
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At the same time, the post-war period was characterized by a general and gradual 
move away from the almost unbridled medical enthusiasm of the previous generations. 
The research of physiologist and epidemiologist Richard Doll, which linked tobacco 
smoking to lung cancer, highlighted the serious potential health effects of regularly us­
ing certain substances.27 As a result of these sorts of discoveries, US doctors began ques­
tioning the health benefits of, among other things, amphetamines, particularly where 
they feared that their introduction to college-level and other younger athletes might 
have subsequent wide negative social implications.28 This sort of view gained impor­
tant traction as doubts about recreational drug use by non-athletes grew, culminating 
in US President Nixons declaration of the “War on Drugs” in 1971.29
In the world of sport, the death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen in 1960 served as a 
dramatic indication to the public that doping by elite athletes constituted a serious prob­
lem. Jensen collapsed during the one hundred km bicycle race at the Summer Olympics 
in Rome, ostensibly due to heat stroke, although his collapse has been blamed on am­
phetamine so many times since then that the story has almost taken on the status of 
legend.30 No substantial evidence seems to support the amphetamine charge, although 
it likely contributed to the eventual passing, in 1967, of the CE Resolution on the Dop­
ing of Athletes (67/12), an event that signaled the beginning of modern anti-doping 
legislation.
After English cyclist Tommy Simpson died in the middle of the televised 1967 Tour 
de France, with post mortem traces of amphetamine in his blood, the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC)—having done little more than publicly denounce doping 
during the previous years—began implementing systematic doping tests. The 1972 Mu­
nich Olympics saw extensive testing for the first time, resulting in seven positive tests 
for the likes of ephedrine and amphetamine.31
Anabolic steroids were, however, still not on the anti-doping radar at the time, due 
as much to a lack of knowledge among anti-doping officials about its widespread use 
as to medical disagreement on whether or not it actually provided any performance- 
enhancing effects.32 Nor were there any reliable tests for the detection of blood doping.
27Dimeo, “The Origins of Anti-Doping Policy in Sports,” 32.
28Ibid., 34-35.
29Hoberman, “Putting Doping Into Context.”
3OM0ller, The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping, 37-42.
31 Mazanov and McDermott, “The Case for a Social Science of Drugs in Sport,” 279.
32Todd, “Anabolic Steroids,” 96-97.
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This lacuna was exploited by various actors in sport, including the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). Due to systematic and forced doping of athletes, beginning in the late 
1960s and continuing until the collapse of the country in 1989, the GDR was able to 
secure a disproportionate number of Olympic and world medals, given the size of its 
population.33
Additionally, many saw the IOC as incapable of backing their anti-doping rhetoric 
with sufficient action. The time period 1968-96 saw fifty-three positive doping tests 
during the various Olympic Games, out of approximately 15,400 tests performed,34 
despite acknowledgement from numerous athletes about the endemic proportions of 
various forms of doping. The president of the IOC during the period 1980-2001, Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, is widely credited with having successfully commercialized the 
Olympic Games. Others have, however, raised concerns over his seeming inability to 
implement effective doping control. John Hoberman goes as far as accusing Samaranch 
of viewing doping as “primarily a public relations problem that threatened lucrative 
television and corporate contracts that are now worth billions of dollars,” maintaining 
that his leadership resulted in “an almost total commercializing of the Olympic Games,” 
which contributed to converting the Olympic movement “into an advertising vehicle 
for the multinational corporate sponsors and American television networks that are 
the foundation of his power.”35
This general state of affairs changed dramatically when a soigneur (massage thera­
pist and assistant) to the Festina cycling team at the 1998 Tour de France was caught by 
French customs officials with large quantities of EPO and anabolic steroids in the trunk 
of his car. The discovery triggered further investigations and police searches, which in 
turn led to team personnel arrests, negative media publicity, a flurry of doping confes­
sions by various riders, and an unprecedented amount of withdrawals of teams from 
the race, leaving its reputation shattered.36 The situation saw significant involvement 
from politicians intent on tackling the issue of doping in elite sport.37 And to the gen­
eral public, it made clear, for perhaps the first time, the truly endemic nature of doping 
practices in, at least, professional cycling.
33 See Spitzer, “A Leninist Monster”; Spitzer, “Sport and the Systematic Infliction of Pain.”
34IOC, Factsheet, 2.
35Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 242,245; see also Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs 
in Sport, 181-82.
36Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in Sport, 132.
37Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 264-65.
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As a direct result of the Festina scandal, and in an attempt to counter its declin­
ing image, the IOC convened a “World Conference on Doping in Sport” in Lausanne, 
Switzerland February 2-4, 1999.38 The resulting Lausanne Declaration on Doping in 
Sport called for the creation of an “independent international anti-doping agency,” with 
the objective to harmonize the various anti-doping rules and standards in place at the 
time.39 As a result, on November 10,1999, WADA was formed.
2.2 The World Anti-Doping Agency
WADA is composed in equal parts of representatives from the sporting movement and 
from world governments. Its stated mission is to “promote, coordinate and monitor 
the fight against doping in sport in all its forms.”40 The mission is explicated in its core 
defining document, the World Anti-Doping Code (hereafter WADC), originally imple­
mented in 2004 (hereafter WADC1), and revised and re-implemented in 2009 (hereafter 
WADC2). Identified as “fundamental and universal” to WADAs approach, the stated 
purpose of the WADC is to “advance the anti-doping effort through universal harm o­
nization of core anti-doping elements,” by being “specific enough to achieve complete 
harmonization on issues where uniformity is required, yet general enough in other ar­
eas to permit flexibility on how agreed-upon anti-doping principles are implemented.”41 
The WADC  contains stipulations on, among other things, the roles and responsibilities 
of different ADOs and governments in undertaking anti-doping work. These are fur­
ther detailed in the supplemental and mandatory International Standards (such as the 
International Standard for Testing, hereafter 1ST; and the International Standard for the 
Protection o f Privacy and Personal Information, hereafter ISPPPI), as well as various 
non-mandatory, but by WADA recommended, “Models of Best Practice and Guide­
lines.”42
WADA is responsible for the universal harmonization and implementation of its 
anti-doping policy, but does not normally undertake practical anti-doping work, such
38 For a general overview of these developments, see Waddington and Smith, An Introduction to Drugs in 
Sport, ch. 10.
39IOC, Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport, § 4.
40WADA, About WADA.
41 WADA, W ADC2,11.
42Ibid., 12-13.
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as anti-doping testing or athlete education, itself. These sorts of responsibilities instead 
fall on the various ADOs, which WADA defines as those “organizations responsible for 
adopting, implementing or enforcing anti-doping rules within their authority”; a list 
that includes the IOC, the International Paralympic Committee, major sporting event 
organizations, International Federations (IFs), and National Anti-Doping Organiza­
tions (NADOs).43 The two most important for present purposes—insofar as they bear 
the responsibility for monitoring athlete whereabouts in accordance with the WADC— 
are IFs and NADOs. An IF is the global governing body of a specific sport or disci­
pline, responsible for, among other things, creating the rules of the sport, and orga­
nizing global or regional championships within it. A NADO is an entity recognized by 
a country as “possessing the primary authority and responsibility to adopt and imple­
ment anti-doping rules, direct the collection of Samples, the management of test results, 
and the conduct of hearings” at a national or regional level.44 As far as anti-doping work 
is concerned, the jurisdictions of IFs and NADOs can overlap; elite athletes competing 
at an international level will belong to both the IF of their relevant sport and the NADO 
of their relevant country or region.
WADAs general anti-doping efforts, and the WADC in particular, receive a large 
part of their moral mandate from the existence of various international anti-doping 
agreements and declarations, dating back to the 1967 CE Resolution on the Doping 
of Athletes. The most important among these include the 2003 WADA Copenhagen 
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport, and the 2005 UNESCO International Conven­
tion against Doping in Sport. The Copenhagen Declaration—which has been ratified 
by 193 countries worldwide—was drafted and agreed to by governments as a first po­
litical step toward a globally harmonized anti-doping policy framework. The UNESCO 
Convention—which came into force in 2007 and has so far been ratified by 164 coun­
tries worldwide—seeks to ensure this, with a stated purpose of promoting “the preven­
tion of and the fight against doping in sport, with a view to its elimination.”45 To this 
effect, the Convention stipulates the following for all contracting states:
States Parties com m it them selves to the principles o f  the [W ADC] as the basis for 
the [adoption o f  appropriate anti-doping measures, such as legislation, regulation,
43WADA, W ADC2,16.
44 Ibid., 131.
45 International Convention against Doping in Sport, art. 1.
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policies or administrative practices]. N othing in this Convention prevents States 
Parties from adopting additional measures com plem entary to the [ WADC] ,46
WADAs 2009 WADC2 contains explicit reference to the UNESCO Convention, re­
quiring each government to “take all actions and measures necessary to comply with 
[it].”47 Failure to do so has important potential consequences:
Failure ...  to com ply w ith the [UNESCO Convention] ... may result in ineligibil­
ity to bid for Events ...  and m ay result in additional consequences, e.g. forfeiture o f  
offices and positions w ithin WADA; ineligibility or non-adm ission o f  any candi­
dature to hold any International Event in a country, cancellation o f  International 
Events; sym bolic consequences and other consequences pursuant to the Olym pic 
Charter.48
In addition to this sort of pressure on governments to comply with the stipulations 
of the WADC, WADA also requires governments to “respect arbitration as the preferred 
means of resolving doping-related disputes.”49 Such arbitration occurs most often at the 
level of the individual ADO, in deciding on appropriate sanctions for an athlete found 
to have committed an anti-doping rule violation. Where an athlete disagrees with a fi­
nal ruling, there is a possibility of appealing the ruling to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS). CAS—which was founded in 1984 as a result of the increasing number 
of international sports-related disputes—provides an “arbitral jurisdiction devoted to 
resolving disputes directly or indirectly related to sport.”50 It is independent of govern­
ments and sporting organizations, and generally considered the court of last resort for 
sport cases.
Although WADA has no direct influence over CAS, the latter have consistently up­
held the legitimacy of WADA and its WADC in the majority of doping cases heard at 
the court in recent years.51 In addition, WADA reserves the right to, at any time, ap­
peal the final decisions of any ADO directly to CAS, regardless of whether or not the 
ADO’s internal arbitration mechanisms have been exhausted, as many of those cases 
demonstrate.52
46Ibid., §§ 4-5 .
47WADA, WADC2, § 22.1.
48Ibid., § 22.6.
49Ibid., § 22.3.
50 CAS, History.
51See e.g. WADA v. FILA 2008/A/1470 (CAS); WADA v. Pakistan Cricket Board 2006/A/1190 (CAS).
52 WADA, WADC2, §13.1.1.
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Since the inception of WADA, there have been numerous high-profile doping ex­
posures. In 2003, for instance, the US Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) began investi­
gating Victor Conte—the founder and owner of the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative 
(BALCO)—as the result of an anonymous phone call naming Conte as the source of the 
steroid tetrahydrogestrinone (THG). The anonymous tip—which later turned out to be 
from Trevor Graham, former sprint coach of, among others, Marion Jones—was fol­
lowed by the delivery of a syringe containing THG, for which there were no detection 
procedures at the time (and which had therefore earned it the nickname “the Clear” 
among those aware of its existence). A testing procedure for THG was quickly devel­
oped, and USADA proceeded to retest a large amount of athlete samples taken at previ­
ous competitions. This resulted in a number of positive tests for several athletes, includ­
ing UK sprinter Dwain Chambers, who was subsequently sanctioned with a two-year 
ban from athletics.53
Similarly, Spanish police began an operation, codenamed Operation Puerto, against 
Spanish doctor Eufemiano Fuentes in 2006. Upon raiding his clinic in Madrid, they 
found blood bags and lists of elite athletes from various different sports. Among others, 
the lists named cyclists Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso, who were subsequently excluded 
from the 2006 Tour de France prior to its start, despite being generally considered fa­
vorites to win.54 During the race itself, American rider Floyd Landis did well until the 
sixteenth stage, where he lost a full eight minutes. During the seventeenth stage, the very 
next day, he regained the loss with a sudden burst of energy. His subsequent doping test, 
which was not revealed until after the race had completed and Landis had been declared 
the winner of the 2006 Tour, showed that he had elevated levels of testosterone.55 As a 
result, Landis was dismissed from his team, stripped of his Tour victory, and banned 
from cycling for two years. Although initially maintaining his innocence and appeal­
ing against the decision, he confessed in 2010 to doping for most of his professional 
career, through the use of such performance-enhancing technologies as EPO, testos­
terone, human growth hormone, and blood doping, along with “female hormones and 
a one-time experiment with insulin.”56 Additionally, Landis implicated several other
53Kimball and Dure, BALCO Investigation Timeline.
54Moller, The Scapegoat, 15.
55 Ibid., 16-17.
56 Ford, Landis Admits Doping, Accuses Lance.
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riders as having doped, including his former teammate Lance Armstrong.57 As a result, 
WADA promised to investigate the allegations:
W ADA is aware o f  the serious allegations m ade by Mr. Landis. We are very in ­
terested in learning m ore about this matter and we w ill liaise with [USADA] and 
any other authorities with appropriate jurisdiction to get to the heart o f  the issues 
raised. W ADA looks forward to these further investigations and enquiries by those 
responsible.58
Armstrong, who had won the Tour a record seven consecutive times during the years 
1999-2005, had long been dogged by doping accusations, although he never had a pos­
itive doping test recorded against him. As a result of numerous eye witness testimonials 
from former teammates, such as Landis, USADA in 2012 nevertheless stripped Arm­
strong of all his competitive results from 1998 to present, and imposed a lifetime ban 
from cycling on him.59 At first, he chose not to contest the sanctions: “There comes a 
point in every mans life when he has to say, ‘Enough is enough.’ ... For me, that time is 
now.”60 Then, in January 2013, Armstrong confessed in a television interview to doping 
during his full run of Tour de France victories.61 The extent to which these revelations 
will affect the future of the Tour remain to be seen.
2.2.1 Whereabouts
Although in-competition testing forms an important part of anti-doping monitoring 
activities, WADA views out-of-competition testing as central to its success. Insofar as 
“a number of prohibited substances and methods are detectable only for a limited pe­
riod of time in an athletes body while maintaining a performance-enhancing effect,” 
WADA views out-of-competition testing as “at the core of effective Doping Control” 
and “one of the most powerful means of deterrence and detection of doping.”62 This 
view is an extension of the call for the creation of an international anti-doping agency 
in the Lausanne Declaration, which maintained that “consideration should be given in 
particular to expanding out-of-competition testing”63
57 Ibid.
58 As quoted in ibid.
59Macur, Armstrong Drops Fight against Doping Charges.
60 Ibid.
61 BBC, Lance Armstrong Admits Doping to Win Cycling Titles.
62 WADA, WADC1, 29; WADA, Questions and Answers on Whereabouts.
63IOC, Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport, § 4.
29
2. D o p in g  a n d  A n t i - D o p in g
For out-of-competition testing to be effective, it is important for an ADO to not 
only know where athletes are, but also to be able to test them at those times during 
which they would be most likely to use any prohibited technologies. To overcome the 
practical limitations of this, WADA included whereabouts requirements in its original 
WADC1, with supplements, in 2003 (implemented in 2004). These detailed the obliga­
tions of AD Os to monitor the whereabouts of their top-level elite athletes, as well as the 
obligations of the athletes to report their whereabouts to their relevant ADOs.
Prior to considering whereabouts specifically, all ADOs were required to undertake 
a general evaluation of the potential risk of doping in each sport or discipline, as based 
on various considerations such as the physical demands of the sport or discipline, any 
available and relevant doping statistics or research about doping trends within it, and 
the relevant training periods and competition seasons.64 This would then be used as 
the basis for a test distribution plan, in order to ensure that the available resources for 
testing were allocated in the most efficient manner possible. The plan, to be continu­
ously updated to take account of any relevant changes, would also need to consider the 
specific case of each individual athlete within the ADO s testing jurisdiction, in order 
to ensure that testing was focused primarily on those athletes exhibiting behavior that 
could indicate an increased risk or pattern of doping.65
As regards whereabouts, all ADOs were required to establish a registered testing pool 
(RTP) of athletes, who would, in virtue of their inclusion in the RTP, be subject to the full 
whereabouts requirements. At a minimum, IFs were required to include in their RTPs 
all athletes who “compete at a high level of international competition,” while NADOs 
were required to include all athletes who were “part of national teams in Olympic and 
Paralympic sports and recognised national federations.”66 The ADOs were tasked with 
setting the exact sport-specific threshold criteria by which to implement this mandate, 
in order to ensure that the focus for out-of-competition testing would fall on the higher 
echelons of athletes within any given sport.67
The whereabouts obligations for those athletes who were included in an RTP were, 
to a large extent, determined by their respective ADOs. Although WADAs WADC1
64WADA, IST1, § 4.5.
65 Ibid., § 4.6.
66WADA, WADC1, § 5.1.1; WADA, IST1, § 4.3.1.
67WADA, W ADC1,77.
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included stipulations on certain minimum “accurate, current location information”— 
more specifically: name, sport, home address, contact phone numbers, training times 
and venues, training camps, travel plans, competition schedule, and disability where 
applicable—that the athletes had to provide to their relevant ADOs, it left it up to the 
individual ADOs to “define procedures and/or systems” for how to collect, maintain, 
and monitor athlete whereabouts information.68 It also granted the ADOs the right to 
decide, “based on reasonable rules,” what would constitute a missed test, and how many 
whereabouts filing failures or missed tests would constitute an anti-doping rule viola­
tion.69 WADA furthermore allowed significant freedom to the ADOs in determining 
and implementing proper sanctions for whereabouts rule failures, ranging from three 
months to two years’ ineligibility, at the ADOs discretion.70 This flexibility was, osten­
sibly, due to the “varying circumstances encountered in different sports and countries,” 
and needed to be developed by each ADO in correspondence with the initial doping 
risk evaluation they would have undertaken for each sport.71
2.2.2 Whereabouts Criticism
The original whereabouts requirements received significant media exposure in the wake 
of high-profile cases of whereabouts filing failures, such as those of Greek sprinters Ka­
terina Thanou and Kostas Kenteris, who were subsequently excluded from the 2004 
Athens Olympic Games, and Danish cyclist Michael Rasmussen, who had his team 
contract cancelled due to whereabouts failures while in the yellow jersey at the 2007 
Tour de France (more on which in chapters 6 and 7).72 Despite such instances arguably 
demonstrating the need for the system, the requirements nevertheless faced consid­
erable criticism. A 2006 survey of 236 Norwegian elite athletes on various aspects of 
WADAs anti-doping regulations clearly showed this.73 Anonymous comments detail­
ing the harshness of the whereabouts requirements included the view that the fact that
68WADA, IST1, §§ 4.4, 14.3.
69WADA, WADC1, § 2.4.
70Ibid., § 10.4.3.
71 Ibid., 11.
72BBC, Greek Duo Out of Olympics; BBC, Leader Rasmussen Pulled from Tour.
73Hanstad and Loland, “Elite Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information On Their Whereabouts”; Hanstad, 
Skille, and Thurston, “Elite Athletes’ Perspectives on Providing Whereabouts Information”; a similar sur­
vey was undertaken in the UK in 2007, with highly similar results—for details, see Waddington, “Surveil­
lance and Control in Sport,” 260-61.
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athletes “can risk exclusion because of this system” was “reprehensible,” and the per­
sonal experience of having “received written warnings for forgetting to update twice,” 
and feeling, “after I received the letter, almost like a doping sinner”74 As part of the 
same study, an Olympic medalist expressed the following sentiment:
It is a system that is based on everyone being sinners. It is created by people with  
good  intentions and a decent goal, but they m iss com pletely and abuse their power 
in  a way that in n o  other dem ocratic organ than sports would ever achieve ap­
proval. Systems like these belong in very different political systems than that which  
is called democracy.75
Swedish heptathlon athlete Carolina Kliift expressed similar sentiments in a news­
paper interview in 2006. There, she maintained that it took her “hours” to complete her 
whereabouts filings, and that it was “impossible as a human” to subsequently remem­
ber what she had registered in the filing, if she would need to make any changes. Half 
jokingly, she suggested having a chip operated into her arm as a feasible alternative:
Give me a chip and 1*11 operate it into m y arm. You can have m e on GPS, som e 
bloody computer where you can see m e all the time. The doping control officials 
know  where I am anyway, so for m e its  not a big deal if  they also know when I go 
to the bathroom. Given the am ount o f  tim e and worry I spend on making sure not 
to miss any controls, I’d rather have had it that way.76
In addition to these concerns, over one third of the surveyed Norwegian athletes 
stated that it had occurred that they had not been able to update their whereabouts in­
formation due to technical problems.77 Approximately one in five expressed a lack of 
confidence in the technological implementation of the whereabouts system, and more 
than 11 percent claimed that they had received a written warning regarding their where­
abouts as a result of a technical problem.78 One participant gave a particularly illustra­
tive comment on this:
The system for registration is not good  enough. I have experienced approximately 
5 -1 0  tim es during the last year that the login on the web does not work. SMS is
74Hanstad and Loland, “Elite Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information On Their Whereabouts,” 6.
75 Ibid., 7.
76Roos, Operera in ett chip i mig, authors translation from Swedish.
77Hanstad, Skille, and Thurston, “Elite Athletes’ Perspectives on Providing Whereabouts Information,” 39.
78Ibid., 38.
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problematic to send from abroad. It is difficult to reach people to register over the 
phone because o f  opening hours, breaks and m eetings.79
In addition to this sort of criticism, the flexibility inherent in the whereabouts system 
resulted in a lack of standardization that many, WADA included, found problematic. 
Where, for instance, two ADOs (such as an IF and a NADO) might have testing ju­
risdiction over the same athletes, it could be that they would not be able to agree on 
whether or not, or to what extent, an athlete ought to be subject to sanctions, due to 
differing stipulations regarding whereabouts filing failures, missed tests, and appropri­
ate sanction lengths. This could lead to a situation where the same athlete might be 
sanctioned by one ADO, but not by another, resulting in inconsistent rulings regard­
ing competition eligibility. Similarly, two athletes from the same country, both guilty 
of the same sort of whereabouts filing failures or missed tests, could receive sanctions 
of different lengths, due to the specific whereabouts stipulations of their respective IFs, 
which many athletes found unfair.80
As a result, and after a lengthy consultation process, WADA implemented revised 
whereabouts requirements with the new version of the WADC, which came into effect 
on January 2009. It represents an effort by WADA to harmonize the various previously 
instantiated whereabouts rules across the board into one central piece of regulation. 
This second version, the IST2, underwent minor further revisions in 2011, which were 
implemented in 2012.81
2.3 Current Whereabouts Requirements
WADAs revised whereabouts requirements include definitions of precisely what con­
stitutes an anti-doping rule violation in relation to whereabouts and missed tests, and 
what potential sanctions can be applied in such cases. Their general form, however, still
79Hanstad, Skille, and Thurston, “Elite Athletes’ Perspectives on Providing Whereabouts Information,” 39; 
see also Hanstad, “Governance and the Whereabouts System,” for an enlightening discussion on the issue, 
with further sources.
80Hanstad and Loland, “Elite Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information On Their Whereabouts,” 4-5; WADA, 
IST3,42; WADA, Questions and Answers on Whereabouts; see also the various resources at WADA, Code 
Review - Archives, generally, for an exhaustive overview of the commentary received by WADA in drafting 
their 2009 version of the WADC.
81 Although I reference the third version, IST3, in what follows, the wording and status of all the elements 
of interest herein are identical between the 2009IST2 and the 2012IST3.
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follows the original WADC1 and IST1, obliging ADOs to undertake a doping risk eval­
uation for each sport or discipline under their jurisdiction and to create and maintain 
a corresponding RTP of athletes subject to the full whereabouts requirements, as well 
as obliging the athletes themselves to submit specific whereabouts information to their 
relevant ADO.
The new requirements stipulate that an ADO s test distribution plan should still con­
sist of “a considered evaluation of the risk of doping and possible doping pattern for 
the sport/discipline/nation in question,” on the basis of the same criteria as previously 
(i.e. the physical demands of a sport, relevant doping statistics or research about doping 
trends, and relevant training periods and competition seasons), with additional consid­
eration of the “history of doping in the sport and/or discipline,” and any “information 
received on possible doping practices.”82 Furthermore, the new rules explicitly stipulate 
how this doping risk evaluation should help guide the allocation of testing resources for 
each ADO, rather than leaving it to the interpretation of the ADO, as previously:
In sports and/or disciplines with a high risk o f  doping O ut-of-Com petition, Out- 
of-C om petition Testing shall be m ade a priority, and a substantial portion o f Test­
ing shall be conducted O ut-of-C om petition. However, som e material amount o f  
In-C om petition Testing shall still take place. For those sports and/or disciplines 
where there is a low  risk o f  doping O ut-of-C om petition, In-Com petition Testing 
shall be m ade a priority, and a significant am ount o f  Testing shall be conducted  
In-C om petition. However, som e material am ount o f  O ut-of-C om petition Testing 
shall still take place.83
This sort of test distribution planning still allows a certain degree of flexibility for 
the ADOs. A NADO is, for instance, not required to include in their RTP athletes from 
those sports or disciplines with a sufficiently low risk of doping, in order to instead focus 
their testing resources on those sports or disciplines with a higher risk of doping.84 Note, 
however, that where such athletes compete at a sufficiently high international level, they 
will nevertheless be subject to WADAs whereabouts requirements in virtue of being part 
of their IF s RTP. All ADOs, both NADOs and IFs, are required to create and maintain 
an RTP of those athletes competing at a sufficiently high sport-relative level to be made 
subject to the whereabouts requirements, and all ADOs are further required to ensure
82WADA, IST3, §§ 4.3.1-4.3.2.
83 Ibid., §§ 4.3.5-4.3.6.
84Ibid., § 4.4.4.
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that at least some of their testing is performed out-of-competition, as per the above 
quote, regardless of a sport’s particular doping risk profile.
The specific stipulations regarding an ADO s criteria for selecting which athletes to 
include in their RTP are also more extensive than in the original rules. ADOs are now 
required to make their respective criteria public, along with an up-to-date list of those 
athletes included in their RTP on the basis of those criteria.85 The criteria—and, subse­
quently, the number of athletes in an ADOs RTP—will differ from sport to sport. But 
at a minimum, each IF is expected to include in their RTP all athletes who “compete 
regularly at the highest level of international competition (e.g. candidates for Olympic, 
Paralympic or World Championship medals), determined by rankings or other suit­
able criteria, ’’while each NADO is expected to include in their RTP all athletes who 
have been included in the RTP of their IFs, or who “perform at Olympic/Paralympic or 
World Championship level and may be selected for such events.”86 In addition, ADOs 
with jurisdiction over team sports may choose to define the criteria for inclusion in 
their RTP by reference to teams, rather than to individual athletes (although the latter 
are still responsible for ensuring both that their in-team and away-from-team where­
abouts are correctly filed). Note also that these are merely the minimum requirements 
WADA levies against ADOs—the latter are allowed to develop more and broader athlete 
testing pools than just the RTP, where the affected athletes are then subject to stricter 
or “lesser” whereabouts requirements, as befits the situation.87
In addition to this allocation of testing resources within an RTP, WADA also requires 
ADOs to develop a strategy for determining which individual athletes to subject to no 
advance notice out-of-competition doping tests. For this purpose, WADA recommends 
a combination of random selection, weighted random selection (where the chance of an 
athlete being randomly selected is made to correspond to some pre-determined ranking 
criteria), and target testing.88 Although all three methods are viable, the WADC2 stip­
ulates that the latter is to be made a “priority.”89 Target testing is testing “based on the 
intelligent assessment of the risks of doping and the most effective use of resources to 
ensure optimum detection and deterrence.”90 This is to be established by any of a num-
85Ibid.,§ 11.2.
86Ibid., 45.
87Ibid., 43.
88Ibid., § 4.4.
89WADA, WADC2f § 5.1.3.
90WADA, IST3, § 4.4.2.
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ber of different factors, including physiological (such as abnormal blood parameters or 
injury), behavioral (such as going into or coming out of retirement, withdrawing from 
expected competitions, or the submission of whereabouts information that indicates a 
risk of doping), historical (such as sudden major performance improvements, moves 
from junior to senior level, or prior doping test results), and environmental (such as 
important financial incentives, association with third parties with a history of involve­
ment in doping, or reliable information from other parties).91
The whereabouts requirements for athletes stipulate that all athletes who are chosen 
by their relevant ADO for inclusion in the latter s RTP—and are therefore subject to the 
requirements—must make a whereabouts filing with their ADO prior to each annual 
quarter. The filing must contain, among other things, the following:
1. A complete mailing address.
2. The consent of the athletes to the sharing of their whereabouts information with 
other ADOs with the authority to test them.
3. For each day of the subsequent quarter, the full residential address of the athletes 
(at home, at hotels, etc.).
4. For each day of the subsequent quarter, the name and address of every location 
used by the athletes for regular activities (training, work, school, etc.), as well as 
the expected time-frames for those activities.
5. For the subsequent quarter, the athletes’ competition schedule.92
In addition to this, the rules also require the athlete to specify, for the subsequent 
quarter, “one specific 60-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day where 
the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location.”93 This re­
quirement does not preclude the possibility of testing between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., it 
merely relieves athletes of the possibility of being charged with a missed test during that 
time period, or indeed any time period outside the specified sixty minutes.94
91 WADA, IST3, § 4.4.2.
92Ibid.,§ 11.3.1.
93Ibid., § 11.3.2.
94Ibid.,§ 11.4.
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There are various ways in which an athlete may fall foul of these rules. Particularly 
egregious instances, such as an athlete knowingly supplying fraudulent whereabouts 
information, may be considered under doping violation headings other than where­
abouts, like sample evasion, or tampering or attempted tampering with a doping con­
trol.95 Most will, however, fall under the whereabouts rubric, according to which any 
three whereabouts failures within an eighteen-month period (starting from the date of 
the first whereabouts failure) constitute an anti-doping rule violation, and result in a 
subsequent suspension of the athlete for a time period of between one and two years, 
depending on the athletes “degree of fault.”96
A whereabouts failure is defined as either a missed test or a filing failure. A missed 
test only concerns an athletes daily sixty-minute time slot, as already noted. It applies 
to any instance where a doping control officer is unable to locate the athlete for testing 
during the time slot, despite undertaking whatever is “reasonable in the circumstances 
(i.e. given the nature of the specified location) to try to locate the Athlete, short of giving 
the Athlete any Advance Notice of the test.”97
A filing failure arises whenever athletes have failed to provide or update “accurate 
and complete” whereabouts information. This can occur in one of three ways. First, it 
may be that an athlete simply does not provide whereabouts information in advance, 
as required. Second, it may be that the provided whereabouts information is obviously 
inaccurate or otherwise inadequate to allow a doping control officer to locate the athlete, 
in which case it will constitute a filing failure prior to any attempt to locate the athlete. 
Third, it may be that the provided whereabouts information is inadequate to allow a 
doping control officer to locate the athlete, but that this only becomes obvious once any 
such attempt is made (outside the athletes sixty-minute time slot).98
Although individual athletes are allowed to delegate whereabouts filings and updates 
to third parties (trainers, coaches, teams, etc.), they remain “ultimately responsible at 
all times for making accurate and complete Whereabouts Filings” and “personally re­
sponsible at all times for ensuring [they are] available for Testing at the whereabouts 
declared on [their] Whereabouts Filings,” regardless of whether or not they “made that
95WADA, IST3, § 11.3.4; WADA, WADC2, §§ 2.3, 2.5.
96WADA, WADC2, §§ 2.4, 7.4,10.3.3.
97WADA, 7ST3, § 11.4.3.
98Ibid., 49-50.
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filing personally or delegated it to a third party (or a mixture of the t w o ) W A D A  is 
adamant that delegation to third parties can not function as a defense to an allegation 
of a missed test or filing failure. This is similar to the strict liability criterion for the 
presence of any prohibited substances in an athlete s sample, which specifies that there 
is no need to demonstrate “intent, fault, negligence or knowing use” in order to hold an 
athlete liable for the adverse sample.100
For these reasons, it is in the interest of the athletes themselves to ensure that they 
provide sufficient whereabouts information for any doping control officer to be able 
to locate them, and gain access to where they are, for testing. If they are unsure what 
their whereabouts will be for certain periods during a forthcoming quarter, or if their 
whereabouts change unexpectedly, they are required to update them as and when they 
gain certainty of what they will be, so long as the reporting of the changes occurs in 
advance of the changes themselves.101 But although it is possible to update ones location 
for the daily sixty-minute time slot up until the start of that time period, doing so in a 
manner regarded as suspicious by the ADO with testing jurisdiction is likely to lead 
to either an accusation of violating the rules against sample evasion, or becoming the 
subject of target testing due to behavior that indicates an increased risk or likelihood of 
doping.102
In return for these requirements from the athletes, the ADOs are required to (a) in­
form all athletes who are made part of their RTP not only of their inclusion in the latter, 
but also of their corresponding responsibilities and liabilities under the system, (b) send 
a notice to any athlete deemed to have committed a whereabouts failure within fourteen 
days of it taking place, giving them the relevant details about the instance and inviting a 
response within fourteen days of receipt of the notice, and (c) give any athlete deemed 
to have committed a whereabouts failure the opportunity to demand an administrative 
review where they may protest the judgment of the ADO.103
Furthermore, all ADOs with testing jurisdiction must establish “a workable system 
for the collection, maintenance and sharing of Whereabouts Filings.”104 WADA prefers
"W ADA,/ST3,§ 11.3.7.
100 WADA, WADC2, § 2.1.1; for general discussion on the ethical difficulties of this form of strict liability, 
see the contributions to the first half of McNamee and Moller, Doping and Anti-Doping Policy in Sport.
101 WADA, 7ST3, § 11.4.2.
102Ibid., 53-54.
103Ibid., §§ 11.3.5,11.6.2-11.6.3,11.7.
104 Ibid., § 11.7.1.d.
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ADOs to use its Anti-Doping Administration and Management System (ADAMS)—a 
free web-based database system available in numerous languages—or a similar on-line 
system “capable of recording who enters information and when,” but also allows the 
use of fax, e-mail, and SMS text messaging wherever this is not feasible.105 Regardless of 
which system any one ADO decides to utilize, WADA requires ADOs who share testing 
jurisdiction over an athlete to share all relevant athlete whereabouts information with 
each other, and to recognize each others findings with regard to that athlete.106
In addition, WADA specifies the manner in which ADOs are to make public disclo­
sures about whereabouts failures. Specifically, where an athlete is found to have com­
mitted a whereabouts failure, ADOs are prohibited from disclosing that information 
“beyond those persons with a need to know,” except for in those instances where the 
athlete is found to “have committed an anti-doping rule violation under [ WADC2] ar­
ticle 2.4 based on (among other things) such Whereabouts Failure.”107 In other words, 
a whereabouts failure may not be publicly disclosed unless it either (a) is sufficiently 
serious to amount to an anti-doping rule violation, such as sample evasion, in and of 
itself; or (b) is the third whereabouts failure within any eighteen-month period, thereby 
amounting to an anti-doping rule violation on the basis of the whereabouts rules. On the 
other hand, where an athlete is found to have committed any such anti-doping rule vio­
lation, including one consisting of three whereabouts failures within eighteen months, 
the relevant ADO is required to publicly disclose the details of the case within twenty 
days of finding the athlete in breach of the rules. Such public disclosure is stipulated 
as consisting of, at a minimum, “placing the required information on the Anti-Doping 
Organizations Web site and leaving the information up for at least one (1) year.”108
2.3.1 Support
WADA does acknowledge that their whereabouts requirements are “burdensome,” yet 
maintains that they are “critically important to clean sport.”109 Various organizations 
and individuals have spoken out in support of this view, in terms largely analogous to
105Ibid.,§ 11.7.
106Ibid.,§ 11.7.
107Ibid., § 11.6.4; the section also specifies an exception to the rule in cases of anonymized whereabouts 
information used for the presentation of whereabouts statistics.
108WADA, WADC2, § 14.2.4.
109WADA, Whereabouts Requirements, 1.
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WAD As own justification of it, i.e. that it is a (tiresome) necessity that is nevertheless 
acceptable on the basis of the goals of anti-doping. The IAAF, for instance, which im ­
plemented similar whereabouts requirements of its own as early as 1997, has expressed 
its unreserved support for the system, stating that although it acknowledges “the bur­
den placed upon athletes,” it nevertheless “believes that the whereabouts system ... is 
both proportionately fair as well as absolutely mandatory for the effective fight against 
doping in sport.”110
Some elite athletes affected by the rules have expressed similar opinions. Swiss tennis 
player Roger Federer stated that “I know its a pain, but I would like it to be a clean 
sport, and that’s why I’m OK with it.”111 French cyclist Thomas Voeckler maintained that 
“giving your whereabouts is demanding, but it is normal to request top athletes from 
all sports to do it,” and that “if it takes this kind of efforts to make sport more credible, 
everybody should contribute to this system.”112 UK swimmer Kate Haywood noted the 
initial difficulty of the system, stating that “when it first came in it was a bit of a pain but 
once you have done it the first time it is pretty easy.”113 Finally, German cycler Sabine 
Spitz expressed stronger support for the requirements by directly criticizing potential 
detractors of the system:
I do not understand w hy the new  whereabouts rules create so m uch controversy.
For clean athletes there is no issue whatsoever. It strengthens chances to catch 
cheats. The objective o f  the rule is to protect clean athletes. Submitting where­
abouts takes tim e, but whereabouts can always be updated. Intelligent testing is 
crucial. To protect clean sport, athletes need to accept it and contribute to this 
system . A nti-doping protects athletes’ and sport’s credibility.114
The academic debate has also seen analogous standpoints. Dag Vidar Hanstad and 
Sigmund Loland have argued that the whereabouts requirements are, ethically speak­
ing, on a par with, or less problematic than, everyday surveillance, for various reasons:
Everyday surveillance o f  individuals is far more extensive, . ..  concealed, and ... 
problematic. The W AD A system  is described in detail both when it com es to its 
contents and consequences, and it requires active participation from the person
110IAAF, IAAF Opinion On “New” Whereabouts Requirements.
11'WADA, Athlete Testimonies on Whereabouts System, 3.
112 Ibid., 3.
113Ibid., 4.
114Ibid., 5.
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being watched. H ence, the system does not seem  to involve undue violations either 
on principles o f  justice or on the grounds o f  athletes’ autonom y and right to self- 
determ ination. 115
Despite positions like the above, there have nevertheless been numerous objections 
to the revised whereabouts requirements, many of which stem from concerns about the 
privacy of elite athletes. These concerns are engendered by any of a host of underlying 
considerations, including the aforementioned worries about the robustness of the tech­
nology used to store athlete whereabouts information or the demands on the time of 
the affected athletes. In addition, some have expressed reservations about how far out 
of proportion the requirements seem to be in relation to the actual risks of wrongdoing, 
when compared with other social practices. Others have argued that the requirements 
are not compatible with existing law. The following section presents a brief sample of 
these sorts of arguments.
2.3.2 Privacy Concerns
There are various instances of criticism against WADA’s revised whereabouts require­
ments. UK tennis player Andy Murray has, for instance, expressed the following view:
These new  rules are so draconian that it makes it alm ost im possible to live a norm al
life I m ay m iss a flight or a flight could be delayed, yet I have to let W ADA know
exactly where I w ill be, even when I am resting. They even turned up at m y hotel 
in M iam i while I was on  holiday. Tennis has not got a big problem  with drugs. I 
support drug testing and strongly condem n any use o f  drugs in sport, but there 
has to be a m ore realistic and practical way to deal with the problem  with tennis 
players.116
The most legally and ethically important critique, however, has been the claim that 
the revised whereabouts requirements invade the privacy of elite athletes. This claim 
has taken various forms. Tennis player Rafael Nadal has, for instance, maintained that 
the whereabouts requirements show “a lack of respect for privacy”:
115Hanstad and Loland, “Elite Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information On Their Whereabouts,” 9; note, how­
ever, that Hanstad later presents a more ambivalent view of the whereabouts requirements in Hanstad, 
“Governance and the Whereabouts System.”
116Eason, Andy Murray Criticises New Anti-Doping Rules.
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Even m y m other or m y u nd e do not know  where I am som etim es, so having to 
send a m essage or to be scared all day in case there is a last-m inute change seem s 
to m e to be a com plete exaggeration. ... These are things that com pletely have 
to change, and there is a unanim ous voice on that in the locker room. It is an 
intolerable hunt. We have proved that we are a clean sport. You can count (doping) 
cases with one hand.117
In response to concerns of this sort, WADA has argued that they are based primarily 
on a misunderstanding of the whereabouts requirements, and that the affected athletes 
will come to terms with the changes in due course:
O nce things settle down then you find that people say “well, w ere doing this to 
make sure there is integrity in our sport and people stay clean, and we accept the 
responsibility on  our shoulders to make sure people comply.”118
The criticism has, however, persisted. Several international sporting federations have 
voiced concerns about privacy similar to those voiced by the athletes themselves. The In­
ternational Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and the Union of European Foot­
ball Associations (UEFA) have, for instance, jointly opposed WADAs revised where­
abouts requirements, arguing not only that the training regimes of team sports differ 
to a sufficient extent from individual sports to warrant separate sorts of whereabouts 
requirements, but that the requirements themselves amount to an invasion of player 
privacy:
FIFA and UEFA do not accept that controls be undertaken during the short h ol­
iday period o f  players, in order to respect their private life. . ..  FIFA and UEFA 
want to draw attention to the fact that, both on  a political and juridical level, the 
legality o f  the lack o f  respect o f  the private life o f  players, a fundam ental elem ent 
o f  individual liberty, can be questioned.119
Similarly, Shashank Manohar, president of the Board of Control for Cricket in India 
(BCCI), enumerated three reasons for why the BCCI rejected WADAs revised where­
abouts requirements, and why, as a result, professional Indian cricketers refused to sign 
up to the requirements:
117Eason, Andy Murray Criticises New Anti-Doping Rules.
118 As quoted in BBC, Athletes Air Issues Over Testing.
119FIFA, FIFA and UEFA Reject WADA "Whereabouts” Rule.
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The players ...  cannot disclose their whereabouts with a security cover. Secondly, 
the privacy o f  an individual cannot be invaded and thirdly, our constitution gives 
a guarantee regarding an individuals privacy. You cannot invade ... som ebody’s 
privacy 24 hours a day for 365 days.120
This official rejection of the whereabouts requirements, in combination with the po­
litical weight of the BCCI within the cricket world, has resulted in the ICC formulating 
its own whereabouts requirements, distinct from WADAs. According to the ICC refor­
mulation, elite-level cricket players are divided into two groups, with different where­
abouts requirements applied to each. Those athletes who belong to the ICC s interna­
tional registered testing pool (IRTP) are subject to WADAs full whereabouts require­
ments, while those athletes who belong to their national player pool (NPP) are instead 
subject to the ICC’s own crickets whereabouts requirements.121 The NPP includes the 
following:
[E]leven Players from each o f  the National Cricket Federations ranked in the top  
eight men’s O ne D ay International Match rankings . . . ,  selected as o f  dates speci­
fied by the ICC. [These are] the wicket-keeper w ho has played the m ost O ne Day 
International Matches for that team in the twelve m onths prior to the N PP Review  
Date in q u estion ;... the five highest-ranked bowlers in that team ...  as at the NPP  
Review Date in question; and ... the five highest-ranked batsm en in that team ... 
as at the N PP Review Date in question.122
The athletes included in the NPP are required to submit limited whereabouts infor­
mation to the ICC in the month before that information becomes relevant. Specifically, 
the information must consist of the full details—i.e. the locations, addresses, dates, and 
times—of the time spent with their team while training or playing domestic or interna­
tional matches, as well as the dates and addresses of the places the athlete stays overnight 
with their team during the same period.123 Unlike WADA’s regulations, however, an 
athlete’s National Cricket Federation (NCF) is responsible for submitting the informa­
tion to the ICC in the case of international matches, and is nominable by the athlete
120 As quoted in Indian Express, BCCI Rejects Anti-Doping Clause, Stands By Its Players; for a more exhaus­
tive account of critical responses from various athletes and sport federations, see Waddington, “Surveil­
lance and Control in Sport,” 261.
121 ICC, The International Cricket Council Anti-Doping Code, § 3.
122Ibid., § 2.1; for clarification, the NPP comprises eleven players from eight countries, or a total of eighty- 
eight players globally.
123Ibid., § 2.4.
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for the same duty in the case of domestic matches.124 Where there is a filing failure in 
any such scenario, it is the NCF, rather than the individual athlete, that faces sanctions; 
three NCF filing failures within any twelve-month period result in a fine for the NCF 
of 10,000 US dollars.125
Individual athletes only face sanctions where they have any combination of three 
missed tests and/or filing failures (that is, where they have not delegated responsibility 
for the submission of their whereabouts information to their NCF) within any twelve­
month period. The sanction in question consists of being moved up to the IRTP, the 
criteria for inclusion in which are any of the following:
1. A ny Player w ho has been found to have com m itted an anti-doping rule v io ­
lation. ... Such [a] Player sh a ll...  remain in the IRTP until any final appeal 
decision or other decision exonerating the Player o f  any anti-doping rule v i­
olation, or (in the absence o f  any such decision) until six m onths after any 
period o f  Ineligibility im posed on the Player has expired, or (where no pe­
riod o f  Ineligibility was im posed  on  the Player) until he/she has been in the 
IRTP for six m onths.
2. A ny Player in the N PP w ho has not played ... either an International Match 
or a D om estic Match for a continuous period o f  three m onths and, at the 
expiry o f  the continuous period o f  three m onths, does not provide to the ICC 
a written declaration from the National Cricket Federation’s C hief Medical 
Officer that he/she is fit to play (at that date) in an International Match. Such 
[a] Player sh a ll... remain in the IRTP until the earlier of: (a) the date he/she 
next plays ... [a] Match; or (b) the date he/she is able to provide to the ICC 
a written declaration from the National Cricket Federations C hief Medical 
Officer that he/she is fit to play in an International Match.
3. A ny Player in the N PP w ho is declared ... to have com m itted three NPP  
Player Violations within any twelve m onth period. Such [a] Player sh a ll ... 
remain in the IRTP until a continuous period o f  three m onths has passed in 
which the Player has not com m itted a Filing Failure or M issed Test.126
Although WADAs whereabouts rules allow for the creation of various testing pools 
for athletes competing at different levels within a sport, they nevertheless require ADOs 
to subject a certain amount of their top-level athletes to the full whereabouts require­
124ICC, The International Cricket Council Anti-Doping Code, §§ 2.6-2.7.
125Ibid., § 2.14.
126ICC, The International Cricket Council Anti-Doping Code, § 3.1; see also ICC, About the ICC Whereabouts 
Programme, for a schematic overview of the manner in which the ICC’s NPP and IRTP interact.
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ments.127 The ICC has instead, and in direct contravention of WADAs regulations, de­
fined a pool of athletes subject to the full whereabouts requirements that may, at any 
given time, be altogether empty of any athletes. In this respect, the IRTP of the ICC 
constitutes a significant departure from the global harmonization inherent to WADAs 
anti-doping rules.
Various scholars have also criticized WADAs revised whereabouts requirements, on 
a number of different bases. Verner Moller has, for instance, and contrary to the earlier 
claims of Hanstad and Loland, argued that the surveillance to which elite athletes are 
subjected as part of the whereabouts system is difficult to ethically defend:
If an athlete is included in the registered testing pool at the age o f  20 and continues 
his career at the highest level until the age o f  35, he w ill have been obliged to remain 
at a specified site for 5475 h or the equivalent to 228 full days. In other words, 
athletes w ho are guilty o f  nothing other than 15 years o f  athletic excellence have 
to accept a total o f  m ore than 7 m onths o f  house arrest. Furthermore, not only do 
they have to accept a rigorous surveillance regim e whereby they have to report any 
plan and any change o f  plan to the anti-doping authorities in advance, they must 
also accept the stress that com es with the know ledge that a few lapses o f  m em ory  
can result in a ban that could potentially end their career since any com bination  
o f  three filing failures or m issed tests over a rolling period o f  18 m onths am ount 
to an anti-doping rule violation .128
Others have raised jurisprudential concerns with WADAs whereabouts require­
ments. For instance, Adam Pendlebury and John McGarry have argued that the require­
ments constitute a legally disproportionate response to a legitimate problem, possibly 
amounting to a violation of European athletes’ human right to privacy.129
Establishing the strength of these various legal and ethical privacy-based objections 
to WADAs whereabouts requirements necessitates a closer investigation of general legal 
and ethical considerations pertaining to privacy. The next chapter sets the framework 
for handling the former issue (in the context of law in the UK), while the subsequent 
chapter does the same for the latter ethical issue. Only once a clearer understanding 
of the law and ethics of privacy is in place, does it become possible to assess in a valid
127WADA, IST3, §§ 4.4.4,11.1.6.
128M0ller, “One Step Too Far,” 178.
129Pendlebury and McGarry, “Location, Location, Location”; cf. also Halt, “Where Is the Privacy in WADAs 
‘Whereabouts’ Rule?”
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manner the legal and ethical acceptability of the whereabouts requirements in relation 
to privacy.
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Al t h o u g h  t h e r e  is  n o  legal right to privacy as such in UK law, there is nev­ertheless a patchwork of legal privacy protections. These arise not only from legislation and common law principles—most notably the equitable doctrine 
of breach of confidence—but also from the incorporation of European legal positions 
into UK law. EU law on data protection and working time, and CE human rights law, 
constitute some of the most important of these influences, helping to give shape to and 
direct the future development of legal privacy protections in the UK. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of this legal terrain, in order to subsequently establish, 
in chapter 7, the legal acceptability of WADAs whereabouts requirements in relation to 
it.
3.1 Legal Privacy Protections Prior to 1998
English common law does not explicitly recognize any general right to privacy. As in 
any common law system, there are two primary modes by which such a right might have 
come to be recognized: judicial extension of common law principles or parliamentary 
legislation. History has, however, instead demonstrated only gradual and piecemeal ex­
pansions of each, in order to remedy what was commonly considered the most serious 
flaws in existing privacy protections at the time. As a result, UK legal privacy protections 
today consist of a patchwork of legal principles, practices, and parliamentary legislation, 
in addition to European and other international treaties, as opposed to any unified and
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discrete area of law. This patchwork system can be roughly classified into three broad 
but non-exclusive domains, ordered here by approximate historical primacy (the first 
being the earliest to be developed):
1. There are several forms of protection of personal physical space and goods. These 
arise, in particular, in relation to the law concerning trespass, nuisance, and ha­
rassment.
2. There are protections against the public dissemination of information about an 
individual. This information may be false, in which case it is covered by defama­
tion law. Or it may be true, in which case it could be covered by, for instance, the 
law on blackmail or the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, depending on 
the circumstances in which a case arises.
3. There are protections against the arbitrary collection and misuse of personal in­
formation, which include cases where no dissemination of the information need 
have occurred. This area is covered by more recent data protection and surveil­
lance legislation.
Numerous forces have affected the development of these various areas of privacy law. 
Apart from international political influences, there is, for instance, significant and long­
standing political pressure from a powerful British press lobby against the development 
of any general right to privacy; various media representatives have repeatedly expressed 
concerns and warnings that increased legal protections of privacy will inevitably involve 
an undermining of free speech.1 To this situation, one might add a pervasive celebrity 
tabloid culture, public skepticism toward some of the more unscrupulous newspaper 
exposes, and increasing public concerns about such privacy-related issues as national 
identification cards and CCTV surveillance.2
Parliaments passing of the HRA 1998 is perhaps one of the most important sources 
of the more recent developments in English privacy law. The HRA 1998 stipulates that 
UK courts are required to take the ECHR—which includes the explicit stipulation of
‘For a comprehensive, if somewhat dated, overview of such claims, see Markesinis, “Our Patchy Law of 
Privacy,” 807-8.
2 For an empirical overview of the claim that the British public is increasingly concerned about privacy, 
see Morrison and Svennevig, The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy.
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a qualified right to private and family life—into consideration in determining the out­
comes of the cases they hear.3 Doing so has resulted in an expansion of the traditional 
range of application of the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, rendering it more 
proximate to a general legal right to privacy than its original contractual scope would 
suggest. Other privacy-related areas of UK law have seen similar European influences 
from EU (as opposed to CE) law, including through data protection principles and le­
gal limits to working time. None of this is, however, to suggest that legal protections of 
privacy were incorporated into UK law merely as a result of these sorts of recent Euro­
pean legal influences. The debate regarding the recognition of legal privacy protections 
in the UK is a longstanding one.
3.1.1 Protections of Confidence
Legal protections against breaches of confidence, or confidentiality, have long consti­
tuted one of the primary means of safeguarding privacy in English law. The English 
Court of Chancery was the primary driving force behind the initial expansion and re­
finement of this area of law. One of the earliest of these developments was the stipula­
tion of confidence between different specific parties. Legal professional privileges, which 
protect all communications between professional legal advisors and their clients from 
being disclosed, unless by the express permission of a client, date at least to 1576.4 Simi­
larly, English courts recognized spousal privileges, protecting communications between 
spouses by prohibiting them from testifying against each other, just some years later.5
Beyond these and other related legal privileges, a number of further legal protections 
of personal information evolved over the years.6 The most important of these early de­
velopments pertained to the protection of personal correspondence, seen as a subset 
of property law. In Pope v. Curl7—a case involving an attempt to publish letters from 
Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope, and others—the Lord Chancellor argued that the re­
ceiver of any personal letters had no right to publish them without the original author s
3 HRA 1998, §2.
4Berd v. Lovelace [1576] Cary 62, 21 ER 33.
5Bent v. Allot [1579] Cary 94, 21 ER 50; although this was repealed by the implementation of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, art. 80.
6For a more exhaustive overview, see Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 133-45; for an overview 
of the historical development of English blackmail law, see Alldridge, “Attempted Murder of the Soul’.”
7( 1741) 2 Atk. 342,26 ER 608.
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permission. Later cases strengthened this view, notably Gee v. Pritchard,8 which in­
volved the attempted publication of personal letters by an individual formerly close to 
their writer. This decision effectively cemented the earlier view of Yates, J, in a dissent­
ing opinion at the Court of King s Bench, that “every man has a right to keep his own 
sentiments” and “to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to 
the sight of his friends.”9
More significantly, the English courts began recognizing duties of nondisclosure in 
the eighteenth century. These were presumed to apply to a number of confidential rela­
tions, understood as those relations in which one party confided in another in a way that 
left them vulnerable should the second party break the trust. Where the aforementioned 
legal privileges concerned only a prohibition on certain forms of testament in court, and 
protections of personal correspondence constituted a small subset of property law, du­
ties of nondisclosure eventually grew from an initially primarily property-based view 
to a general prohibition against the divulging of any confidential information to unau­
thorized third parties.10
Although the origins of the common law of confidence are somewhat obscure, one 
of the earliest documented cases to establish something like a breach of confidence 
(though not in those exact terms) was Queensberry v. Shebbeare, n  where the court 
found that a manuscript freely given by an author to another could not be published 
unless it had been so given for the express purposes of publication. Later, in Yovatt 
v. Winyard,12 the court used the terminology of breach o f confidence for possibly the 
first time. In the case, the defendant had been employed by the plaintiff as an assistant 
in a veterinary medicine practice. Where he had surreptitiously copied the plaintiff s 
medicine recipes from the latter s personal books, to subsequently make a profit sell­
ing the recipes to others, the Lord Chancellor found that there had been a “breach of 
trust and confidence.”13 Essentially the same wording was used some years later in Aber- 
nethy v. Hutchinson,14 a case involving an attempt by the medical journal The Lancet to
®(1818) 2 Swans. 402, 36 ER 670.
9Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303,98 ER 201,242.
10Further elucidation of these developments can be found in Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a 
Right To Privacy,” 337-45, 357-62; for the definitive treatment of breach of confidence in English law, 
see Gurry, Breach of Confidence.
11 (1758) 2 Eden 62,21 ER33.
12(1820) 1 Jac. and W. 394,37 ER425.
13 Ibid., 426.
14(1825) 1 H. and Tw. 28,47 ER 1313.
50
3.1. Legal Privacy Protections Prior to 1998
publish transcripts, by an unknown medical student, of a series of lectures held by Mr. 
Abernethy, a “distinguished surgeon,” at St. Bartholomew s Hospital. The court found 
that there was a “breach of contract or of trust” by the student in question, eventually 
finding in favor of the plaintiff.15
One of the most important cases in the development of the equitable doctrine of 
breach of confidence was Prince Albert v. Strange,16 from 1849. It has had a signifi­
cant impact on later English common law, not least due to its famous plaintiffs. But its 
outcome also contributed to the subsequent development of a legal right to privacy in 
the US (as detailed in the following chapter). The case concerned specific drawings and 
etchings made by Queen Victoria and her husband Prince Albert for their own personal 
use and amusement. An employee of the printer commissioned to make impressions of 
the etchings for the royal family had, without his employer s consent or knowledge and 
“in violation of the confidence reposed in him,” taken some of the impressions for him ­
self.17 After being sold, they had eventually come into the ownership of the defendant, 
who had intended not only to exhibit the impressions, but had also printed a catalog 
describing them to potential buyers. The queen and her husband had sued for the pre­
vention of the exhibition and the publication of the catalog.
On appeal, Lord Cottenham, LC, ruled in their favor, maintaining that “privacy is the 
right invaded”18 As the facts of the case were novel, the court claimed “an original and 
independent jurisdiction.”19 Rather than granting an injunction on the basis of invasion 
of privacy, however, it deferred to property and confidence law, maintaining, first, that 
Prince Albert had a literary property right to his unpublished works, i.e. a right to keep 
them from being published as a means of protecting his “private use and pleasure,” and 
second, that confidence law sufficed to prohibit publication of the catalog, insofar as 
Stranges possession of the impressions had “originated in a breach of trust, confidence, 
or contract.”20
This distinction, between property and confidence law, was strengthened in the sub­
sequent case of Morison v. Moat.21 In the case, two sons had inherited from their de-
15 Ibid., 1317.
16(1849) 1 Mac. and G. 25,41 ER 1171.
17Ibid„ 1172.
18Ibid„ 1179.
19Ibid., 1179.
20 Ibid., 1178-79.
21 (1851) 9 Hare 241, 68 ER492.
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ceased father the rights to the recipe and prescription for preparing a medicine formu­
lated by him, by the name of Morisons Universal Medicine. The son of the fathers also 
deceased business partner had, “by breach of faith or of contract” of his father, received 
a copy of the same recipe, and had subsequently produced and sold the medicine in 
question under its original name and for his own profit. In finding for the plaintiffs, the 
court suggested that breach of confidence, as an equitable remedy, was entirely separate 
from the issue of property rights:
That the Court has exercised jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I think, 
admit of any question. Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the exer­
cise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to property, in others 
to contract, and in others, again, it has been treated as founded upon trust or con­
fidence, meaning, as I conceive, that the Court fastens the obligation on the con­
science of the party, and enforces it against him in the same manner as it enforces 
against a party to whom a benefit is given the obligation of performing a promise 
on the faith o f which the benefit has been conferred.22
This distinction was cemented in the 1888 case of Pollard v. Photographic C oP  In 
the case, a woman had commissioned a photographer to take photographs of herself 
and her family for her personal use. The photographer had subsequently utilized copies 
of the negatives to produce Christmas cards featuring the woman, for public sale on 
display in his shop window. North, J, of the newly formed Chancery Division of the 
High Court of Justice, granted an injunction against the exhibition and sale of the cards, 
arguing that although the photographer maintained a property right in the negatives, 
and although the plaintiff could not utilize copyright statute in her favor (insofar as 
she had not registered any copyright in the photograph), there had nevertheless been a 
breach of an implied contract by the photographer not to so utilize the negatives, as well 
as a breach of the confidence the woman, as a customer of his, had placed in him.24 In 
considering the limits to such legal privacy protections, however, the court maintained 
that if the photographs had been taken “on the sly,” there would have been “no contract 
or consideration to support a contract,” and hence no available legal redress.25
There were various further developments in confidence law throughout the twen­
tieth century. In 1948, the English courts explicitly recognized the existence of an eq-
22Morison, 498.
23 [1888] Ch. D. 345 (Ch.)
24 Ibid., 349,352.
25Ibid., 346.
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uitable doctrine of confidence as entirely independent from that of contract.26 Some 
years later, in Argyll v. Argyll, the Chancery Division ruled that the same law applied 
to personal confidences as well as commercial ones. In the subsequent case of Coco v. 
Clark,27 the court systematized this legally novel notion of confidence. In his judgment 
in the case, Megarry, J, noted that for a breach of confidence to apply separate from con­
tract, certain criteria needed to be fulfilled. These included the criteria that the relevant 
information needed to have “been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence,” and that it needed to have a “necessary quality of confidence about it.”28 
The former criterion considers the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
in breach of confidence cases. The English and UK courts have found this sort of “obli­
gation of confidence” not only in various professional relationships—such as those be­
tween trade partners, doctors and patients, employers and employees, and fiduciaries 
and beneficiaries—but also in various personal relationships, such as those between 
spouses, lovers, and even friends.29 Furthermore, the same obligations are taken to ap­
ply to third parties, even where not themselves responsible for the original breach of 
confidence (as in Prince Albert), whenever “a person receives information he knows or 
ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential ”30
The latter criterion, regarding the “necessary quality of confidence,” was further re­
fined in A-G  v. Observer Ltd.,31 a case involving the attempted publication by a former 
MI5 British secret service agent of his memoirs. Lord Goff, in his opinion, clarified the 
potential limitations to consider in establishing whether there was a necessary quality 
of confidence. First, the information in question must be rightly confidential, i.e. “once 
it has entered what is usually called the public domain ... then, as a general rule, the 
principle of confidentiality can have no application to it.” Second, it must not consist 
of “useless information” or “trivia” Third, the interest in confidence must not be out­
weighed by a public interest in its disclosure.32
26 “The obligation to respect confidence is not limited to cases where the parties are in contractual relation­
ship,” Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co. [1963] 3 All ER 413 (CA), 414.
27 [1968] FSR415 (Ch.)
28Ibid., 419.
29Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL); Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler [1987] Ch. 117 (CA); Stephens 
v. Avery [1988] Ch. 449 (Ch.); Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004], UKHL 22 [2004] 2 AC 
22, f  1035.
30 Campbell, f  14.
31 [1990] 1 AC109(HL).
32Ibid., 282.
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In the supporting argument for these prescriptions, Lord Goff departed, in a subtle 
but drastic way, from previous common law (no cases were cited in support of his claim), 
in maintaining that an action for breach of confidence could be brought even where the 
information disclosed was discovered entirely by accident:
It is well settied that a duty o f  confidence m ay arise in equity independently o f  such 
cases [where there is a contractual relationship between the parties]; and I have 
expressed the circum stances in which the duty arises in broad terms, not m erely 
to embrace those cases where a third party receives inform ation from  a person who  
is under a duty o f confidence in respect o f  it, knowing that it has been disclosed by 
that person to him  in breach o f  his duty o f  confidence, but also to include certain 
situations, beloved o f  law teachers— where an obviously confidential docum ent 
is wafted by an electric fan out o f  a w indow  into a crowded street, or where an 
obviously confidential docum ent, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public 
place, and is then picked up by a passer-by.33
This notion found further support in the opinion of Laws, J, in Hellewell v. Chief 
Constable o f Derbyshire,34 who argued as follows:
If som eone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no authority 
a picture o f  another engaged in som e private act, his subsequent disclosure o f  the 
photograph would, in m y judgment, as surely am ount to a breach o f  confidence 
as if  he had found or stolen a letter or diary in w hich the act was recounted and 
proceeded to publish it.35
These considerations represent an almost complete reversal from the view presented 
a century earlier in Pollard; that publication of a (non-defamatory) photograph taken 
surreptitiously in a public place would not be actionable at law. Although the newer 
contrary views were only expressed obiter, they nevertheless helped to set the stage for 
the expansion of the doctrine of breach of confidence that followed from Parliament s 
enacting of the HRA 1998 (to be discussed in further detail below). Even prior to this 
development, however, there were various further strands of the UK legal discussion on 
privacy, beyond that pertaining to just confidence law.
33A-G v. Observer, 281.
34[1995] AUER473 (QB).
35 Ibid., 476.
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3.1.2 Judiciary Privacy Considerations
Outside the law of confidence, numerous cases in the twentieth century saw the English 
and UK courts inclined to resolve privacy concerns through more or less novel appli­
cations of existing law, while explicitly or implicitly declining to recognize any general 
right to privacy The case of Tolley v. JS Fry and Sons Ltd?6 is an early example of this. It 
was brought by an amateur golfer, whose caricature had been used in an advertisement 
by a chocolate manufacturer. Given the nature of amateur golf at the time, the plaintiff 
feared that the use of his portrait might suggest that he had been paid for it, which could 
have undermined his amateur status. As a result, he sued the chocolate manufacturer 
for defamation. Upon reaching the Court of Appeal, Greer, LJ, reiterated the sentiment 
expressed earlier in Pollard, stating in his opinion that:
In m y judgm ent the defendants ... acted in a m anner inconsistent w ith the decen­
cies o f  life, and in doing so they were guilty o f  an act for which there ought to be a 
legal remedy. But unless a m ans photograph, caricature, or nam e be published in 
such a context that the publication can be said to be defamatory w ithin the law o f  
libel, it cannot be m ade the subject-m atter o f  com plaint by action at law.37
The case provoked further debate, then Cambridge law professor Percy Winfield 
penning an article calling for the explicit recognition of a right to privacy in UK law, 
whether by parliamentary legislation or judicial reform:
[The H ouse o f  Lords] m ight hold the wrong to be d efam ation ....  Alternatively and 
preferably, they m ight hold the defendant s act to be a tort sui generis,— offensive 
invasion o f  personal privacy.38
Although the case did reach the House of Lords, Winfields pleas fell on deaf ears, 
their Lordships instead finding remedy in said defamation.39 This sentiment was echoed 
too in Bernstein v. Skyviews & General Ltd.40 The defendant had photographed the 
plaintiff’s country house from an airplane, without the knowledge of the latter, who
36[1930] 1 KB 467 (CA).
37 Tolley [1930], 478
38Winfield, “Privacy,” 39.
39 Tolley v. JS Fry and Sons Ltd. [ 1931 ] AC 333 (HL); David Seipp suggests that the failure of Winfields article 
explains why subsequent calls for a right to privacy have instead been targeted primarily at Parliament, in 
Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right To Privacy,” 327; notable academic examples of the latter 
include Dworkin, “Privacy and the Press”; Markesinis, “Our Patchy Law of Privacy”; Samuels, “Privacy.”
40 [1978] QB 479 (QB).
55
3 . P r iv a c y  La w  i n  t h e  UK
had subsequently sued for trespass and/or invasion of privacy. Although Griffiths, J, 
was generally sympathetic to the plaintiffs concerns, he found in favor of the defendant, 
arguing that occasionally flying an aircraft in the airspace above a piece of private prop­
erty would not amount to trespass.41 He gave no consideration to the separate charge 
of invasion of privacy, although he noted briefly that “constant surveillance” of an in­
dividual by aircraft might, as a “monstrous invasion of his privacy,” be an actionable 
nuisance.42
This judicial disinclination to recognize a separate and general right to privacy in 
English law was given its seminal formulation in the 1979 High Court case Malone v. 
Metropolitan Police Comr.43 In the case—which concerned the authorized tapping of 
a suspected criminals telephone conversations—council for the plaintiff argued for a 
common law recognition of at least a specific right to privacy with respect to the hold­
ing of telephone conversations “in the privacy of ones home without molestation.” Sir 
Robert Megarry, V-C, expressed sympathy for the fact that the loss of privacy the plain­
tiff had suffered amounted to a violation of his rights under European law.44 But he 
maintained that the lack of any relevant UK legislation (at the time) made it impossi­
ble for the court to recognize those rights as legally binding. Noting that the topic was 
“plainly suitable for legislation [by Parliament],” he argued that the court did not have 
a sufficient mandate to implement such recognition at its own behest:
It is no function o f  the courts to legislate in a new  field. The extension o f  the existing 
laws and principles is one thing, the creation o f  an altogether new  right is another.
... N o  new  right in the law, fully-fledged with all the appropriate safeguards, can 
spring from the head o f  a judge deciding a particular case: only Parliament can 
create such a right.45
This statement has been frequently and approvingly cited in later cases as illustrative 
of the English judicial view on privacy.46 It also aligns closely with the view of the court 
in Kaye v. Robertson ,47 one of the most infamous English privacy cases prior to the HRA
41 Bernstein, 488.
42 Ibid., 489.
43 [1979] Ch. 344 (Ch.)
44This was furthermore ruled to be the case in the subsequent Malone v. UK [1984] ECHR 8691/79.
45Malone, [1979] 372, 379
46See e.g. R v. Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558 (HL), 565; Wainwrightv. Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 
2 AC 406, f  19.
47 [1991] FSR62 (CA).
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1998. Well-known actor Gordon Kaye had been recovering in hospital after extensive 
head surgery following an automobile accident. After several days on life support, fol­
lowed by a period in intensive care, he was moved to a private room. A journalist from 
the tabloid newspaper Sunday Sport surreptitiously gained access to Kayes room and 
interviewed and photographed him prior to being ejected by hospital security. Kaye 
could not recollect the incident fifteen minutes later.
Through personal acquaintances, Kaye sought an injunction to prohibit the tabloid 
from publishing the interview, on the basis of malicious falsehood, libel, passing off, 
and trespass to the person. The court disagreed with all the claims except that of ma­
licious falsehood, granting an injunction only on any implication by the tabloid that 
the interview and photographs had been consented to, rather than on publication of 
the interview itself. All three judges were in agreement, however, that the case con­
stituted a particularly heinous illustration of the need for parliamentary legislation on 
privacy. Speaking obiter, Glidewell, LJ, argued that “the facts of the present case are a 
graphic illustration of the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what 
circumstances statutory provision can be made to protect the privacy of individuals.”48 
Bingham, LJ, concurred, noting that the invasion of privacy that Kaye had suffered, 
“however gross, does not entitle him to relief in English law.”49 Highlighting the op­
portunity to draw on the wealth of experience provided by US privacy law, Leggatt, LJ, 
concluded:
We do not need a First Amendment to preserve the freedom of the press, but the 
abuse of that freedom can be prevented only by the enforcement of a right to pri­
vacy. This right has so long been disregarded here that it can be recognised now 
only by the legislature. ... It is to be hoped that the making good of this signal 
shortcoming in our law will not be long delayed.50
3.1.3 Parliamentary Privacy Considerations
By the time of Kaye, numerous right to privacy bills had already been discussed in Par­
liament, although none of them had been passed.51 For instance, Brian Walden, MP,
48Ibid., 66.
49 Ibid., 70.
50Ibid., 71.
51 For detailed discussion of such attempts prior to the 1980s, including press responses, see Pratt, Privacy 
in Britain; and Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right To Privacy,” 345-50; for slightly more
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introduced a right to privacy bill already in 1969. Though it was not the first, it gar­
nered sufficient support to bring about the formation of a committee to investigate the 
issue, chaired by Sir Kenneth Younger.52 The committee found, in their report, that al­
though they could not recommend the creation of a general right to privacy, they did 
suggest a need for, among other things, greater public scrutiny of press practices, by 
an increase in the number of non-press lay members on the Press Council, the then 
self-regulatory organization of the British press.53
Although this recommendation was implemented, the 1980s saw a general increase 
in concern regarding the ability of the press to properly self-regulate. As a result, the 
issue of privacy legislation was revisited in 1989, when John Browne and Tony Wor­
thington, MPs, introduced a new right to privacy bill, this time directed only against 
privacy intrusions by the press. Again, Parliament formed a committee to investigate, 
this time chaired by David Calcutt, QC. The final committee report found that although 
it was “satisfied that it would be possible to define a statutory tort of infringement of 
privacy,” it did not deem it necessary to legislate any such tort.54 Instead, the report 
recommended the creation of a crime of physical intrusion, in order to provide pro­
tection from the circumstances of cases like the then recent Kaye}5 Furthermore, the 
report argued that the press ought to set up a complaints body in place of the ineffi­
cient Press Council, specifying that if the body could not “be made to work effectively” 
within eighteen months, it should be replaced by a statutory tribunal.56
The Calcutt report directly resulted in the subsequent formation of the Press Com­
plaints Commission (PCC) in early 1991. The legislative suggestions of the report were, 
however, not implemented. Nor were they implemented when Calcutt, in 1993, au­
thored a second report finding that the PCC had failed in its self-regulation and that 
further legislative protection of privacy was needed:
up-to-date accounts, see Krotoszynski, “Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty,” 1404-7; and 
Samuels, “Privacy,” 123-24.
52Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 183-84; Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right To Privacy,” 347; see 
also Dworkin, “The Younger Committee Report on Privacy,” for a critical overview of the specific rec­
ommendations of the committee.
53 Younger, Report of the Committee on Privacy, f f  661-67; Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 198; Dworkin, “The 
Younger Committee Report on Privacy,” 404-5.
54Calcutt, Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, 46-50.
55Ibid., 49-50.
56Ibid., 73.
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The Press Complaints Commission ... does not, in my view, hold the balance fairly 
between the press and the individual. ... As constituted, it is, in essence, a body 
set up by the industry, financed by the industry, dominated by the industry, and 
operating a code of practice devised by the industry and which is over-favourable 
to the industry.57
Calcutt s recommendations were not followed; the PCC was not replaced by a new 
organization. Intead, it remains as the primary self-regulatory body of the British press 
to this day, although its continued existence has been cut short by various recent scan­
dals. Primary among these, the discovery of “phone hacking” practices at the now de­
funct News o f the World newspaper, eventually led Prime Minister David Cameron to 
call for the scrapping of the PCC, and its replacement by a body less “ineffective and 
lacking in rigour.”58 As a result, Lord Hunt, Chairman of the PCC since October 2011, 
announced his intention to replace the body with a new independent regulator that, 
unlike the PCC, would have the legal mandate necessary to ensure that its decisions are 
followed by the press.59 More recently, Leveson, LJ, of the Court of Appeal published 
a report commissioned by Prime Minister Cameron to investigate the same issues. In 
the report, Leveson recommends the disbanding of the PCC and its replacement by an 
entirely independent regulatory body, backed by relevant legislation.60 Although vari­
ous press editors have noted their concerns that such a system could be used to infringe 
press freedom,61 it is still too early to tell what effects the report might have.
In any event, the various instances in which Parliament has declined to legislate a 
general right to privacy over the years is largely analogous to the courts’ disinclination 
to recognize any such right. They have, however, stepped in at other times to revise leg­
islation on specific privacy issues. For instance, the lack of legal remedy for the phone- 
tapping suffered by the plaintiff in Malone, and the subsequent chiding the UK received 
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), led directly to Parliament passing 
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA 1985). The act limited the power 
of the police to perform wiretaps, requiring a judicial review of each wiretapping case 
in advance.62
57 Calcutt, Review of Press Self-Regulation, xi, see also xi-xiv generally.
58As quoted in BBC, Phone hacking.
59PCC, Towards a New System of Self-Regulation.
60Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Ethics and Practices of the Press.
61 BBC, Press “Need to Act” after Leveson.
62IOCA 1985, esp. §§ 1-4; for further commentary, see Krotoszynski, “Autonomy, Community, and Tra­
ditions of Liberty,” 1410-11; McCamus, "Celebrity Newsgathering and Privacy,” 1196.
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In a similar manner, the Police Act 1997 was introduced to restrict the bugging of 
private properties by the police, in direct response to R v. Khan (Sultan).63 The central 
contention of the House of Lords case concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained 
in a potentially unlawful manner. Insofar as their Lordships had declared unlawfully ob­
tained evidence admissible (in certain situations), they had seen it unnecessary to make 
any further declarations as to whether the bugging amounted to an unlawful invasion 
of privacy or not.64
The Court of Appeal took a significantly more assertive line in Khorasandjian v. 
B ush65 The case concerned an eighteen-year old woman receiving frequent harassing 
phone calls from a male prior acquaintance to her mother s home, where she was resi­
dent at the time. At Barnet County Court, the presiding judge had granted an injunc­
tion forbidding the defendant from “harassing, pestering or communicating” with the 
plaintiff. The defendant appealed, on the basis that the injunction “did not reflect any 
tort known to the law,” insofar as the tort of private nuisance was interpreted as enjoy­
ment of a persons property, and the plaintiff had no proprietary interest in her mother s 
home.66 Dillon, LJ, disagreed, arguing as follows:
To m y m ind, it is ridiculous if  in this present age the law is that the m aking o f  
deliberately harassing and pestering telephone calls to a person is only actionable 
in the civil courts if  the recipient o f  the calls happens to have the freehold or a 
leasehold proprietary interest in the prem ises in which he or she has received the 
calls.67
Although the court found in favor of the plaintiff, this expansion of private nui­
sance was explicitly overturned in a later case before the House of Lords, restricting 
the bringing of a tort of private nuisance to the actual property owner.68 Again, Parlia­
ment stepped in to fill the resulting legal lacuna, this time by way of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997.
It is worth noting that Parliament has also, at times, enacted legislation that has been 
taken by some to pose a direct threat to personal privacy. Such concerns have, for in­
stance, arisen in relation to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA
63 [1997] AC 558 (HL).
6AKhan (Sultan), 571; see also McCamus, “Celebrity Newsgathering and Privacy,” 1196.
65 [1993] QB 111 (CA).
66 Ibid., 733.
67 Ibid., 733.
68 Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] AC 655 (HL).
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2000), which repealed the IOCA 1985, and which set out certain powers of, among 
other things, the surveillance and interception of communications of individuals in 
the UK. The act—which was enacted primarily as a means of granting law enforce­
ment agencies wide-ranging power to tackle terrorism and organized crime, including 
through covert surveillance and the interception of emails and internet usage—has been 
dubbed a “snoopers’ charter” by critics, who allege that it grants extensive powers, with­
out sufficient oversight, and that it could be used to unacceptably invade the privacy of 
individuals.69
Regardless, the piecemeal development of the law on privacy has taken a somewhat 
new direction following the enacting of the HRA 1998. In effect, the act handed the 
responsibility of creating a common law right to privacy to the UK judiciary, who were 
required not only to consider European human rights legislation in their decisions, but 
to make it applicable within existing principles of common law. The overall effect of this 
has been the expansion of the doctrine of breach of confidence in order to accommodate 
much of the European human right to privacy. Proper appreciation of this development, 
however, requires some initial historical background.
3.2 A Human Right to Privacy
Following in the wake of the World War II, the CE formed in 1949, with the stated aim 
of achieving “greater unity” for its member states in “economic, social, cultural, scien­
tific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”70 As one element of this task, the CE drafted 
the ECHR in 1950, in part as a regional response to the signing of the Universal Dec­
laration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, MP—lawyer and 
prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials—oversaw the development of the ECHR, ensuring 
a significant British stake in the way it was formulated.71 The UK, as one of the found­
ing members of the CE, ratified the ECHR in 1950, and it entered into force in 1953.72
69 Cf. Herbert, Zero Privacy.
70Statute of the Council o f Europe, art. 1.
71Marston, “The United Kingdoms Part in the Preparation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
1950.”
72CE, The Convention in 1950.
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Ratification of the ECHR remains a condition of membership for any country seeking 
to join the CE.73
The arguably most important element of the ECHR—and that which took it signifi­
cantly beyond the declarative nature of the UDHR—was its call for the establishment of 
an international court for adjudicating purported human rights violations within its ju ­
risdiction. This court, the ECtHR, began functioning in 1959. Originally, it formed one 
part of a tripartite system. The European Commission of Human Rights would perform 
a preliminary examination of all ECHR cases brought by individuals or member states. 
If a case was deemed admissible under the ECHR, the Commission would produce a 
report on the facts of the case with a non-binding opinion. The Commission and/or the 
member state accused of a human rights violation could then choose to refer the case 
to the ECtHR for a binding judgment; otherwise it would be decided by the Committee 
of Ministers.74
The member states of the CE originally numbered just ten, all West European. Since 
its inception, however, the CE has grown to include practically all of Europe, with a sig­
nificant boost in membership in the 1990s, following the fall of Communism in Cen­
tral and Eastern Europe. In order to deal more efficiently with the resulting dramatic 
increase in the number of people and member states over which the ECtHR had juris­
diction, the ECHR was amended in 1998. This amendment—Protocol 11—led to two 
important changes. First, the tripartite system was replaced by a single full-time court, 
of the same name as before, with the aim of thereby reducing the typical time it would 
take for a case to reach conclusion. Second, and as a result, individuals were granted 
the ability to petition the court directly, without first needing their case referred by any 
Commission-like body.75 The hope was that these changes would not only make the 
ECtHR truly accessible to all individuals within its jurisdiction, but that a more effi­
cient system would help clear the existing backlog of “approximately 4-5,000 cases.”76
The ECtHR has, however, been something of a victim of its own success. According 
to the ECHR, member states are committed not only to secure the rights established in 
the ECHR to all individuals within their jurisdiction, but to furthermore “abide by the
73Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 3.
74 ECtHR, 50 Years of Activity, 3.
75 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby, arts. 29, 34-35.
76Reid, A Practitioners Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 17.
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final judgments of the court in any case to which they are parties.”77 This has created 
an unprecedented possibility for individuals to bring a case against their own, or some 
other European, country, at a supra-national level, provided they have exhausted the 
available domestic remedies pertaining to their complaint.78 This state of affairs has 
resulted in a steady rise in the number of cases brought before the court every year. 
There were more unique cases in 2008 alone (49,900 total) than in the entire forty-year 
period 1958-1998 (45,000 total).79 As a result, on the latest count, the backlog now 
stands at over 160,000 unheard cases.80
Although somewhat worrying from the point of efficiency, these numbers are a pow­
erful indication of how well-established the ECtHR has become. They reflect the will­
ingness of wronged individuals in Europe to seek justice at a distant, supra-national 
level, when they are of the opinion that their national law is not able provide a sufficient 
remedy. They also indicate the extent to which people feel that the judgments of the 
ECtHR are respected by the CE member states. The authority of the ECtHR is further 
evident in the fact that the EU recently became a signatory to the ECHR. As a unique 
legal organization separate from its individual member states and with its own legal 
order—adjudicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—doing so 
submits the EU s legal system to “independent external control,” by allowing residents 
within the EU to bring purported human rights violations against the EU itself.81
In the ECHR, article 8 defines a right to privacy. It reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for h is private and family life, h is hom e and 
his correspondence.
2. There shall be n o interference by a public authority with the exercise o f  this 
right except such as is in accordance w ith  the law and is necessary in a dem o­
cratic society in the interests o f  national security, public safety or the eco­
nom ic w ell-being o f  the country, for the prevention o f  disorder or crime, 
for the protection o f  health or m orals, or for the protection o f  the rights and 
freedom s o f  others.82
77ECHR, art. 46(1).
78Ibid., art. 35.
79 ECtHR, 50 Years of Activity, 4.
80 CE, Reform of the European Court o f Human Rights.
81CE, EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
82ECHR, art. 8; compare to the UDHR, which specifies that no person “shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and repu­
tation”; this is repeated almost verbatim in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 17.
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In hearing article 8 cases, the ECtHR adopts a two-stage approach. The first stage 
establishes whether or not a given case pertains to a persons article 8 right, i.e. if it 
violates the right set out in article 8.1. Only if this is found to be the case will the court 
then proceed to the second stage, which consists of determining whether or not the 
violation of article 8.1 might nevertheless be justified by any of the exceptions noted in 
article 8.2.83 The right set out in article 8.1 is, in other words, qualified; where there is 
sufficient justification, as stipulated in article 8.2, a violation of the right is considered 
legally acceptable.
This two-stage approach is not an entirely straightforward affair. Given the ECtHRs 
international jurisdiction, and the various cultural and social mores of the many Euro­
pean societies and individuals whose rights it protects, the court has adopted a certain 
degree of flexibility in its judgments on a number of articles, including article 8, by tak­
ing into account the specific cultures of the member state at trial, wherever necessary. 
This allows the ECtHR to rule according to the cultural particulars of each case, rather 
than attempting to impose any single universal view on all its member states.
This flexibility, referred to as the margin of appreciation,84 is not stipulated in the 
ECHR itself, but has instead arisen as a general principle in the work of the ECtHR 
over the years.85 As regards the protection of personal privacy, it is central to the inter­
pretation of the various exception conditions listed in article 8.2, such as the “protection 
of health and morals”-clause, in any given case. Depending on the legal and social real­
ities within the CE member state brought to trial, the ECtHR can exercise the margin 
of appreciation in order to establish a final judgment that, although applicable to that 
context, need not be prescriptive for other member states facing similar situations.
The margin of appreciation, and its relation to privacy, was discussed in some detail 
in Dudgeon v. UK.86 The case was brought by a homosexual man, who maintained that 
the criminalization of consensual homosexuality at the time in Northern Ireland, where 
he was resident, constituted a violation of his article 8 right to a private life. Although the 
court recognized that there was a particularly wide margin of appreciation in relation 
to the mores of a country or region, they nevertheless found that, insofar as the case 
concerned a “most intimate aspect of private life,” there “must exist particularly serious
83Kilkelly, The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, 8-9.
84From the French marge d ’appreciation.
85Greer, The Margin of Appreciation, 5.
86[1981] ECHR 7525/76.
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reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities can be legitimate for 
the purposes of article 8(2).”87
This judgment highlights another feature of the ECtHRs interpretation of article 8. 
Although the article could conceivably be construed in only a narrow fashion, corre­
sponding to something like a right to be free from unlawful searches by officials, the 
ECtHR has instead chosen to give the right a relatively broad interpretation:
The concept o f  “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive defin i­
tion. It covers the physical and psychological integrity o f  a person. It can som e­
tim es embrace aspects o f  an individuals physical and social identity. Elem ents 
such as, for example, gender identification, nam e and sexual orientation and sex­
ual life fall within the personal sphere protected by article 8. Article 8 also protects 
a right to personal developm ent, and the right to establish and develop relation­
ships with other hum an beings and the outside w orld .88
This view has been reiterated on a number of occasions, with the ECtHR further 
maintaing, among other things, that the protection of private and family life includes 
a requirement that “may involve the authorities adopting measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between them ­
selves.”89 It therefore gives rise to a positive obligation under human rights law. That is, 
it requires a member states public authorities to have policies and procedures in place 
to prevent breaches of article 8 even where there is no involvement by a public author­
ity. This phenomenon is recognized, to a certain extent, in the HRA 1998, as discussed 
below.
In addition to these considerations, article 8 s protection of an individuals right to 
respect for private and family life is not confined solely to those acts performed in pri­
vate, but can also pertain to certain acts performed in public, where these are neverthe­
less considered to be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.90 In this manner, 
the ECHR provides a broad legal protection of privacy to all individuals within the CE.
87Ibid., f  52.
66Pretty v. UK [2002] ECHR 2346/02, 5 61.
89Moreno Gomez v. Spain [2004] ECHR 4143/02, f  55.
90See e.g. Peck v. UK [2003] ECHR 44647/98; Von Hannover v. Germany [2004] ECHR 59320/00, discussed 
in further detail below
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3.2.1 The Human Rights Act 1998
The UK government gave two primary reasons for the enacting of the HRA 1998. The 
first was the “inordinate delay and cost” that bringing a case before the ECtHR involved. 
This was to be avoided, where possible, by instead allowing the British people to claim 
their ECHR rights in domestic courts, thereby sparing time and expense.91 The second 
reason was that the act was understood to have implications for the subsequent develop­
ment of jurisprudence, thereby bringing UK law closer into line with the vision set out 
in the ECHR. This, the Home Office argued, was desirable. Given its stake in the orig­
inal drafting of the ECHR, the UK government had originally assumed that the rights 
were already sufficiently protected in UK law to obviate any explicit incorporation via 
legislation.92 This assumption was not borne out by the "number of cases in which the 
[ECtHR] have found that there have been violations of the Convention rights in the 
United Kingdom.”93
As a result, the HRA 1998 was drafted to “give further effect to [ECHR] rights in 
domestic law.”94 As already noted, one the most significant developments in English 
common law following the enacting of the HRA 1998 has been the gradual expansion 
of breach of confidence to cover much of the protection provided by article 8 of the 
ECHR. What originally began as a means of, primarily, regulating certain contractual 
obligations in trade, is now on the verge of bifurcating into two separate pieces of law: 
(a) its traditional contractual ambit, and (b) broad legal protection of the individual 
against public dissemination of personal facts.
The HRA 1998 is primarily a vertical piece of legislation, allowing individuals to 
bring an ECHR-based action against UK public authorities. However, it also provides a 
limited horizontal effect, allowing individuals to claim their ECHR rights in cases that 
do not involve any public authority. Parliament is adamant that this horizontal effect is 
limited in scope. Where a case is brought to court by some previously established cause 
of action, the act will apply to both parties, but the HRA 1998 does not, in and of itself, 
create any new cause of action:
91 Home Office, Rights Brought Home, § 1.14.
92Ibid.,§ 1.11.
93Ibid.,§ 1.16.
94Ibid., § 3.8.
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The lack of a cause of action to bring a case to court would mean that in many cases 
“horizontal” application of [ECHR] rights would be of little assistance to victims 
of a breach of [ECHR] rights by a provider of a public service which was not a 
public authority.95
Douglas v. Hello!96 was the first case to take advantage of these general develop­
ments. Actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones had sought an emergency 
injunction against Hello! magazine to prohibit the latter from publishing photographs 
taken surreptitiously at their wedding, as they already had an exlusive deal to that effect 
with OK! magazine. Although an interim injunction was at first granted, the decision 
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which argued that the claimants’ interests were 
sufficiently protected by the possibility of damages at trial, on the basis of a breach of 
confidence by the covert photographer. Sedley, LJ, did note, in his opinion, that tradi­
tional breach of confidence doctrine was not easily applied to the case, insofar as there 
was no established relationship between the covert photographer and the couple to give 
rise to issues of confidence.97 Nevertheless, he argued that, given the “increasingly in­
vasive social environment,” together with the enacting of the HRA 1998, it was safe to 
conclude that the law “no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of con­
fidentiality between intruder and victim,” but that it could instead “recognise privacy 
itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy.”98 
Keene, LJ, in his opinion, agreed with this sentiment, clarifying the manner in which 
the doctrine of breach of confidence had developed since the enacting of the HRA 1998 
to accommodate (most of) the protection afforded to privacy by the ECHR:
Whether th e ... liability is described as being for breach of confidence or for breach 
of a right to privacy may be little more than deciding what label is to be attached to 
the cause of action, but there would seem to be merit in recognising that the orig­
inal concept of breach of confidence has in this particular category of cases now 
developed into something different from the commercial ... relationships with 
which confidentiality is mainly concerned.99
95 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report, f  88.
96 [2001] QB 967 (CA).
97 Ibid., 998.
98 Ibid., 997,1001.
"Ibid., 1012.
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The courts were quick to adopt this extension of breach of confidence. The case of 
Venables v. News Group Newspapers100 concerned two boys who had, at the age of ten, 
murdered a two-year old boy. During their subsequent detention, the courts enjoined 
the press from reporting on the two. Upon turning eighteen, and being scheduled for 
release, the boys sought a continuation of the injunction to prevent publication of any 
personal details about themselves. Relying on the discussion in Douglas, Dame Butler- 
Sloss, P, granted an injunction on the basis of confidence, maintaining that insofar as 
publication of such details could lead to “grave and possibly fatal consequences,” it suf­
ficed to restrict the press from any such publication “independently of a transaction or 
relationship between [the] parties.”101
This view was strengthened in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. The case 
concerned the international super-model Naomi Campbell, who was photographed 
leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting and was subsequently made the subject of a 
tabloid story purporting to detail her fight against drug addiction. Where the trial court 
had initially awarded her £3,500 in damages, and the Court of Appeal had reversed this 
judgment, the House of Lords, by a slim majority of three to two, overturned the rever­
sal. Although the court was divided on the merits of the appeal, there was agreement 
among their Lordships that an extended notion of confidence applied to cases of this 
kind, as summarized succinctly by Lord Hoffman:
In recent years ... there have been two developm ents o f  the law o f  confidence, 
typical o f  the capacity o f  the com m on law to adapt itself to the needs o f  contem ­
porary life. O ne has been an acknowledgem ent o f the artificiality o f  distinguishing  
between confidential information obtained through the violation o f  a confidential 
relationship and sim ilar inform ation obtained in som e other way. The second has 
been the acceptance, under the influence o f  human rights instrum ents such as [ar­
ticle 8 o f  the ECHR], o f  the privacy o f  personal inform ation as som ething worthy  
o f  protection in its ow n right.102
Their Lordships furthermore agreed that where the privacy of individuals is to be so 
protected, it must be weighed against the protection of freedom of speech and press (as 
articulated in article 10 of the ECHR). This constituted a reiteration of the position of 
the courts in several earlier cases, such as X (formerly known as Mary Bell) v. O'Brien103
10°[2001] Fam. 430 (F).
101 Ibid., 462.
102Campbell, f  46.
103[2003] EWHC 1101 (QB), [2003] All ER 282.
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which concerned the potential publication of the identities of a woman—who at the 
age of eleven had killed two young children—and her daughter. Dame Butler-Sloss, P, 
in granting an injunction “contra mundum,” referred to a “necessary balancing exercise 
between the need to protect confidentiality and the need to pay proper respect to the 
right of freedom of expression.”104 Similarly, in A v. B pic. 105 a case involving an attempt 
to enjoin the publication of details of a Premiership footballers (Gary Flitcroft s) extra­
marital affairs, Lord Woolf, CJ, specified, broadly, the way in which such a balancing 
ought to take place:
There is a tension  between the two articles w hich requires the court to hold the 
balance between the conflicting interests they are designed to protect. This is not 
an easy task but it can be achieved by the courts if, when holding the balance, they 
attach proper weight to the im portant rights both articles are designed to protect.
Each article is qualified expressly in a way w hich allows the interests under the 
other article to be taken into account.106
Lord Woolf denied the injunction, ruling that the sort of relationships Flitcroft had 
engaged in were not sufficiently stable to justify judicial interference with freedom of 
press in the form of any injunction.107 The courts have since reconsidered this sort of 
view, which accords the press a prima facie right to publication, due to case law from 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg. For instance, in Von Hannover v. Germany,108 Princess Car­
oline of Monaco had sought to prevent German newspapers from publishing photos 
of her engaging in various daily activities in public, such as shopping, horseriding, and 
skiing. The German courts had found that she, in virtue of her public profile, could not 
hold any reasonable expectation of privacy while in public. The ECtHR unanimously 
rejected this view, ruling that Germany had breached its positive obligations to pro­
tect the princess’s private life in accordance with article 8 of the ECHR. Although they 
recognized that publication of details of the private lives of famous individuals may at 
times be justified—particularly in the case of politicians—they maintained that where 
the sole purpose of publication was “to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership re­
garding the details of the applicant s private life,” there was not sufficient public interest 
to justify the breach of privacy inherent in doing so:
104Ibid., 5 58.
105 [2002] EWCA Civ. 337, [2003] QB 195.
106Ibid., y 6.
107Ibid., f  y 45-50.
108 [2004] ECHR 59320/00.
69
3 . P r iv a c y  La w  in  t h e  UK
The public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant is 
and how she behaves generally in her private life even if she appears in places that 
cannot always be described as secluded and despite the fact that she is well known 
to the public. Even if such a public interest exists, as does a commercial interest 
of the magazines in publishing these photos and these articles, in the instant case 
those interests must, in the Court’s view, yield to the applicant s right to the effective 
protection of her private life.109
These developments encompass a view of privacy as a public interest in its own right, 
rather than privacy as in direct opposition with public interest:
In deciding whether a right has been infringed, and in assessing the relative worth 
of competing rights, it is not for judges to make individual moral judgments or 
to be swayed by personal distaste. It is not simply a matter of personal privacy 
versus the public interest. The modern perception is that there is a public interest 
in respecting personal privacy. It is thus a question of taking account of conflicting 
public interest considerations and evaluating them according to increasingly well 
recognised criteria.110
In light of the ruling in Von Hannover, there has been speculation about the potential 
outcome of prior cases had they been heard since. For instance, Sedley, LJ, has recently 
maintained, extra-judicially, that Von Hannover makes it “extremely doubtful whether 
[A v. £] could now be decided as it was”111 The Court of Appeal has concurred, Buxton, 
LJ, arguing in McKennitt v. Ash112—a case brought by a Canadian folk musician seeking 
to enjoin the publication of a book containing details about her life—that “the width of 
the rights given to the media by A v. B cannot be reconciled with Von Hannover ”113
Its effects are also highly visible in recent case law, such as Mosley v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd.114 The case concerned the former president of the Federation Inter­
nationale de l’Automobile, after he had been made the subject of a News of the World 
tabloid exposure publishing details, images, and an online video of his masochistic sex­
ual activities. The event had been covertly photographed and filmed by one of the female 
participants. Mosley took the tabloid to court, claiming that his right to privacy, as en­
shrined in the ECHR, had been breached by the publication, and that this amounted to
109 Von Hannover, 5 77; this view is in line with earlier rulings by the ECtHR, such as Peck.
n0Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] All ER 322, J 130.
111 Webb, Curbs On a Modem Millers Tale.
112[2006] EWCA Civ. 1714, [2008] QB 73.
113Ibid., f  62.
114 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] All ER 322.
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a joint breach of confidence and “unauthorised disclosure of personal information.”115 
For such a case to succeed, the court argued in line with the above prescriptions, it 
would need to be shown not only that there would have been a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” but that the interests in privacy outweighed those of free expression.116 This 
was deemed to be the case, Eady, J, reaching the following conclusion:
W hen the courts identify an infringem ent o f  a persons article 8 rights ... it is 
right to afford a rem edy and to vindicate that right. The only permitted exception  
is where there is a countervailing public interest w hich in the particular circum ­
stances is strong enough to outw eigh it. . .. It is yet to be determ ined how  far that 
doctrine w ill be taken in the courts o f  this jurisdiction in relation to photography  
in public places. If taken literally, it w ould m ean a very significant change in what 
is permitted. It w ould have a profound effect on  the tabloid and celebrity culture 
to which w e have becom e accustom ed in recent years.117
Although Eady in the end awarded Mosley an unprecedented £60,000 in damages, he 
refused to grant an interlocutory injunction against the defendant, on the basis that the 
online stories and video had already been viewed hundreds of thousands of times.118 
Mosley subsequently filed an application to the ECtHR, claiming that the UK was in 
breach of his article 8 right to respect for privacy in failing to impose a duty on the 
News o f the World to notify him in advance of publication of the story. The case, which 
was only recently heard, ruled that there had been no breach of Mosley s article 8 right 
to private life.119
Regardless, the success of Mosley in the High Court has spawned a flurry of sim­
ilar cases in recent years, which include the granting not only of injunctions, but also 
of what are commonly referred to as super-injunctions, which prohibit the press from 
even mentioning the existence of the court order. Given the lack of any specific parlia­
mentary guidance for the development of this area of privacy law beyond the general 
provisions of the HRA 1998, the courts have instead tended to rely relatively directly on 
ECtHR judgments such as Von Hannover. In their interpretation and application of the 
European jurisprudence, there have thus been numerous instances where newspapers 
have been enjoined from reporting on any details of a case. These have, nevertheless,
I5Ibid., f  3.
16Ibid., f  7.
l7Ib id .,f 131.
18Ibid., f  j  32,236.
19Mosley v. UK [2011] ECHR 48009/08.
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come to light in a variety of means, including when the court has refused to continue 
an existing super-injunction,120 when the details of the injunction have been reported 
in another legal jurisdiction such as Scotland or the US, when the injunction has been 
revealed through parliamentary privilege, or when the details have been disseminated 
in contempt of court.
All of the last three instances occured in relation to an affair between English foot­
baller Ryan Giggs and Welsh glamor model Imogen Thomas. Giggs sought to enjoin 
English newspaper The Sun against revealing the details of their relationship. On April 
14, 2011, the High Court granted a temporary injunction to that effect. On May 8 the 
same year, an account on the website Twitter was created and used to post the details 
of several anonymized privacy injunctions, including that of Giggs, which was subse­
quently reported in various media outlets outside England, including on the front page 
of the print edition of the Sunday Herald in Scotland, on May 22. This was done despite 
the (English) High Court judgment, on May 16, finding in favor of the claimant and cit­
ing article 8 of the ECHR as the basis for the court’s decision to enjoin the English press 
from identifying Giggs in relation to the relationship.121 Eady, J, argued as follows:
It w ill rarely be the case that the privacy rights o f  an individual or o f  his family 
will have to yield in priority to another’s right to publish what has been described  
in the H ouse o f  Lords as “tittle-tattle about the activities o f  footballers’ wives and 
girlfriends.”122
On May 23, John Hemming, MP, utilized parliamentary privilege (i.e. legal immu­
nity in one’s duties as a legislator) to name Giggs as the CTB of the case.123 When The 
Sun on the very same day attempted to have the injunction lifted, Eady, J, refused the 
application, again citing the importance of privacy and the lack of any substantial pub­
lic interest in the case. In 2012, Giggs finally consented to the court naming him in 
proceedings.124
The situation arising in relation to the Giggs case—namely that of widespread knowl­
edge about the individual in question, despite there being an injunction on English
120See e.g. Hutcheson (previously known as “KGM”) v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ. 808.
121CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB), [2011] All ER 142.
122 Ibid., 5 33.
123HC Debate, May 23, 2011, vol. 528, col. 638.
n iGiggs (previously known as “CTB") v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWHC 431 (QB), [2012] All 
ER 93.
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newspapers against reporting this information—was unique in its specifics. Neverthe­
less, general concerns about super-injunctions have led to the publication of a judiciary 
report by a committee headed by Lord Neuberger, MR. The report found, among other 
things, that super-injunctions should “only be granted when they are strictly neces­
sary,” and not in such a manner that they became permament.125 Although it thereby 
took the position that there was a risk of overusing super-injunctions, it provided no 
judicial specification of precisely how to draw any boundary for such strict necessity.
3.3 Other European Influences
The UK is, in virtue of its status as a founding member of the CE, and an early acces­
sion member to the EU, subject to a variety of European laws and treaties. While these 
impose various legal recommendations and requirements, the areas of data protection 
and working time limitations are particularly pertinent to the question of athlete where­
abouts. I treat them briefly, in turn, below.
The EU is comprised of a set of European countries that share in certain economic 
and political aims, and that have agreed to follow EU law, as per the original 1957 Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, and its subsequent amendments as 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (most recently amended, in 2007, 
by the Treaty of Lisbon). EU law is based on the various EU treaties, as well as its regula­
tions and directives. According to the Treaty of Rome 1957, member states are required 
to apply this law, either directly or indirectly, within their own jurisdictions; failure to 
do so risks proceedings against the member state in question by the European Commis­
sion. The judicial authority of the EU is the CJEU; in addition to ensuring that member 
states comply with EU law, it is responsible for ensuring the legality of the acts of EU 
institutions and interpreting EU law when requested to do so by national courts and 
tribunals.126 As a member of the EU, the UK is required to recognize EU law within its 
own jurisdiction, whether through legislation or judicial application.
There are various areas of contention between the EU and WADA. The Sports Com­
mission of the European Union has, for instance, questioned the legality of WADAs 
data protection policies, in relation to the revised whereabouts requirements and their
125Neuberger, Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions.
126CJEU, General Presentation.
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implementation in the EU. Among several points of concern, the Commission voiced 
their reservations regarding the process by which athlete whereabouts data was trans­
mitted to WAD As database in Canada.127 At the time of their coming into force, then 
EU Sport Commissioner Jan Figel stated these concerns, requesting that WADA wait 
with the implementation of the new whereabouts requirements:
I w ould urge the president o f  W ADA for the sake o f  clarity and cohesion between  
m any stake holders [to] put on  hold this article and await the opinion o f  our work­
ing party on this and then m ake a final decision It is better to delay this decision
since anti-doping policy  deserves sensitivity and time. The reward w ould be very  
high for the credibility o f  W ADA and the com petitions. It w ould show m ore fair­
ness in dealing with sportsm en and w om en .128
Similarly, concerns have also been raised that the whereabouts requirements fall foul 
of EU law governing restrictions on maximum working time and minimum rest periods 
for employees. The International Federation of Professional Footballers (FIFPro) have 
considered raising a legal challenge against the requirements on this basis.129 It has also 
been the subject of academic consideration:
A  strong case can be m ade that the new  “whereabouts” rule clearly infringes on  
this right [to a w eekly rest period]. Under the rule, an athlete is subject to a p o ­
tential no-notice drug test for one hour out o f  every day, 7 days a week, 365 days 
a year. By having to provide inform ation on where the athlete can be located dur­
ing this sixty-m inute tim e period, the athlete is essentially put “on call” every day.
There is no point in tim e when the athlete w ould be able to enjoy an uninterrupted  
twenty-four hours o f  rest and relaxation as guaranteed by [EU law]. The athlete 
m ust be present at the “specified location” during the “specified tim e” no matter 
what. W ADAs new  “whereabouts” rule requires com pliance every day and clearly 
obstructs an athletes right to a weekly rest period .130
I discuss the legality of WADAs whereabouts requirements, in relation to the above 
sorts of issues, in further detail in chapter 7. The purpose of the current section—as of 
the chapter as a whole—is to provide an initial overview of the general legal terrain.
127Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 312008; Article 29 Working Party, Second Opinion 4/2009.
128As quoted in Ennis, Doping-EU Regulator Wants “Whereabouts” Rule On Hold.
129FIFPro, Legal Threat to Anti-Doping Code.
130Halt, “Where Is the Privacy in WADAs ‘Whereabouts’ Rule?” 284.
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3.3.1 Data Protection
In 1980, the OECD published its recommendations for the protection of personal data, 
consisting of various principles dictating reasonable limitations to the processing of 
personal data.131 Although the OECD guidelines were non-binding, they were even­
tually implemented in EU law through the adoption of the European Data Protection 
Directive 1995 (EDPD 1995).132 Briefly, the directive stipulates a “right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data,”133 with the latter defined as follows:
“Personal data” shall m ean any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one w ho can be identi­
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification num ber 
or to one or m ore factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, econom ic, 
cultural or social identity.134
The EDPD 1995 sets out the general conditions that must be met in order to allow for 
the legal processing of such personal data. According to the directive, personal data may 
only be processed with the consent of the data subject, unless there are other overriding 
concerns (such as prior legislation, or national or public security).135 Furthermore, it 
falls on the processor of any personal data to ensure that the data are processed fairly, 
collected and used for the specified purposes only, relevant to the purposes of collection 
and processing, accurate and up-to-date, and stored no longer than is necessary for the 
specified purposes; in addition to communicating to the data subject the processors 
identity, the purposes of processing, and any further relevant information.136
Finally, the EDPD 1995 grants data subjects a right of access to the personal infor­
mation held about them by data processors, as well as a right to object to, among other 
things, the use of their personal data for the sake of direct marketing.137 More specifi­
cally, the EDPD 1995 forbids the transfer of data to countries outside the EU, unless the 
data subject has explicitly consented or sufficient protection is otherwise in place.138
131 OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, §§ 7-14.
132Council Directive 95/46/EC [1995] OJ L281/31.
133EDPD 1995, art. 1.1.
134Ibid., art. 2.a.
135Ibid., arts. 7,13.
136Ibid., arts. 6, 10.
137Ibid., arts. 12,14.
138Ibid., ch. IV.
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The EDPD 1995 was implented in the UK through the passing of the Data Protection 
Act 1998 (DPA 1998), a UK Act of Parliament that defines the law on the processing of 
the data of identifiable living people.139 It consolidates and replaces previous legislation 
such as the Data Protection Act 1984 and the Access to Personal Files Act 1987, and was 
enacted in order to bring UK law into line with the requirements of the EDPD 1995.
More specifically, the DPA 1998 establishes the legal requirements pertaining to data 
collection and processing within the UK, in effect granting individuals the possibility 
of controlling the use by others of their personal information. The act defines various 
data protection principles, and also enunciates the entitlements and rights of individ­
uals in respect to their personal data. Briefly, and in general, individuals in the UK are 
entitled to be informed about the processing of any of their personal data, a description 
of the personal data processed, the purposes of the data processing, the recipients of the 
processed data, and information about the source of the data. This entitlement must be 
met, barring overriding concerns (such as national security, crime, or taxation), where 
an individual has submitted a formal request, and paid any “subject access fee,” to the 
data controller for the relevant information.140 Furthermore, and again in general, in­
dividuals in the UK have the right to at any time require that their personal data is not 
processed for the purposes of direct marketing, not processed for any purposes “likely 
to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to another” where that 
damage or distress would be considered unwarranted, and that it be corrected if it is 
inaccurate (as to matters of fact).141
In addition, any organization seeking to process the personal data of individuals in 
the UK must be officially registered with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), 
a non-departmental public body that reports directly to Parliament and is taxed with 
regulating adherence to, educating about, and resolving problems regarding the DPA 
1998 and related pieces of legislation. Failure to register is classed as an offence, as is 
failure to abide by the act.142 The ICO is an active body, dealing with a multitude of in­
dividual complaints and cases, and ultimately behind a spate of well-publicized events,
139Note also that although the ECtHR hears cases against member states of the CE for purported breaches 
of the rights stipulated in the ECHR, it also recognizes in its decisions the rights set forth in the EDPD 
1995 for those EU member states to which the latter applies, as per S v. UK [2008] ECHR 30562/04, f  
50.
140DPA 1998, § 7.
141 Ibid., §§ 10-11,14.
142 Ibid., § 21.
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from various prosecutions over the illegal processing of personal data to the public re­
lease of controversial UK MP expenses.143
3.3.2 Working Time Restrictions
The EU legislated on working time restrictions for workers within its member states as 
early as 1993.144 After several amendments,145 EU lawmakers consolidated the law into 
a replacement directive in 2003: the European Working Time Directive 2003 (EWTD 
2003).146 The new directive stipulates various legal restrictions on working time, for 
the purpose of protecting workers’ health and safety. More specifically, it requires EU 
member states to recognize certain minimum daily, weekly, and annual rest periods, in 
addition to maximum limitations on weekly working hours.147
According to the EWTD 2003, workers are entitled to (a) a rest period of at least 
eleven consecutive hours during every twenty-four-hour period; (b) a further rest pe­
riod of at least twenty-four consecutive hours during every seven-day period; and (c) 
at least four weeks of paid annual leave.148 In addition, the maximum average weekly 
working time, including overtime, is set to forty-eight hours.149 “Working time” is de­
fined in the directive as “any period during which the worker is working, at the em­
ployer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national 
laws and/or practice,” while “rest period” is defined as any period that is not working 
time.150
The UK legislated working time restrictions in 1998, in response to the 1993 ver­
sion of the EU directive. The delay was due to significant political opposition from the 
UK in response to the original directive. It was not until the 1996 European Court of 
Justice (ECJ; the highest court of the CJEU) case against the Council of the European 
Union (CEU) that the EU found the UK legally obliged to implement the details of 
the directive. The success of the directive, the court argued, “necessarily presupposes
143 See ICO, Introduction to the ICO, and links from there.
144Council Directive 93/104/EC [1993] OJ L307/18.
145As specified in Directive 2000/34/EC [2000] OJ LI95/41.
146Directive 2003/88/EC [2003] OJ L299/9, EWTD 2003.
147Ibid., f  5.
148Ibid., arts. 3, 5,7.
,49Ibid„ art. 6.
150Ibid., arts. 2.1- 2.2.
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Community-wide action,” since otherwise it would, “as in this case, [leave] the enact­
ment of the detailed implementing provisions required largely to the Member States.”151 
The resulting legislation, the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR1998), imple­
mented the specifics of the EWTD 1993, although it differed from the latter in allow­
ing exceptions from the forty-eigh-hour maximum weekly working time limit.152 These 
would occur where employees would agree with their employer in writing that the max­
imum weekly working time limit did not apply to them, where the employer would 
maintain up-to-date records on affected employees, and where the employer would 
provide any official health and safety inspector access to those records and any further 
information requested.153 Such exceptions would apply for a specified time period or 
indefinitely, as agreed between the employees and employer, and subject to no less than 
seven days’ written notice where an employee would seek to terminate the agreement.154 
The WTR 1998 has since been amended numerous times, in order to ensure that it re­
flects developments at the European level, as through the amendments to EWTD 2003. 
It still retains, however, the possibility of exceptions from the forty-eight-hour maxi­
mum weekly working time limit, as in the original.
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is taxed with monitoring employer com­
pliance with the WTR 1998, in a similar role to that of the ICO in the context of data 
protection legislation. The HSE was, however, created prior to the WTR 1998, as a result 
of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, to regulate and enforce certain minimum 
standards of workplace safety, health, and welfare. In relation to working time limits, the 
HSE is, among other things, responsible for the enforcement of the maximum weekly 
working time limit, as well as the possible exceptions to that limit.155
In summary, there are a host of different legal privacy protections in England—some 
of which are still undergoing extensive development—although there is still no explicit 
legal general right to privacy as such. While only some of these areas of law are directly 
relevant to WADAs whereabouts requirements, they all inform common interpreta­
tions of and judgments about privacy among the general public. The conceptual situa­
tion is, however, made more complex by a variety of further factors. Foremost among
151 UK v. CEU [1996] ECR1-05755,5 47.
152WTR 1998, SI 1998/1833.
153WTR 1998, § 5.
154Ibid., § 5(2).
l55HSE, The Working Time Regulations.
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these is the contingent historical fact that serious philosophical treatment of privacy 
is—in at least English-speaking philosophy—almost exclusively limited to particular 
concerns arising from the context of US legal developments over the past fifty years or 
so. For this reason, it is impossible to appreciate the impact and importance of much 
of the philosophical discussion without an initial overview of its roots in US law. The 
following chapter addresses this issue, as a foundation for the subsequent development 
of an account of privacy suited to the whereabouts context.
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Co n t e m p o r a r y  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  p r iv a c y , when expressed in English, share an interesting etymological quirk. Privacy has long been discussed by the ju ­diciary in a number of countries, including the UK, but philosophical treat­
ment of it (in at least the English-speaking world) is an almost uniquely American phe­
nomenon, arising in response to historical expansions in the US legal interpretation 
of privacy This philosophical discussion is fractured and indeterminate. But it has, in 
virtue of its near monopoloy on robust accounts of privacy, influenced interpretations 
of the term globally. Roughly, these can be divided into two groups: what I will call 
narrow accounts of privacy restrict their treatment of the concept to certain types of 
personal information, while wide accounts maintain that there is more to privacy than 
just personal information.
4.1 Conceptual Origins
There are a multitude of different uses of privacy and its near cognates. Many of these 
are largely irrelevant to present purposes; private as a military rank, as an indication 
of a person not holding public office (as in private citizen), or as a designator of that 
which is not provided by the state or some equivalent public body (as in private sector). 
The interest here lies instead with privacy and private as designators of that which is, in 
common parlance, “nobody elses business.”
Although this notion is not sufficiently specific to be used as the basis for a robust 
account of privacy—not least because “nobody elses business” can be reasonably in-
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terpreted in a number of different ways—it nevertheless corresponds to the intuitive 
discomfort many people feel about various sorts of harms. The concern also seems to 
be on the rise among the public generally, as surveillance technologies continue to be 
developed:
In recent years, surveillance has becom e an increasingly salient political issue in
the United States___Generally speaking, the polls show that concern about threats
to personal privacy has been growing in recent years. A lthough the public was tem ­
porarily w illing to expand the governm ent s investigative powers in the aftermath 
o f the September 11 ,2001 , terrorist attacks, support for m ost forms o f  surveillance 
has declined .1
In order to establish the normative force of such concerns—whether in relation to 
the general public or to elite athlete whereabouts requirements—it is crucial to first 
establish a clear idea of what, precisely, is being objected to, in order to assess its legal 
and ethical acceptability. While there are a multitude of scholarly accounts of privacy 
that purport to do just that, few of them agree on the specifics. As a result, there is a risk 
of skepticism about the utility of the concept of privacy generally. I provide an overview 
of the most important scholarly accounts of privacy below, beginning with the origins 
of the discussion in the historical distinction between public and private.
4.1.1 Early History
There is a well-documented tendency, among both humans and animals, to at times 
seek solitude or concealment from other individuals, whether through territorial be­
haviors, selective concealment (of e.g. body parts), or the regulation of social taboos.2 
Such findings suggest that, cultural variations notwithstanding, all people (and many 
animals) share a strong and primeval drive to control the extent to which they expose 
themselves to others, whether in actions or words. Although different groups express 
this drive in different ways, it tends to amount to a similar functional distinction, be­
tween those matters considered rightly public and those considered rightly private, rel­
ative to the context.
1 Best, Krueger, and Ladewig, “Privacy in the Information Age”; cf. also Katz and Tassone, “Public Opinion 
Trends”; DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy; and, for a similar overview of privacy concerns in the UK context, 
Morrison and Svennevig, The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy.
2 See e.g. Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa; Westin, Privacy and Freedom; Altman, The Environment and 
Social Behavior; DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 11-13.
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Various scholars have reflected upon this disctinction, between normatively loaded 
notions of public and private.3 The original Hippocratic Oath, for instance, from around 
400 BCE, includes the following section:
W hat I may see or hear in the course o f  the treatment or even outside o f  the treat­
m ent in regard to the life o f  m en, which on no account one m ust spread abroad, I 
will keep to myself, holding such things sham eful to be spoken about.4
Aristotle, in turn, separated the polis—the public realm of political activity—from 
the oikos—the private realm of the family. The oikos, consisting of certain primary re­
lations (husband-wife, father-child, master-slave), constituted, according to Aristotle, 
the individual units of the polis, with the man of the house serving as the intermediary 
between the two.5
John Stuart Mill proposed a related distinction, between other-regarding and self- 
regarding activities. Government authority, in his view, had jurisdiction over the for­
mer, but not over the latter, insofar as self-regarding activity concerned “the interests of 
no persons besides [oneself].”6 Such a division, although similar in form to Aristotle’s, 
differed from the latter s in its explicit focus on the individual, rather than the family, 
as well as in its explicit emphasis on the normative importance of governmental non­
interference with any self-regulating activity.
John Locke applied a similar normative distinction to the realm of economics, argu­
ing that although the world, in a state of nature, belonged equally to all, rightful private 
property was achieved by one’s own toil:
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be com m on to all m en, yet every man  
has a property in his ow n person; this nobody has any right to but him self. The 
labour o f h is b ody and the work o f  his hands w e m ay say are properly his. W hat­
soever, then, he rem oves out o f  the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he 
hath m ixed his labour with, and joined to it som ething that is his ow n, and thereby 
makes it h is property.7
3 For a more thorough overview of different interpretations of the public-private distinction, see Gavison, 
“Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction” 4-9; cf. also DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 9-11.
4As given in Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath, 3.
5Aristotle, Politics, §§ 1253bl-14,1260b8-27; Roy, “Polis and Oikos in Classical Athens.”
6Mill, On Liberty, 135.
7Locke, O f Civil Government, 15-16.
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This narrow selection of historical views about the distinction between private and 
public is sufficient to illustrate the variety of conceptually separate but overlapping in­
terpretations of the distinction. Explicit discussion about privacy itself, however, only 
began in earnest at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by the development in 
US law of a general tort right to privacy. Serious subsequent philosophical treatment of 
the topic, from the late 1960s onward, grew from reflections on the US Supreme Courts 
extension of privacy to range over certain legal instances concerning, particularly, con­
traception and procreative rights. This philosophical discussion has been broad and 
varied, but any attempt to appreciate the source and main thrust of its form and content 
requires a closer initial investigation into its underpinnings in US law.
4.1.2 Warren and Brandeis
As noted in the previous chapter, common law protections of privacy in England de­
veloped significantly throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, by the end of 
the century, important concerns remained. As North, J, noted in Pollard, there was, at 
the time, no legal redress for non-defamatory photographs taken surreptitiously.8 In 
the US—which at the time still derived much of its law from English legal cases and 
considerations—this was made all the more pressing by two then recent non-legal de­
velopments.
First, Eastman Dry Plate Company introduced their Kodak camera in 1888. This was 
an inexpensive and widely popular roll film camera that allowed simple pointing and 
snapping, making it significantly easier to take covert photographs than with the bulkier 
and more conspicuous (and significantly more expensive) plate cameras of the day.9 
Second, the publication ranges of so-called yellow papers—i.e. newspapers seeking to 
increase sales by resorting to exaggeration, gossip, and sensationalism—were expanding 
rapidly. And where a newspaper would choose to write about an individual, there was 
very little in the way of legal remedies—apart from protections against outright libel 
and slander—to stop them from doing so, regardless of the perceived newsworthiness 
of the information thus divulged.10
^Pollard, 346.
9The camera was so successful that the company subsequently changed its name to the Eastman Kodak 
Company: Jenkins, “Technology and the Market.”
10 For a brief historical discussion of yellow papers and their influence on the development of legal privacy 
protections in the US, see Solove, Rotenberg, and Schwartz, Privacy, Information, and Technology, 9-10.
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It was in this historical context that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis penned their 
seminal 1890 article “The Right to Privacy.” In their view, instantaneous photography 
and the yellow press had jointly “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life; and ... threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet 
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops’ 'n 1
Their article, which led to the creation of various US privacy torts and marked the 
starting point for subsequent scholarly discussion of privacy, is still central to that dis­
cussion today.12 An indication of its position in US law can be gleaned from the fact 
that it was cited recently, more than a century after its publication, by the majority of 
Supreme Court justices—among those both in concurrence and in dissent—in a recent 
case.13
In response to the concerns that Warren and Brandeis shared about instantaneous 
photography and the yellow press, they argued that although there was no explicitly 
recognized legal right to privacy thereto, its general principle was nevertheless implicit 
in the development of English and US common law up to that point. What had orig­
inally served as a primitive notion of a right to life—understood merely as a right to 
one’s physical self and property—had expanded, they maintained, to include various 
rights pertaining to more than just the physical being of the individual. These included 
protections from assault (as opposed to just from battery), from nuisance, and from 
slander and libel; as well as protections of both tangible and intangible property, such 
as trademarks, and literary and artistic works. A legal right to privacy was, in the au­
thors’ opinion, merely the next stage of this natural expansion of the common law.14 
Recognizing this in the courts would not, they argued, amount to a case of judicial leg­
islation:
The application o f  an existing principle to a new  state o f  facts is not judicial legis­
lation. To call it such is to assert that the existing body o f  law consists practically 
o f  the statutes and decided cases, and to deny that the principles (o f w hich these
n Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 195.
12 It has been referred to by various epithets, including “one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of 
theoretical jurisprudence,” by Adams, “The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel,” 37; the 
“most influential law review article of all,” by Kalven, “Privacy in Tort Law,” 327; and “momentous,” by 
Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 127.
n Kyllo v. US 533 US 27 (2001), concerning the use by law enforcement authorities of a thermal-imaging 
device to detect heat patterns emanating from a person’s home.
14Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 193-96.
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cases are ordinarily said to be evidence) exist at all. It is not the application o f  an 
existing principle to new  cases, but the introduction o f  a new  principle, which is 
properly termed judicial legislation .15
To overcome what they viewed as the primary limitations of the law at the time with 
regard to the issue, the authors maintained that the right to privacy expanded beyond 
the traditional relationship-focus of confidence law, instead amounting to a right “to 
each individual ... of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thought, sentiments, 
and emotions shall be communicated to others.”16 This right, interpreted as part of “the 
more general right of the individual to be left alone,” was strongly individualistic; in­
stead of focusing on what individuals may owe each other in terms of trust, as in confi­
dence law, their new account sought to demarcate a domain of “inviolate personality” 
around each individual, to be protected by the law.17 Such an interpretation—what has 
since been termed “a right against the world to protect hurt feelings”—constitutes, in 
its explicit restriction to the sole individual, the foundation for the modern US legal 
interpretation of privacy.18
Warren and Brandeis reached this account through a novel reading of Prince Albert. 
The court in Prince Albert had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that exhibition 
and publication of the Princes etchings were prohibited on the grounds of both literary 
property and confidence. Where common law literary copyright amounted to, in the 
Lord Chancellor s opinion, the protection of people s “private use and pleasure” of their 
unpublished work, Warren and Brandeis argued that this form of intellectual property 
protection was “but [an instance] and [application] of a general right to privacy.”19 Con­
fidence did not suffice, in their view, for such protection, insofar as it “would not sup­
port the court in granting a remedy against a stranger,” i.e. it would not protect against 
the sorts of recent technological advances they were concerned with.20 Instead, the “pri­
vate use and pleasure” referred to by the Lord Chancellor amounted, in their view, to 
an explicit recognition of the applicability of existing legal principles to the protection 
of individual privacy. In this manner, Warren and Brandeis took the Lord Chancellor s
15 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 213nl.
16Ibid., 198.
17Ibid., 205,211.
18Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 132.
19Prince Albert, 1178; Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 198.
20Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 211.
86
4.1. Conceptual Origins
reference to “private use and pleasure” and used it to turn Prince Albert from a case 
concerning property rights to one concerning the protection of personal feelings from 
undesired publicity.21
Warren and Brandeiss implicit interpretation of privacy has proved important to 
subsequent philosophical discussion, despite the fact that they at no point provided 
any definition for privacy, nor, for that matter, explained or justified the source of its 
value (being to “protect peoples dignity”). They spoke, at some length, about the press 
contributing to an unacceptable spreading of “idle gossip,” and maintained that “of the 
desirability—indeed of the necessity—of some ... protection [of privacy], there can, it is 
believed, be no doubt,” but they made no attempt to either posit or describe a definition 
of any sort.22
This conceptual lacuna has not hindered later authors from attributing to Warren 
and Brandeis different definitions of privacy, typically read merely as “being let alone.”23 
Such a definition has obvious conceptual problems: it is easy to imagine situations in 
which an individual maintains privacy despite not being let alone (such as if they are hit 
in the head with a brick), or perhaps even in which they have no privacy despite being 
let alone (such as, arguably, if they are subject to certain forms of covert surveillance).24 
This is, however, not a particularly charitable reading of Warren and Brandeis.25 They 
maintained that a right to privacy was evident in an individuals right to determine 
“to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to oth­
ers,” insofar as “no other has the right to publish [a persons] productions in any form, 
without his consent.”26 Such an interpretation seems to suggest a notion of privacy that 
emphasizes personal control, rather than a simple matter of determining whether or 
not a person is being let alone.
Little can be said with absolute certainty, however, of the specifics of their preferred 
account of privacy. What can be noted with more confidence is their position, through­
out their article, that (a) privacy is a matter of the individual against larger groupings
21Cf. Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 131.
22 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 195-96.
23See e.g. Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 271; Archard, “The Value of Privacy,” 14; S. Davis, “Is 
There a Right to Privacy?” 451.
24Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 295; Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 272; S. Davis, “Is There 
a Right to Privacy?” 451.
25Cf. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 437n48, 46In 120; Austin, “Privacy and the Question of 
Technology,” 122.
26Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 198-99.
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in society (as opposed to e.g. one individual against another), and (b) privacy is in di­
rect opposition to the interests of the press (particularly in its more populist guises) in 
reporting on the affairs of individuals. They recognized that, by their account, it would 
become necessary to balance the interests of privacy against the interests of free speech, 
arguing that the former could not be used to “prohibit any publication of matter which 
is of public or general interest,” which they saw as in practice restricted to the question 
of suitability for public office or some similar public position.27 Likewise, they main­
tained that if any individual would choose to make something public, or consent to its 
being made public by another, that which was made public could receive no further 
legal protection on the basis of privacy. In response to the question of where to draw 
the line, practically, between private and public—whether, for instance, telling a friend 
a secret would legally constitute making the secret public or not—Warren and Brandeis 
argued that “a private communication of circulation for a restricted purpose is not a 
publication within the meaning of the law.”28 While this position seemed to allow for 
the expansion of privacy to concern not just individuals but also their intimate or secret 
relations, it gave no further consideration to the specifics of precisely where to draw the 
line. This was an issue Warren and Brandeis left for the US courts to develop as a matter 
of legal practice.
In any event, their novel reading of Prince Albert—shifting its focus from confidence 
to privacy, and arguing that the latter was the only means by which to protect peo­
ples dignity in light of recent technological advances—effected a fundamental shift in 
US privacy law, diverting it away from the thereto ongoing development of confidence 
protection. This shift was recognized by US courts in an initially piecemeal fashion, no 
doubt gaining some momentum from Brandeis s subsequent appointment in 1916 as 
an Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court.29
27Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 214-16.
28Ibid., 218.
29 One of his most celebrated opinions occurred in his dissent in Olmstead v. US 277 US 438 (1928), where 
he argued that “the makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the Government, the right to 
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man,” at 478; for 
an overview of the relevant US legal developments in the first half of the twentieth century, see Prosser, 
“Privacy,” 383-89; Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 146-48.
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4.1.3 Prosser and the US Privacy Torts
The first case in the US to recognize a legal right to privacy was the 1905 Pavesich v. 
New England Life Insurance Co.30 Unlike Warren and Brandeiss account of a right to 
privacy as inherent in common law development, the court in Pavesich sought to base 
the right on a number of foundations, including that it was “derived from natural law” 
and “embraced within the right of personal liberty”31
Warren and Brandeis had a significant impact on a host of cases in subsequent US 
law, but it was not until William Prosser published his article “Privacy” in 1960 that 
the US right to privacy was systematized into something resembling a coherent piece 
of common law. Noting, in the article, that there had been over three hundred privacy 
cases since Warren and Brandeiss “The Right to Privacy,” Prosser sought to clarify the 
defining factors of the relevant law.32 In so doing, he explicitly identified four separate 
torts:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure o f  embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity w hich places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation ...  o f  the plaintiff s nam e or likeness.33
Although Prosser was primarily attempting to construct a taxonomy of privacy law 
in the US, he also had significant concerns about its unregulated and sporadic develop­
ment thereto, insisting that there were “dangers” in its ongoing expansion into various 
different areas of law, and that it was “high time that we realize what we are doing, and 
give some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.”34 In 
unifying the tort of privacy in this manner, Prosser came to have a profound influence 
on later developments in US common law. His involvement as a reporter for the Second 
Restatement o f Torts only strengthened this influence.35 In utilizing his four-part taxon­
omy in the Restatement, Prosser s formulations, by explicitly simplifying and restricting
3050 SE 68 (GA 1905).
31 Ibid.
32Prosser, “Privacy,” 388.
33 Ibid., 389.
34 Ibid., 423.
35 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652.
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existing privacy case law, have become definitive and accepted across practically the en­
tire US.36 Where Warren and Brandeis had initiated the move away from confidence, 
Prosser effectively ossified it.37 And although there have been legal challenges to his 
scheme,38 it remains largely intact to the present day, and has had a significant impact 
on subsequent privacy cases.39
This is, however, not to maintain that the interpretation and application of the com­
mon law right to privacy in the US courts has been entirely uniform. Significant dif­
ferences arise in, for instance, the manner in which the courts draw the distinction be­
tween public and private. Some of the courts have been inclined to take a more or less 
binary and mutually exclusive view of the two, assuming that once something is in the 
public domain, broadly construed, it can no longer be considered private in any sense. 
In Nader v. General Motors Corp,40 Ralph Nader—an author and lecturer on automo­
bile safety (as well as a later political activist and US presidential candidate)—claimed 
that General Motors had violated his right to privacy in conducting a “campaign of 
intimidation” against him in light of a book that he was about to publish—titled “Un­
safe at Any Speed,” about the safety and design of the defendants automobiles. As part 
of this “campaign,” General Motors had, among other things, interviewed various ac­
quaintances of Nader s, questioning them about his “political, social, racial and religious 
views; his integrity; his sexual proclivities and inclinations; an d ... his personal habits.”41 
Insofar as any factual information General Motors received from such interviews was 
due to Nader previously having divulged the information freely to those acquaintances, 
the court found that there had been no violation of his right to privacy. In their view, the 
information “could hardly be regarded as private,” insofar as the divulging of any infor­
mation to others necessitated an assumption of the “risk that a friend or acquaintance 
in whom [one] had confided might breach the confidence.”42
This illustrates a highly stark view of the public-private distinction. Most judgments 
treating analogous cases do so on the basis of arguably less intentionally insidious prac-
36Richards and Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path,” 150-51.
37Note that there has been a highly limited development of confidence law in the US as well, entirely sep­
arate from that of privacy. For an overview, see ibid., 151-53,156-58.
38See for instance Florida Starv. B/F491 US 524 (1989).
39For an overview, see Richards and Solove, “Prossers Privacy Law.”
40255 NE 2d 765 (NY Ct. App. 1970).
41 Ibid., 767.
42 Ibid., 770. Note, however, that the court did subsequently find an invasion of Nader’s privacy on the basis 
of other actions by General Motors than those listed here.
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tices. For instance, in Duran v. Detroit News Inc43—concerning a Colombian judge who 
had previously indicted the infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar in Colombia, but had, 
due to death threats, resigned from the bench there and moved with her husband to 
Detroit—the Michigan Court of Appeal found that the publication in a newspaper of 
the judges Detroit home address did not amount to the revealing of any private infor­
mation. In her function as Colombian consul in Detroit, the plaintiff had handed out 
business cards with her name on them where she had deemed it appropriate. She had 
also signed the lease for her apartment, and introduced herself to her neighbors, using 
her real name (although she kept an unlisted telephone number, did not join any clubs 
or organizations, and did not attend public events). As a result, insofar as her iden­
tity was already “open to the public eye,” the court denied any violation of a right to 
privacy.44
Other cases have seen judgments in direct opposition to these sorts of construals of 
the public-private distinction, arguing that there can still be a reasonable expectation 
of privacy even where some personal information is available to many others. Thus, 
for instance, in Times Mirror Co v. Superior Court45 a reporter from the Los Ange­
les Times had written the then governor of California, requesting, under local public 
records legislation, copies of his “appointment schedules, calendars, notebooks and any 
other documents that would list [the governor’s] daily activities as governor from [his] 
inauguration in 1983 to the present [1988].”46 The governors office refused to comply, 
on the basis, roughly, that the information was private. The court concurred, stating that 
disclosing “every private meeting or association of the Governor ... is to deny human 
nature and contrary to common sense and experience.”47 The fact that several members 
of the governor s office, as well as many outside it (such as those with whom the gover­
nor would meet), were privy to the information did not suffice, in the courts opinion, 
to consider it non-private.
Note also that not all scholars have been satisfied with Prosser s enumeration of the 
privacy rights. Edward Bloustein argued, shortly after Prossers original treatment of 
the issue, against his separation of the right into four torts. Bloustein maintained that a
43504 NW  2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
44 Ibid., 720.
4553 Cal. 3rd 1325 (CA 1991).
46 Ibid., 1329.
47Ibid., 1345.
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“common thread runs through” a number of legal cases concerning privacy, including 
not only the four torts noted of Prosser s, but various other civil and criminal wrongs 
such as peeping, wiretapping, eavesdropping, and public disclosure of confidential in­
formation by the government.48 He identified this common thread as offense to a “rea­
sonable sense of personal dignity,” liberty, and individualism, maintaining that the af­
front was brought about by, among other things, “physically intruding on personal in­
timacy and by using techniques of publicity to make a public spectacle of an otherwise 
private life.”49
This sort of view is strengthened by the fact that subsequent developments in US law 
have often been inclined to treat cases concerning Prosser s privacy torts as linked to, 
in particular, the protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the US 
Constitution (against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against abuse of govern­
ment authority in legal procedures, respectively).50 Brandeis had, for instance, in Olm- 
stead argued that wiretaps on telephones ought to be covered by Fourth Amendment 
law. Although he was in dissent in the case, the Supreme Court eventually overturned 
the judgment in the 1967 cases Berger v. New York and Katz v. US,51 arguing in line 
with Brandeis s recommendations from almost forty years earlier, that Fourth Amend­
ment protection against wiretaps and transmission eavesdropping was necessitated by 
privacy concerns.52
4.1.4 The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The most dramatic expansion of the US legal interpretation of privacy, however, does 
not concern this sort of application of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law to the protec­
tion of personal information. In the landmark 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,53 
the Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution protects a different sort of right to 
privacy, one that invalidated Connecticut state statute against the provision of contra­
ceptives to married couples. Although the Bill of Rights never explicitly mentions pri­
vacy, Douglas, J, writing for the court, famously defended a “penumbral right of ‘pri-
48 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 1000-1001.
49 Ibid., 1002-3.
50See e.g. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 18.
51388 US 41 (1967); 389 US 347 (1967).
52Cf. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 18-21.
53 3 81 US 479(1965).
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vacy and repose’ ” that “emanated” from “those guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] that 
help give them life and substance.”54 This novel right to privacy protected, in Douglass 
opinion, a “zone of privacy” belonging to each married couple, and to their doctor in 
advising them on contraceptive possibilities.55 He argued that the zone arose from the 
guarantees provided by, among others, the First and Third Amendments (concerning 
the freedom of speech—including the freedom to teach and give information—and the 
protection of an individual’s home, respectively), in addition to those of the Fourth and 
Fifth.56
Although most of the Supreme Court Justices concurred with Douglas’s judgment 
about this sort of “penumbral” constitutional right to privacy, they proceeded to give a 
wide range of different justifications for it. Goldberg, J, argued for a right to privacy on 
the basis of the Ninth Amendment, stating that “the enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”57 Harlan and White, JJ, instead argued for the right on the basis of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Regardless of its specific justification, the constitutional right to privacy was ex­
panded a number of times, and was used, among other things, for striking down state 
statutes forbidding interracial marriage, as well as the possession of “obscene” materials 
in one’s home.59 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,60 Brennan, J, maintained that the right to pri­
vacy in respect of contraception and sexual choice applied to all individuals, regardless 
of their marital status:
If the right o f  privacy m eans anything, it is the right o f  the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwanted governm ent intrusion into matters so fundam en­
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child .61
This view was also responsible for the judgment, in the 1973 landmark Supreme 
Court case of Roe v. Wade,62 that a woman’s decision to have an abortion was protected
54 Ibid., 484-85.
55 Ibid., 485.
56 Ibid., 484.
57 Ibid., 488-93.
58Ibid., 500-502.
59Loving v. Virginia 388 US 1 (1967); Stanley v. Georgia 394 US 557 (1969).
60405U S438 (1972).
61 Ibid., 453.
62410 US 113 (1973).
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by the constitutional right to privacy. Of more immediate conceptual interest, the court 
attempted to provide a comprehensive definition of privacy in Whalen v. Roe,63 an un­
related case concerning New York statutes that required the collection and storage of 
information pertaining to all Schedule II drug prescriptions (concerning, among other 
things, opiates). The statutes stipulated that the information must include the name of 
the prescribing doctor, the pharmacy dispensing the drug, the name and dosage of the 
drug, and the name, address, and age of the patient receiving it.64 Specifically, the court 
recognized the dual nature of the US legal right to privacy, noting that one aspect of 
it concerned “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” while 
the other concerned “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”65
Numerous legal scholars have argued that the lack of consensus for the specific jus­
tification of the constitutional right to privacy in Griswold, and the explicit recognition 
of the dual nature of the US right to privacy in Whalen, illustrate conceptual confusion 
on the part of the Supreme Court justices.66 Specifically, there are claims that it is not 
only possible to successfully distinguish the tort right to privacy (including the Fourth 
Amendment protection against wiretaps and similar) from the constitutional right to 
privacy following from Griswold, but that the latter does not rightly concern privacy 
at all, pertaining instead to autonomy or liberty or some similar value. Louis Henkin 
constructs such an argument:
W hat the Court has been talking about is not at all what m ost people m ean by 
privacy. N one o f  the recent cases, and none o f  the older cases the Court cited (ex­
cept those dealing with search and seizure under the Fourth A m en d m en t)...  deals 
with any o f  the matters that are the subject o f  the now  m assive literature on pri­
vacy. In [the Griswold  line o f  cases], the Court was not talking about my freedom  
from  official intrusion into m y hom e, my person, my papers, m y telephone; about 
m y right to be free from official surveillance or accostin g ,... [or] from being m en­
tioned and publicized, or having data about m e collected. ...  The Court has been  
vindicating not a right to freedom  from official intrusion, but to freedom from  
official regulation .67
63429 US 589(1977).
64 Ibid., 589.
65Ibid., 599-600. The court ultimately found that the case in question activated both concerns, although 
not to an extent that required striking down the New York statutes.
66See e.g. Gross, “The Concept of Privacy”; Ely, “The Wages of Crying W olf’; Posner, “Uncertain Protection 
of Privacy by the Supreme Court.”
67Henkin, “Privacy and Autonomy,” 1424-25.
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These sorts of jurisprudential concerns—about the appropriate range of privacy pro­
tections in US law—have given rise to a parallell debate in philosophy regarding the 
proper scope of the concept of privacy. As the latter issues are more directly pertinent 
to the construction of an account of privacy relevant to the whereabouts context in the 
UK, it is to them I now turn.
4.2 Narrow Accounts of Privacy
There is no uncontroversial philosophical account of privacy; views differ widely on 
what, specifically, the term is supposed to encapsulate. This state of affairs has given 
rise to some skepticism about the concept itself. As Lillian BeVier maintains, “privacy 
is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to designate a wide range of wildly dis­
parate interests” and “connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest 
is being asserted in its name.”68 Or, as Judith Jarvis Thomson writes, “the most striking 
thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea of what 
it is.”69 There are presumably a number of reasons for this general state of affairs, but 
a large part of it is specifically due to the various different strategic approaches avail­
able to philosophers, and the lack of any meaningful consensus on which approach is 
best suited to the explication of any given phenomenon. I discuss these issues, and the 
problems entailed by them in relation to the privacy discussion, in more detail in the 
following chapter.
At this stage of the inquiry, the purpose is merely to provide an overview of the philo­
sophical debate on privacy, as a foundation for subsequent argumentation. Given the 
depth and breadth of the debate, this overview is necessarily selective, but it purports to 
be illustrative of the general discussion. More specifically, I separate the most important 
philosophical accounts of privacy into two rough groups. What I term narrow accounts 
of privacy are those that, in one manner or another, restrict their interpretations of pri­
vacy to certain aspects of personal information. W hat I term wide accounts of privacy 
are those that, again in some manner or other, include more than just personal infor­
mation in their definitions.70
68BeVier, “Information about Individuals in the Hands of Government,” 458.
69Thomson, "The Right to Privacy,” 295.
70For similar distinctions, see DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy; Parent, “Review of Decew, Judith Wagner. In 
Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology” 437.
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This distinction corresponds, at least roughly, to the jurisprudential debate on the 
expansion of the US legal interpretation of privacy in the Griswold line of cases. Narrow 
accounts reject this expansion, insofar as it represents an attempt to apply the concept of 
privacy to more than just personal information. Wide accounts, on the other hand, may 
support the legal expansion, at least where it corresponds to some constitutent element 
of their account (although it need not do so).
The most important narrow accounts of privacy are, in turn, subdivisible into two 
general categories. The first view, as espoused by, for instance, Alan Westin, Charles 
Fried, and James Rachels, contends that privacy is best interpreted as the control of 
personal information. The second, most succinctly formulated by W. A. Parent, and 
more recently revised and expanded by Steven Davis, contends that privacy is best in­
terpreted in terms of the possession of personal information.71
4.2.1 Control
Building on Westin s 1967 definition of privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others,” Fried defines privacy as “the control we have 
over information about ourselves.”72 In his view, it is the ability to grant or deny access 
to this information to others that constitutes privacy. The information is furthermore 
subject to “modulations” in quality; i.e. Fried does not consider all instances of personal 
information equivalent in normative status:
We may not m ind that a person knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our 
privacy invaded if  he know s the details. For instance, a casual acquaintance m ay 
com fortably know  that I am sick, but it w ould violate m y privacy if  he knew  the na­
ture o f  the illness. Or a good  friend may know  what particular illness I am suffering 
from, but it w ould violate m y privacy if  he were actually to w itness my suffering 
from som e sym ptom  w hich he m ust know  is associated with the disease.73
Although beginning from similar worries to Warren and Brandeis—that “increas­
ingly sophisticated scientific devices” are making possible more worrying intrusions
71 Cf. also Archard, “The Value of Privacy,” for a similar account of privacy as the possession of personal 
information.
72 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 7; Fried, “Privacy,” 482; he espouses essentially the same definition in Fried, 
An Anatomy of Values, 140.
73 Fried, “Privacy,” 483.
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into privacy—Fried diverts from previous authors in focusing not on concrete exam­
ples of how privacy is being invaded, nor on suggestions for how to better protect against 
such invasions, but instead exclusively on the philosophical basis of a right to privacy; 
in his own words, the “reasons why men feel that invasions of that right injure them in 
their very humanity.”74
These reasons, he maintains, are based on the inherent value of privacy. Fried ex­
presses dissatisfaction with instrumental analyses of this value, insofar as these pur­
portedly render privacy overly “vulnerable.” Instead he seeks to assign to privacy some 
form of intrinsic value, maintaining that it is “necessarily related to ends and relations 
of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.”75 Insofar as these re­
lations appear, at least to Fried, to be fundamentally important to our general notion 
of personhood, he surmises that privacy is at least indirectly necessary for our “notion 
of ourselves as persons among persons.”76 On this view, intimate relationships, by their 
very nature, require privacy in order to be at all possible:
To be friends or lovers persons m ust be intimate to som e degree with each other.
But intim acy is the sharing o f  inform ation about on es actions, beliefs, or em otions 
w hich one does not share w ith all, and which one has the right not to share w ith  
anyone. By conferring this right, privacy creates the m oral capital which we spend  
in friendship and love .77
There are concerns with Fried’s analysis that are worth noting. First, Ruth Gavison 
points out that, contrary to his claims, Fried in fact does treat privacy in an at least partly 
instrumental manner, granting it value in virtue of its purported ability to provide cer­
tain other relations that we tend to value highly.78 Fried is not entirely forthcoming 
on this matter, stating merely that “privacy is much more [than] just a possible social 
technique for assuring this or that substantive interest.”79 Perhaps he means to support 
an implicit distinction, not between purely intrinsic and instrumental values, but be­
tween some specific cut-off point of instrumentality along a range of possibilities. By
74Fried, “Privacy,” 475; cf. also Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” 325: “Even married couples whose 
sex-lives are normal (whatever that is), and so who have nothing to be ashamed of, by even the most 
conventional standards, and certainly nothing to be blackmailed about, do not want their bedrooms 
bugged.”
75 Fried, “Privacy,” 477.
76Ibid., 478.
77Ibid., 484.
78Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 442n67.
79 Fried, “Privacy,” 477.
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alluding to the possibility of viewing privacy as “just a possible social technique,” Fried 
leaves open the possibility of a more refined distinction, one that might have rendered 
his account of privacy separable from more explicitly and thouroughly instrumental 
accounts. This remains, however, a mere possibility; as it stands, there is nothing in his 
writing to directly defend such a notion.
Second, numerous scholars have raised challenges against the notion that privacy is 
necessary for intimate relations of the various sorts Fried lists. As Davis argues:
W hat is important for friendship, love, and trust is not necessarily the sharing o f  
personal inform ation, but caring about and caring for others, m eeting on es obli­
gations to them, doing things for them, etc.80
Along a similar line, Jeffrey Reiman objects to Fried s “market conception of personal 
intimacy,” so dubbed because its value lies “not merely in what I have but essentially in 
what others do not have.”81 In Reimans view, Frieds concept of privacy is not able to 
account for the fact that it does not seem necessary to maintain that the value of personal 
relations are born out of their exclusiveness “rather than because of their own depth 
or breadth or beauty.”82 Instead, Frieds view “overlooks the fact that what constitutes 
intimacy is not merely the sharing of otherwise withheld information, but the context 
of caring which makes the sharing of personal information significant.”83 He offers the 
following thought experiment as an illustration of his concerns:
If two analysts decided to psychoanalyze one another alternately—the evident un ­
w isdom  o f  this arrangement aside—there is no reason to believe that their relation­
ship w ould necessarily be the m ost intimate one in their lives, even if  they revealed 
to each other inform ation they withheld from everyone else, lifelong friends and 
lovers included. A nd  this wouldn’t be changed if  they cared about each others  
well-being. W hat is m issing is that particular kind o f  caring that makes a relation­
ship not just personal but intim ate.84
Like Reiman, Parent argues that Fried s conception of intimacy is “skewed,” insofar 
as it exclusively focuses on the sharing of information. On the contrary, according to
80S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 462.
81 Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” 32.
82 Ibid., 32.
83Ibid., 33.
84Ibid., 33.
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Parent, intimacy also involves “the sharing of ones total self—ones experiences, aspira­
tions, weaknesses, and values.”85 On Parents account, Frieds mistake lies in his failing 
to supply an argument in favor of the claim that intimate relationships “cannot survive 
the loss of privacy.”86
In addition to these specific criticisms of Fried’s account of privacy, there are also 
more general criticisms of the idea that privacy is essentially about the control of per­
sonal information. First, control does not seem to be a sufficient condition for privacy. 
As Parent argues, people who voluntarily divulge all sorts of personal information about 
themselves to others are “exercising control, in a paradigm sense of the term,” while 
nevertheless losing (in the sense of relinquishing) some of their privacy.87
Second, control also does not seem to be a necessary condition for privacy. As Davis 
notes, it is legal in the US, under certain specific circumstances, to tap somebody’s tele­
phone. But the existence of this law, and the lack of control it entails for all individuals 
in the US, does not in and of itself thereby diminish their privacy:
Let us im agine a particular US citizen w hose telephone has not been tapped and 
w ho has done nothing to warrant his telephone’s being tapped. The very existence 
o f the law means that his capacity to determ ine w hen, how  and to what extent 
inform ation about him  is to be com m unicated to others is dim inished, since it is 
possible that his telephone could be tapped w ithout his perm ission .88
Gavison argues, in similar terms, that control theories suffer from a fatal ambiguity 
in their notion of control. On a weaker interpretation of the term, voluntary disclosure 
of personal information is an exercise in control, thereby falling victim to Parent’s suf­
ficiency counterexample. On a stronger interpretation, the very same act constitutes a 
loss of control, insofar as “the person who discloses loses the power to prevent others 
from further disseminating the information.”89 As an interpretation of privacy, this is,
85Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 275.
86Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 275; cf. also Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” 408: “As for love and 
friendship, they, of course, exist and flourish in societies where there is little privacy.” it is worth noting 
that Fried himself has acknowledged that there seems to be something to these criticisms, stating that he 
is “prepared to grant” some of the attacks on his earlier view, in Fried, “Privacy,” 426. What this ultimately 
makes of his position is less clear.
87Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 273.
88S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 452; Parent, “A New Definition of Privacy for the Law,” 327, raises 
similar points; as does Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology,” 126.
89Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 427.
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in Gavison’s view, self-defeating, insofar as it makes it impossible to distinguish actual 
losses of privacy from mere threatened or possible losses of privacy, as in Davis’s neces­
sity counterexample.90
Lisa Austin notes a further difficulty, maintaining that control theories of privacy beg 
the question. To accept a definition of privacy as control of personal information is, she 
argues, to assume that there is an entitlement to such personal information. But “rather 
than presuppose such an entitlement, a theory of privacy needs to justify it,” insofar as 
holding any subsequent normative value of privacy hostage to control (understood as 
choice) is to muddle any potential distinction between privacy and autonomy.91
4.2.2 Possession of Personal Information
In a 1983 article entitled “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” Parent argues for a novel 
account of privacy, while nevertheless keeping it restricted to a narrow basis of personal 
information. He defines “personal information” as consisting of,
facts w hich m ost persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves 
(except to close friends, fam ily,. . . )  or o f facts about which a particular individual is 
acutely sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal about himself, 
even though m ost people don’t care if  these same facts are widely known about 
them selves.92
Further to this, Parent defines “documented” personal information as those personal 
facts belonging to the public record; that is, he does not consider the term to include 
medical or other records that are not available for public consumption. Given these 
explanations, he defines privacy as,
the condition o f  not having undocum ented personal knowledge about one p os­
sessed by others. A person’s privacy is dim inished exactly to the degree that others 
possess this kind o f  knowledge about him .93
Parent excludes documented personal knowledge from his account of privacy, in­
sofar as he is loath to maintain that an individual could have their privacy invaded by
90Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 426-27.
91Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology,” 126-27; Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 
273-74 also makes a similar point.
92Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 270.
93 Ibid., 269.
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another person gaining knowledge about them from something like an article in an 
old newspaper: “what belongs to the public domain cannot without glaring paradox be 
called private; consequently it should not be incorporated within our concept of pri-
»94vacy.
In defining the value of privacy, Parent is adamant that one must first distinguish 
privacy from other closely related but separate values, such as solitude or liberty, so that 
the latter are not mistaken for the former. On the basis of his account of privacy, he then 
proceeds to give three reasons why privacy ought to be considered valuable “in societies 
like ours”:
1. Obtaining sensitive personal knowledge about another is to acquire power over 
that person which can be used to their disadvantage through exploitation.
2. Given the variants of intolerance in existence in societies like ours, sensitive per­
sonal information may become the object of “scorn and ridicule.”
3. The “liberal ethic” mindset—widespread in societies like ours—that individuals 
ought not to be treated like “mere property of the state,” leads to the conviction 
that some personal facts about ones life are simply not other peoples business.95
Criticism of Parent s account tends to center around its counterintuitiveness in the 
face of specific cases. Davis, for instance, claims that Parent s distinction between private 
and public is too stark, insisting that it is the “ready availability” to others of personal 
information that matters, not whether it has ever been part of the public domain. He 
imagines a rabbi whose eating, long ago, of blood pudding (a non-kosher food) was 
publicized in the local newspaper. Insofar as the newspaper article chronicling the event 
is, in the example, only available in the dusty local library archives, Davis is willing to 
claim that the rabbis privacy concerning this event has, over the years, been restored, 
thus suggesting that the requirement that all private information be “undocumented” 
is too strong.96
94 Ibid., 271.
95 Ibid., 276-77.
96S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 453-54.
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Judith DeCew also objects to Parents insistence that private information must nec­
essarily be undocumented. She insists that Parent is unable to, for instance, account sat­
isfactorily for cases involving personal information that has been documented through 
the perpetration of a moral wrong:
A news agency, for example, surreptitiously taps an entertainer s telephone and 
subsequently publishes revealing inform ation about that persons sex life or drug 
use. Given Parents definition o f  privacy, once that information becom es part o f  
the public record there is no violation o f  privacy in repeated publication o f  the in ­
formation. The entertainer has no recourse for future protection; the inform ation  
is no longer private even if  the original disclosure was an error or a moral wrong.97
Davis also has some misguided criticisms of Parent, that, to a limited extent, guide 
his own investigation of privacy. For one, he maintains that Parent’s definition “turns 
on something being in the public record,” such that, Davis claims, Parent is unable to 
account for the loss of privacy that occurs “if a government agency comes to obtain 
personal information about [someone], but does not put it into the public record.”98 
This is, however, based on a misreading of Parents definition of privacy as “not having 
undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others.” If the government, 
in Davis’s example, possesses undocumented personal knowledge about the person in 
question, then that person—in accordance with Parent’s definition and in contradiction 
to Davis’s claim—suffers a loss of privacy. On Parent’s view, undocumented personal 
information does not become documented simply in virtue of somebody else acquir­
ing it—it only becomes documented if it is published, broadcast or otherwise brought 
into the public domain.99 Or, to phrase the same point in a different manner, Parent’s 
definition does not require that all losses of privacy involve undocumented informa­
tion becoming documented; documentation is sufficient but not necessary for a loss of 
privacy.
Second, Davis suggests that a loss of privacy can occur without any knowledge of 
personal information, as required by Parent, suffice (something like) justifed true beliefs 
about personal information:
97DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 30.
98S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 454.
99 In Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 271, Parent defines information belonging to the public record 
as “information to be found in newspapers, court proceedings, and other official documents open to 
public inspection.” cf. also Parent, “A New Definition of Privacy for the Law,” 308; Parent, “Recent Work 
on the Concept of Privacy,” 347.
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Suppose that Joe sees Sam in  the park with a wom an w ho is not his wife. Joe walks 
quickly so that he can eavesdrop on their conversation. From the way that they  
are talking together, Joe correctly surm ises that Sam is having an affair with her.
Joe is not certain that this is the case and for this reason does not know  that Sam  
is having the affair. D espite his doubts, Joe reports what he believes about Sam to 
his friends. W ord gets back to Sam w ho can rightly regard Joe to have invaded his 
privacy by eavesdropping on his conversation and to take it that he has suffered a 
loss o f  his privacy w ith respect to the inform ation that he is having an affair with  
the w om an .100
This case, however, does not suffice as a counterexample to Parents account. That 
Joe is uncertain about his conclusions regarding the affair between Sam and the woman 
does not change the fact that he, in virtue of eavesdropping, has acquired knowledge of 
at least some sort of personal information, such as (some of) the specific words ex­
changed between Sam and the woman. Whether he knows or merely believes that Sam 
is having an affair seems less pertinent to the question, insofar as the loss of privacy, on 
Parent s view, occurs not in virtue of the specific conclusions Joe draws about Sam and 
the woman, but in virtue of the fact that he entertains sufficient knowledge—gathered 
by eavesdropping—to be able to draw a conclusion to begin with, whether certain or 
uncertain.
In any event, in trying to avoid what he, in this fashion, sees as the primary flaws 
of Parent’s account, Davis constructs his own account of privacy as the possession of 
personal information. Like Parent, Davis defines privacy on the basis of personal infor­
mation, which he glosses as follows:
In society T, p  is personal inform ation about S [if and only if] m ost people in T  
w ould n ot want anyone, other [than] him /herself, to be in an inform ational state 
with respect to q  where q  is inform ation about them  w hich is similar to p, or 5 is a 
very sensitive person w ho does not want anyone, other than him /herself, to be in 
an inform ational state w ith respect to p. In both cases, an allowance m ust be m ade 
for inform ation that m ost people or S m ake available or w ould make available to 
a lim ited num ber o f  other people or to a certain subset o f  peop le.101
He defines privacy in the following manner:
In society T, S, where S can be an individual, institution, or a group, [possesses] 
privacy w ith respect to som e inform ation, p, and som e individual, 17, if  and only  
if:
100S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 454.
101 Ibid., 455.
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(a) p  is personal information about S.
(b) U  is not in an informational state with respect to p  nor is the inform ation, 
p , readily available to (7.102
This definition, Davis notes, says nothing of what it is to suffer a loss of privacy (as 
opposed to simply not having privacy). Privacy is lost, on Davis’s view, under the fol­
lowing circumstances:
In society T, S, where S can be an individual, institution, or a group, loses privacy  
with respect to som e personal information, p, and som e individual, U, at t\  i f  and 
only if:
(a) At to U  is not in an informational state with respect to p  nor is the inform a­
tion, p , readily available to U.
(b) At t\  U  is in an informational state with respect to p  or the information, p , 
is readily available to L/.103
In this manner, Davis constructs a semi-formal account of privacy in the image of 
Parents. Despite revising those features of Parents account that Davis sees as detri­
mental to the view of privacy as the possession of personal information, however, his 
account still falls victim to some of the same counterexamples.
Thomas Scanlon, in discussing the views of Thomson several years prior to the pub­
lication of Parents article, argues that privacy harms may arise even where no personal 
information seems to be involved:
If you press personal questions on me in a situation in which this is convention­
ally forbidden, I can always refuse to answer. But the fact that no inform ation is 
revealed does not rem ove the violation, which remains just as does the analogous 
violation w hen you  peek through my bathroom w indow but fail to see m e because 
I have taken som e m ildly inconvenient evasive action.104
This is a particular problem for Parent and Davis in light of their mutual insistence 
that privacy is diminished only when others come to possess personal information 
about an individual. Parent has responded to such concerns by explicitly arguing that 
the actions of the interrogator in the example are “most accurately condemned not in
I02S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 455.
103Ibid., 456.
104Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy,” 317.
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the language of privacy but as invasions of [a person] s personal security and peace of 
mind.”105 But such a response is unsatisfactory; Parent offers no principled argument 
for the view that “personal security” and “peace of mind” are not, for instance, essential, 
or at least potential, components of privacy, other than that they do not cohere with his 
aforementioned definition of privacy.106
A related difficulty arises from a deeper concern about the views of Parent and Davis, 
concerning their explicit stipulation that personal information is the sort of informa­
tion that “most people” in a given society are unwilling to share with others (save a 
select few). Such a view can perhaps adequately account for many traditional privacy 
concerns, and is particularly well considered in how it relativizes the normative value 
of privacy to the social mores of a society, thereby rightfully allowing specific privacy 
concerns to differ in normative strength across cultures. But it struggles to account for 
the discomfort many people today experience with regard to the currently available 
technologically enhanced ability to construct data profiles of individuals on the basis 
of countless, discrete pieces of personal information that do not themselves fall within 
such an interpretation of personal information, and are therefore excluded from the 
heading of privacy under Parents and Davis’s accounts.
Helen Nissenbaum, for instance, has argued for the ethical importance of recogniz­
ing what she terms “privacy in public”107 She considers various privacy concerns that 
are grouped around the claim that personal information that is neither intimate nor 
sensitive, and that already exists in the public domain, may nevertheless give rise to 
privacy harms when shifted from one informational context to another, or when aggre­
gated into a sufficiently comprehensive profile on an individual.
First, Nissenbaum maintains that most people have a “robust sense of the infor­
mation about them that is relevant, appropriate, or proper to particular circumstances, 
situations, or relationships.”108 Thus, for instance, where people may speak to their doc­
tor about details regarding their health, or with their friends about some recent piece 
of gossip pertaining to their social circle, it is usually considered improper or impolite 
to discuss these in the opposite contexts. When these social conventions are respected,
105Parent, “Review of Decew, Judith Wagner. In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology”
106I discuss the question of the extent to which common use of a term ought to figure in constructing an 
account of some phenomenon in more detail in the following chapter.
107Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age.”
108Ibid., 580.
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Nissenbaum claims that the “contextual integrity” of the information is maintained.109 
Contextual integrity also applies, in her view, to non-sensitive personal information, 
to the extent that such information can, through a shift in context, develop into a pri­
vacy concern. She notes, as examples, the copying of ones home address from driver s 
records, to be used for purposes unrelated to ones driving, or when “information about 
your supermarket purchases is sold to a list service for magazine subscriptions.”110 
Second, although people freely (and often unknowingly) divulge vast amounts of 
non-sensitive information about themselves, there is generally a certain assumption of 
the discreteness of the information. Such an assumption is undermined when informa­
tion bureaus mine details about individuals in order to establish,
com prehensive profiles ...  that would indicate such things as: purchasing power 
(credit card activity index, estim ated incom e, fixed payments, etc.), purchasing 
activity (active accounts, bank debits, etc.), shopping data, and dem ographic data 
(job, marriage status, dwelling type, gender, market segment, etc.).111
The financial value of personal profiles compiled in this fashion lies in the power of 
various algorithms and statistical models to construct, on the basis of the available data, 
“a richer portrait of the individual than even the bits taken together ... as it may include 
not only information explicitly given but information inferred from that which has been 
given”112 This state of affairs has, Nissenbaum notes, only expanded with the further 
possibilities of electronic surveillance, in the ability to view and record peoples online 
behavior, and even to match this with information about the corresponding physical 
behavior of the person. Large electronic databases make information about individuals 
much easier to store, organize, and access:
In the public arena, people have becom e targets o f  surveillance at just about every 
turn o f  their lives. In transactions with retailers, mail order com panies, m edical 
care givers, daycare providers, and even beauty parlors, inform ation about them  
is collected, stored, analyzed and som etim es shared. Their presence on the planet, 
their notable features and all their m om entous m ilestones are dutifully recorded by 
agencies o f  federal, state and local governm ent including birth, marriage, divorce,
109Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 581; Schoeman, “Privacy and Intimate Infor­
mation,” 408, expresses a similar view.
110Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 585.
111 Ibid., 586.
112Ibid., 589.
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property ownership, driver’s licenses, vehicle registration, m oving violations, par­
enthood, and, finally, their dem ise. Into the great store o f  inform ation, people are 
identified through name, address, phone number, credit card numbers, social se­
curity number, passport number, and more; they are described by age, hair color, 
eye color, height, quality o f  vision, mail orders and on  site purchases, credit card 
activity, travel, em ploym ent history, rental history, real estate transactions, change 
o f  address, ages and num bers o f  children, and m agazine subscriptions. The d im en­
sions are endless.113
Proponents of traditional accounts of privacy have, in Nissenbaum’s view, been un ­
able or unwilling to recognize the importance and validity of these sorts of concerns 
for a few reasons. First, the traditional view of public and private presumes the two to 
be mutually exclusive.114 Such a view is inherent to many explications of this distinc­
tion, such as Aristotle’s or Mill’s noted above. Second, this mutual exclusiveness is often 
treated as normatively definitive, such that anything belonging to the public category is 
not considered to qualify for legal or ethical protection under the rubric of privacy.115 
This sort of interpretation is noticeable in various legal cases, such as Nader, as well as 
some philosophical accounts of privacy, most notably Parent’s.116 Finally, and as already 
indicated above, many philosophical accounts of privacy have failed to stay abreast of 
those technological developments that carry a potential to impact on privacy. Prior 
to the advent of widespread electronic surveillance, for instance, traversing the public 
arena would not necessarily diminish one’s overall anonymity. Or, at the very least, peo­
ple could be reasonably confident that those individuals who might make note of some 
aspects of them would nevertheless only hold discrete, non-aggregated pieces of infor­
mation about them. Even explicitly public records, like those held by governments, were 
often only accessible by going to the trouble of locating, travelling to, and requesting the 
relevant physical files from the place where they were stored.117
The notion that the concerns Nissenbaum identifies are taken seriously by society at 
large is supported by, among other things, extensive legal protections of personal data. 
Legislation such as the EU EDPD 1995 and the UK DPA 1998 was introduced with the
113Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 561; cf. also Kosinski, Stillwell, and Graepel, 
“Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior.”
U4Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 568-70.
115Ibid., 571-75.
116Solove, The Digital Person, 42-44, refers to this view as the “secrecy paradigm.”
117Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 575-78.
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express purpose of limiting these forms of harm. Even the US, which has no overriding 
general data protection legislation similar to that of the EU or UK, has nevertheless 
implemented a patchwork of legal protections in the form of legislation on specific data 
security issues, in addition to common law precedents. For instance, in US Dept, o f 
Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom o f the Press,118 the court would not allow the 
disclosure of FBI rap sheets to a CBS news correspondent, arguing as follows:
There is a vast difference between the public records that m ight be found after 
a diligent search o f  courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations 
throughout the country and a com puterized sum m ary located in a single clear­
inghouse o f  inform ation.119
Furthermore, there is a widespread view among legal and philosophical scholars that 
“privacy in public,” of the sort Nissenbaum notes, is, at the very least, a phenomenon 
that needs to be more carefully considered prior to any judgment on the suitability of 
its inclusion in an account of privacy.120 Until that is done, it constitutes an important 
problem for views such as those of Parent and Davis, which restrict privacy not just to 
personal information, but to sensitive personal information.
4.3 Wide Accounts of Privacy
There are two primary alternatives to narrow accounts of privacy in the philosophical 
discussion. The first is to deny that privacy is a useful concept altogether. Thomson ar­
gues, in her 1975 paper “The Right to Privacy,” that privacy is an unhelpful concept 
because it adds nothing of value to the discussion that can not already be described in 
other terms like “autonomy” and “trespass” (for this reason her view is often referred to 
as a “reductionist” view of privacy).121 Asking herself what, if anything, is unique to a 
right to privacy, she constructs what she terms a “simplifying hypothesis”: in her view, 
the right to privacy is actually a non-distinct and “derivative” group of rights over-
118489 US 749(1989).
119Ibid., 764.
120See e.g. Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology”; McFee, Ethics, Knowledge and Truth in Sports 
Research, 152-54; Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 505-20, 536-38.
121 Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 295; previous arguments in a similar vein, albeit with a legal focus, 
include Kalven, “Privacy in Tort Law”; and F. Davis, “What Do We Mean by ‘Right to Privacy’?”
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lapping other rights, such as those pertaining to property ownership or to ones own
122person.1"
Numerous scholars have objected to Thomsons portrayal.123 They frequently note 
that Thomson provides no compelling argument for the notion that privacy is somehow 
“derivative” from other values, rather than vice versa:
[Thomsons argument] requires the recognition of a plethora of rights whose status 
is very dubious indeed. Do we really believe ... that people have rights not to be 
looked at and listened to? Is there a general right not to have ones property looked 
at? Thomson claims that we waive these basic rights all the time, for example when 
we go out in public, but do we usually think of ourselves as doing so? Do we need 
to say this?... One is inevitably led to ask whether it wouldn’t be more reasonable 
and intelligible to talk about a fundamental right to privacy which may or may not 
afford protection in particular circumstances to persons who don’t want to be seen 
or heard or who don’t want their belongings observed.124
The other common response is to claim that the narrow accounts, in virtue of their 
conceptual narrowness, exclude important elements of privacy that ought to figure as 
part of any comprehensive account of the phenomenon. While there may be other ways 
of constructing this sort of wide accounts, the two I focus on here share a disjunctive 
structure, defining privacy as “a or b or c,” although they differ in precisely which values 
they assign to the variables in the disjunction. Gavison argues that privacy consists of 
limitations on access to a person, in the form of secrecy, anonymity, or solitude. DeCew, 
in turn, maintains that privacy is a “cluster concept”, consisting of informational privacy, 
accessibility privacy, and expressive privacy.
4.3.1 Limited Access
Gavison defines privacy as “a limitation of others’ access to an individual,” calling per­
fect privacy when an individual “is completely inaccessible to others.”125 She divides the 
latter notion into three independent components, claiming that in perfect privacy, no­
body has any information about a given person (secrecy), nobody pays any attention to
122Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 306, 312.
123Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy”; Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood”; Gavison, “Privacy and 
the Limits of Law,” 460; Parent, "Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 278-80; Parent, “Recent Work on the 
Concept of Privacy,” 349-50.
124Parent, “Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy,” 350.
125Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 428.
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that person (anonymity), and nobody has any physical access to that person (solitude). 
Noting that perfect privacy, like a total loss of privacy, is presumably an impossibility (as 
well as an undesirability) in most societies, she nevertheless relies on the notion of it to 
define a loss of privacy as “others obtain [ing] information about an individual, pay[ing] 
attention to him, or gain [ing] access to him.”126 Gavison maintains that this sort of dis­
junctive interpretation of privacy—as opposed to a definition focused on any one of the 
three aspects—accords better with common judgments about what constitutes a loss of 
privacy than do alternative philosophical accounts.
As regards the value of privacy, Gavison argues that the ideal degree of privacy is 
one that strikes a balance between the undesirable extremes of a total loss of privacy 
and perfect privacy. Having noted this, she argues that the question of value is best ap­
proached by investigating the functions of privacy. Although this will, inevitably, render 
any specification of the notions value instrumental, Gavison claims that this is prefer­
able to the difficulties involved in attempting to defend a notion of privacy as ultimately 
valuable.127 Recognizing that a functional analysis of the value of privacy constitutes an 
enormous task, she is nevertheless adamant about the importance of undertaking em­
pirical studies regarding the links between privacy and other notions such as “a healthy, 
liberal, democratic, and pluralistic society; individual autonomy; mental health; creativ­
ity; and the capacity to form and maintain meaningful relations with others.”128
In the absence of these sorts of empirical studies, Gavison maintains that instrumen­
tal arguments for privacy must instead guide the inquiry, beginning “by seeking to iden­
tify those features of human life that would be impossible—or highly unlikely—without 
some privacy.”129 She sketches four instrumental arguments of this sort. First, privacy 
seems to be a necessary context for the performance of other activities that are deemed 
essential. Thus, for instance, Gavison approvingly cites Reimans argument that privacy 
“is necessary to the creation of selves out of human beings,” insofar as “a self is at least 
in part a human being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body, his actions— 
as his own.”130 Likewise, although maintaining that Frieds account of intimacy as the 
sharing of personal information is not entirely satisfactory,131 Gavison nevertheless ap-
126Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits o f Law,” 428.
127 Ibid., 441-42.
128Ibid., 442.
129Ibid., 443.
130Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” 39.
131 Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits o f Law,” 446n77.
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provingly notes the contextual nature of his overall argument that privacy is necessary 
for love and friendship.
Second, to the extent that privacy grants a certain freedom from physical access, 
Gavison maintains that it may be necessary for those activities that require concentra­
tion, “such as learning, writing, and all forms of creativity.”132 Furthermore, the ability 
to refrain from being observed seems to facilitate not only solitary relaxation, but also 
intimacy between individuals.
Third, privacy, Gavison claims, may promote liberty of action, in virtue of prevent­
ing “interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions, 
and other forms of hostile reactions” to ones behavior.133 Privacy, in such a context, 
seems to link to various goals, such as freedom from censure and ridicule, the pro­
motion of autonomy—understood as the ability to make and exercise an independent 
ethical judgment—and the promotion of human relations—understood as the ability 
to create or accept different roles for different contexts and relationships, as well as the 
ability to divulge aspects of oneself to those “highest in ones emotional hierarchy.”134
Finally, Gavison presents a broader argument, on the basis of the previous purported 
link between privacy and liberty of action, that maintains that privacy may “both indi­
cate the existence of and contribute to a more pluralistic, tolerant society.”135 First—and 
foreshadowing the views of Thomas Nagel some eighteen years later, in his article “Con­
cealment and Exposure” (where no reference to her is made)—Gavison argues that the 
absence of a general consensus on questions regarding the limits of tolerance and ac­
ceptance indicates that “privacy must be part of our commitment to individual freedom 
and to a society that is commited to the protection of such freedom.”136 Second, given 
that democratic societies are based on the notion that individual citizens are to par­
ticipate in political decision-making on the basis of their own preferences, privacy, as 
conducive to autonomy, seems to be crucial for the functioning of democracy. Finally, 
albeit somewhat more hesitantly, Gavison claims that privacy may yield more talent be­
ing put to use for the greater good, insofar as some talented individuals may feel nervous
132Ibid., 447.
133 Ibid., 448.
134 Ibid., 448-50.
135Ibid., 455.
136Ibid., 455.
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about the idea of e.g. seeking public office in a society that does not respect individual 
privacy.137
Parent and Davis are both critical of Gavisons definition of privacy. Much of their 
criticism is, however, misguided, ignoring the details of Gavisons tripartite definition. 
Parent, for instance, maintains that if access is meant to be interpreted as “physical ac­
cess,” then the subsequent concept of privacy does not mesh well with common inter­
pretations of privacy, while if it is instead meant to be interpreted as “acquisition of 
personal knowledge,” it succumbs to the following thought experiment:
A taps B s phone and overhears many of her conversations, including some of 
a very intimate nature. Official restraints have been imposed on A’s snooping, 
though. He must obtain permission from a judge before listening in on B. This 
case shows that limitation of cognitive access does not imply privacy.138
Davis approvingly cites this counterexample, and seeks to further strengthen the 
case against limited access views with a thought experiment meant to show that even 
unlimited access to personal information need not result in a loss of privacy:
Suppose that you record the details of your daily activities in a diary that you bring 
to my house. You forget to take the diary with you when you leave, but the next 
day you come to pick it up. I had no idea that you had left the diary in my house 
and hence, I did not look at it. While the diary was in my house, however, I had 
unlimited access to the information in the diary. Since I was unaware that it was in 
my house and did not look at it, you have not lost any of your privacy with respect 
to the information in the diary.139
Both these cases, however, attack an overly simplistic reading of Gavisons account. 
In defining a loss of privacy as “others obtain [ing] information about an individual, 
pay [ing] attention to him, or gain [ing] access to him,” the disjunctive formulation of 
the definition is meant to indicate that a loss of privacy occurs when any one of the 
three criteria is fulfilled, regardless of whether the other two criteria are at all relevant 
to the case at hand. In other words, the three criteria are all independently sufficient 
for a loss of privacy, but none of them is independently necessary. Gavison presumably 
takes them to be mutually necessary, in the sense merely of constituting an exhaustive
137Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 455.
138Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 274.
139S. Davis, “Is There a Right to Privacy?” 453.
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list of the possible types of cases involving a loss of privacy, but that is an altogether 
different matter.
Thus, when Davis maintains that there is no loss of privacy in a case where one indi­
vidual has had unlimited access to another’s diary, but did not look at it, Gavison would 
presumably agree; insofar as there has been no particular occurrence of “obtaining in­
formation about an individual,” there has been no loss of privacy on the first part of her 
definition. But equally, by not looking at the diary, the first person has neither “paid 
attention to” nor “gained access” to the owner of the diary, particularly where the last 
element of the definition, “gaining access,” concerns physical access, as per Gavison’s 
gloss of her own definition.
Equally, maintaining that a loss of privacy occurs when a persons phone is tapped, 
despite the fact that there may be limited access on the possibility of tapping another’s 
phone, is also in line with Gavison’s definition. Insofar as information about the person 
whose phone was tapped has been obtained, limitations on access or not, a loss of pri­
vacy will presumably still have occurred, as per both the first and the second element of 
her definition. It seems that what Parent and Davis are objecting to is an interpretation 
of Gavison’s first remarks on a definition of privacy, taken at face value. Where she ini­
tially states that “in its most suggestive sense, privacy is a limitation of others’ access to 
an individual,”140 Parent and Davis seem to have ignored her subsequent refinement of 
this initial suggestion, instead presuming “limitation of access,” with its inherent ambi­
guity and vagueness, to tell the complete story.
Potentially more problematic for Gavison’s view is its incompatibility with the Gris­
wold line of Supreme Court privacy cases, concerning the ability of individuals to make 
certain important life choices. The case of Griswold itself was, for instance, brought by 
the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, against the 
state of Connecticut, after it had found her guilty of breaking state law in opening a 
birth control clinic. As already noted, the Supreme Court argued that the relevant state 
statute was unconstitutional, as it interfered with a “zone of privacy” belonging to mar­
ried couples, although the case did not concern any such married couple in particular. 
The privacy of married couples in the state was therefore, in the court’s view, violated 
not by the state collecting information about them, making them the focus of attention,
140Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 428.
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or having physical access to them, but by imposing certain restrictions on their procre­
ative choices. Although Gavison could argue that there would be a loss of privacy if a 
couple were made the focus of attention in virtue of the state filing a case against them 
on the basis of its contraception laws, this does not correspond to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the privacy harm in question in Griswold, nor does it correspond to 
or account for concurring common judgments.141
Gavison explicitly acknowledges this restriction, arguing that expanding ones con­
cept of privacy to range over such cases risks watering down the concept to the point 
that it interferes with the concepts “usefulness”:
If the concepts we use give the appearance o f  differentiating concerns without in 
fact isolating som ething distinct, we are likely to fall victim s to this false appear­
ance and our chosen language w ill be a hindrance rather than a help.142
She suggests that while privacy interpreted as “being let alone” is broad enough to 
include the sentiments evident in the Griswold line of cases, it fails by being overly broad, 
in “covering almost any conceivable complaint anyone could ever make.”143 DeCew’s 
account of privacy, the final philosophical account to be considered here, takes issue 
with this view, arguing that it is in fact possible to define a useful and distinct concept 
of privacy that succeeds in accounting for both the US tort and constitutional rights, in 
addition to general common judgments about privacy cases.
4.3.2 A Cluster Concept
DeCew presents a wider account of privacy than that found in any of the foregoing. 
Her explicit aim, in so doing, is to align her account not only with the broad US legal 
interpretation of the term, but also with peoples “intuitive notion of privacy.”144 She 
begins with an admittedly “vague” notion that the “realm of the private [is] whatever 
is not generally—i.e. according to a reasonable person under normal circumstances, 
or according to certain social conventions—the legitimate concern of others.”145 Such 
a gloss follows Parent’s and Davis’s accounts in relativizing privacy to certain social
141 Cf. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 1105.
142Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law,” 437.
143 Ibid., 438.
144 DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 42.
145Ibid., 58, 62.
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norms, thereby allowing for differences in ethical judgments about privacy between 
different cultural contexts.
More specifically, DeCew maintains that privacy claims can be identified as those 
at stake when “intrusion by others is not legitimate because it jeopardizes or prohibits 
protection of a realm free from scrutiny, judgment, and the pressure, distress, or losses 
they can cause.”146 Such claims arise in relation to one of three different aspects of pri­
vacy that are “related based on historical links, linguistic use, and similarity of justifi­
cation”147 These three aspects together form what DeCew calls her “cluster concept” of 
privacy.
The first, “informational privacy,” corresponds to the personal information focus of 
the narrow accounts of privacy considered above, as well as to that of US tort and Fourth 
Amendment privacy law. DeCew takes it to include information about a persons daily 
activities, lifestyle, and financial, medical, and academic records.148 The second, “acces­
sibility privacy,” concerns the informational and physical accessibility of a person, and 
corresponds roughly to Gavisons limited access account of privacy, with a particular 
focus on its second and third disjunctive elements (regarding anonymity and physical 
access, respectively). This form of privacy protects “unwelcome” access to an individual, 
that is likely to result in “distraction, inihibition, fear, and vulnerability.”149 The third, 
“expressive privacy,” corresponds to the sort of privacy recognized in the Griswold line 
of cases. It protects a person “from the fears of pressure to conform, from being co­
erced to hold homogenized viewpoints, and from being harassed or damaged by the 
stigmatization of ones choices.”150
Although DeCew notes that this sort of construal fails to provide a “unified and 
simple account of privacy,” she nevertheless maintains that it, in its complexity, better 
manages to capture a general notion of privacy, as evidenced in both US case law and 
common judgments. In response, Parent argues that DeCews position is, at least in 
part, based on a conflating of privacy and liberty.151 DeCew is, however, adamant that
146Ibid., 64.
147Ibid., 73.
148Ibid„ 75.
149Ibid„ 77.
150 Ibid., 78.
151 Parent, “Review of Decew, Judith Wagner. In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technol­
ogy" 438.
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although the two concepts overlap, they are nevertheless separable, with privacy, as per 
her account, forming a unique subset of liberty:
Loss o f  privacy can dim inish freedom. Nevertheless, defending privacy cannot al­
ways protect liberty. It cannot guard against public assault, for example. But if  
privacy protects against certain intrusions by others, and if  one has liberty when  
one is free o f  external restraints and interferences, then protection o f  privacy can 
preserve som e liberty.152
The fundamental disagreement, between Parent and DeCew, as well as between nar­
row and wide accounts generally, pertains to the weight assigned to both legal interpre­
tation of privacy and common judgments about its applicability in different cases. Par­
ent, and other scholars leaning toward narrower accounts, are less likely to countenance 
such considerations than are those preferring wider accounts. The issue turns on a fun­
damental question of philosophical method, regarding the extent to which reliance on 
common use of a concept under consideration ought to figure in ones philosophical ac­
count of the concept. It is to these difficulties, and their applicability to the philosophical 
debate on privacy generally, that I now turn.
152DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 58. 
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Pr iv a c y  is a  d if f ic u l t  p h e n o m e n o n  to conceptualize, as evidenced by the dis­agreement, between privacy scholars, about its proper form and content. These disagreements stem, in many cases, from the various weights different philoso­
phers ascribe to different methodological positions and devices—a state of affairs not 
easily evaluated without closer evaluation of a vast amount of methodological concerns. 
But there is an alternative to moving to such increasingly abstracted domains. In the 
whereabouts context, the need for an account of privacy amenable to pragmatic policy 
application suggests that it is preferable to view privacy as an open-ended list of par­
ticular sorts of harms to the person, where the harms may or may not be acceptable in 
any given instance, in light of their underlying justifying values, and depending on the 
further contextual particulars.
5.1 Difficulties for Traditional Accounts of Privacy
There are many different ways in which one might go about carving up the conceptual 
landscape, in relation to some phenomenon or other. Analytic philosophers have tended 
to approach the issue through what has typically been termed “conceptual analysis,” a 
method which, roughly speaking, emphasizes the establishing of a concepts sufficient 
and necessary conditions, in order to thereby fix and demarcate an extension. Even 
within the boundaries of such an approach, however, there are still numerous ways in 
which the analysis might be performed, and where these differ, it is not always obvious 
which one is to be preferred over another.
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To take a simple medical example, measles is a respiratory infection caused by a spe­
cific virus, the so-called measles virus (a paramyxovirus of the genus Morbillivirus). If 
a patient presents with measles-like symptoms, but the measles virus is not present in 
the patient, then they do not have measles. Patient have measles if and only if they have 
the measles virus.
The situation is quite different in the case of the common cold. Although it is also, 
like measles, a viral respiratory infection, it can be caused by any of a vast amount of dif­
ferent viruses, including, among others, various rhinoviruses and coronaviruses. There 
is no specific underlying virus responsible for the disease in all cases, and it is instead 
recognized in virtue of typical symptoms—at least so long as these symptoms are not 
caused by a virus used to classify some other disease, such as the measles virus. Concep­
tually, common cold is unified by little more than a willingness to group certain macro­
level features—i.e. certain salient viral disease symptoms, along with certain options 
for treating those symptoms—together under one heading, despite their disparate and 
non-unified underlying causes.
In other words, the medical concept of measles is defined primarily in terms of its 
viral (micro-level) cause, while the medical concept of common cold is defined primar­
ily in terms of its salient (macro-level) symptoms. Each of these definitions provides a 
reasonably straightforward means of fixing the extension for each respective concept. In 
the case of measles, the measles virus constitutes the primary necessary and sufficient 
condition for the obtaining of the disease. In the case of common cold, a disjunctive 
list of independently sufficient possible symptoms (none of which are independently 
necessary) constitutes the primary means of establishing the obtaining of the disease.
It might be thought that either of these approaches is preferable to the other. Per­
haps it would, for instance, be preferable, for some reason, to define common cold by 
reference to an exhaustive and disjunctive list of every virus that can cause the disease, 
similarly to the case of measles, only with reference to several viruses, instead of just 
one. Or perhaps, common cold is an altogether redundant concept, in a situation that 
could be better served by explicitly recognizing the differences between the underlying 
viral causes, by stipulating correspondingly different diseases, such as rhino cold, corona 
cold, and so on.
The medical case, of course, provides a perfectly sound defense for its current con­
ceptual practices; where the diagnosis, treatment options, and prognosis for a disease
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are all sufficiently similar, nothing is gained, medically speaking, by further differentia­
tion, regardless of any possible theoretical benefits or drawbacks. Medicine here benefits 
from a reasonably clear and well-established normative framework: everything else be­
ing equal, the less disease, injury, and pain, the better. Generally speaking, medicine 
aims to decrease the incidence and severity of these. Whatever furthers this goal to a 
sufficient degree will, in all but very exceptional cases, be worth pursuing. Whatever 
does not further the goal to a sufficient degree is better ignored or altogether avoided. 
Where the choice to account for a concept one way or another has no noticeable im ­
pact on the incidence or severity of disease, injury, or pain, the question is, medically 
speaking, uninteresting.1 Better, in such a case, to opt for the most pragmatic solution, 
even if it differs between one case and another, as with measles and common cold.
Things are far less straightforward where there is no such pre-conceived norma­
tive framework through which one might evaluate proposed accounts of some phe­
nomenon. If one is not, for instance, bound by the normative framework of medicine, 
but only concerned with, say, the elegance and simplicity of a given account, then the 
medical concept of common cold is, in its conceptual messiness, arguably less appealing. 
If one, on the other hand, wishes to see accounts that are closer in line with common 
use of and judgments about the concepts they concern, then the medical concept of 
common cold is arguably more attractive. But there is no compelling reason to think 
that we ought to prefer elegance and simplicity over alignment with common use, or 
vice versa, with regard to any given phenomenon. Choosing between such alternative 
constellations of methodological commitments is no simple task.
These considerations apply in particular to cases like that of privacy, for a number 
of reasons. First, it is not at all clear what level of definiens, if any in particular, to rely 
upon in seeking to provide the definiendum; one might define privacy by reference to 
specific brain states, emotions, adaptive behaviors, social practices, existing law, or all 
of the above, or one might alternatively argue that such a choice is more or less arbitrary 
(e.g. in the sense that all those definitional candidates nevertheless demarcate the same 
extension). Second, even if this were determined, it is not clearly established how broad 
a definition of privacy ought to be, as evidenced by the disagreement between narrow
1 There are complications here, such as those arising from conflicting interests and limited resources, as 
per Beauchamp, The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics, § 6, but I take it as given that medicine has 
a clearer normative framework than ethics generally.
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and wide accounts of the term. Third, even if both these concerns were allayed, it is 
still not clear what sort of normative considerations would follow; even if there were 
a general consensus that privacy comprises, say, a narrow class of specific emotions, it 
does not follow, without additional argument, that this warrants some sort of normative 
status for the concept so defined. It is not at all certain that more or better-protected 
privacy is, everything else being equal, preferable.
This state of affairs reveals a serious methodological uncertainty in conceptual work 
generally: given the lack of any specific framework for the evaluation of different ac­
counts of some phenomenon, it is not clear how to establish the superiority of one of 
these over its competitors. This uncertainty is enhanced in those further cases where 
there is no clearly defined normative framework to benefit from in choosing between 
competing accounts of some phenomenon. In the case of privacy, there are reasons to 
presume that additional protection is normally a good thing, such as the significant em ­
barrassment and discomfort that may result when aspects of a persons life are shared 
with others. But there are also compelling reasons to seek to limit such protections, 
including the risk that privacy is used as an excuse to cloak dangerous or otherwise 
ethically problematic behaviors, like spouse beating.2 Unlike the medical case, privacy 
provides no clear-cut and straightforward normative framework.
5.1.1 Methodological Uncertainty
There are various ways in which this lack of consensus on a proper evaluatory frame­
work makes for methodological difficulties in conceptual work. This can be so even 
where there is a broad consensus on the proper methodological starting point. There 
are, for instance, numerous widely accepted logical requirements that any robust ac­
count of some phenomenon must fulfill. First, an account must be internally consistent. 
That is, it must not contain any inconsistent propositions; it can not be that both p  and 
not-p as part of the account, or as a direct consequence of its claims. If the account does 
give rise to any such inconsistency, this in itself provides a prima facie reason to reject 
it, or at least, where it is sufficiently complex, to require amendment or revision of some
2Cf. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 191.
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of its parts in order to remove the inconsistency.3 The burden of ensuring this sort of 
internal consistency falls on the proponent of the account in question.
Second, there must be coherence between ones account on the one hand, and ones 
further theoretical commitments on the other. Much like in the case of internal consis­
tency, it can not be that, say, ones novel account of privacy claims that p, while ones 
epistemological commitments state or imply that not-p. But while the case of internal 
inconsistency requires a rejection or revision of the account itself, the external incon­
sistency involved in such cases does not provide any obvious guidance on which of the 
inconsistent elements to reject or revise and which to retain: does the novel account of 
privacy trum p the epistemological commitments, or vice versa?4
It is, in any given case of inconsistency, not obvious how one ought to go about estab­
lishing the relative value of the inconsistent elements, in order to determine a suitable 
trumping order between them. There are any of a number of candidate strategies for 
such a valuation—various rules and systems of logic, relevant empirical results, esthetic 
theoretical values like brevity or simplicity, etc.—but no obvious or prima facie reason 
to prefer some of the strategies at the expense of others. There is a risk of infinite regress 
here, since any valuation of trumping order presumably depends on ones preferences 
among available strategies, which in turn depend on a valuation of those strategies ac­
cording to some other prior preference, itself subject to valuation, and so on. This gen­
eral state of affairs is reflected in the diversity of existing philosophical approaches, as 
noted by Timothy Williamson:
W hen philosophy is not disciplined by semantics, it m ust be disciplined by som e­
thing else: syntax, logic, com m on sense, imaginary examples, the findings o f  other 
disciplines (mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, history, . . . )  or the aes­
thetic evaluation o f  theories (elegance, sim plicity ,. ..) .  Indeed, philosophy subject 
to only one o f  those disciplines is liable to becom e severely distorted: several are 
needed simultaneously. . ..  O f course, each form o f  philosophical discipline is it­
se lf contested by som e philosophers. But that is no reason to produce work that is
3 On the problem of the underdetermination inherent to situations such as these, cf. Quine, “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism,” esp. 41; and Quine, “Ontological Relativity.”
4By distinguishing, in this manner, between what I am calling internal and external inconsistencies, I 
do not mean to suggest that the two are logically distinct, as opposed to, say, opposite end points on 
a spectrum. Regardless of how one chooses to account for the issue, however, inconsistencies between 
two different elements of ones various theoretical commitments will nevertheless normally involve an 
underdetermination of which of the inconsistent elements one ought to reject or revise. Cf. Williams, 
“Inconsistency and Contradiction.”
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not properly disciplined by anything. It m aybe a reason to welcom e m ethodologi­
cal diversity in philosophy: if  different groups in philosophy give different relative 
weights to various sources o f  discipline, we can compare the long-run results o f  
the rival ways o f  working.5
More specifically, the sort of methodological diversity Williamson describes is ev­
ident in the various weights different philosophers assign to different methodological 
commitments. Within the privacy discussion, some of the contrasting aspects of Par­
ents and DeCew s respective accounts illustrate this particularly well. Both philosophers 
agree that a robust account of privacy requires a clarification of precisely what sets pri­
vacy apart from other phenomena; i.e. on what basis it is possible to distinguish the 
concept of privacy from other closely related concepts. They differ, however, in their 
applications of this general rule.
Parent relies on a relatively stark notion of conceptual mutual exclusiveness, accord­
ing to which the extension of the concept of privacy is best interpreted as strictly dis­
tinct from the extensions of other closely related concepts. He does acknowledge that it 
is possible to construe privacy as, for instance, “a part of liberty,” but argues that doing 
so is only the result of “conceptual confusion.”6 Liberty, in Parents view, is “the absence 
of external restraints or coercion,” with a loss of liberty taking the form of “a deprivation 
of autonomy”; this is, in Parents view, “clearly distinguishable” from privacy, insofar as 
a loss of the latter instead concerns the “acquisition of undocumented personal knowl­
edge.”7 He is adamant that the two concepts do not apply to the same sorts of cases, 
for instance maintaining that “the [post-Griswold] Eisenstadt definition confuses the 
values of privacy and liberty.”8
DeCew, on the other hand, and as noted in the previous chapter, constructs an ac­
count of privacy that allows significant overlap in conceptual extensions, while never­
theless requiring a proper separation of conceptual intensions.9 In her view, “it is more 
intuitive to agree that liberty, privacy, and autonomy are distinct concepts that overlap
5Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, 285.
6Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 273.
7Ibid., 273-74.
8 Parent, “A New Definition of Privacy for the Law,” 316.
9The general point here is just Freges well-rehearsed distinction between sense (intension) and reference 
(extension), where, for instance, the two different senses “evening star” and “morning star” nevertheless 
share the same referent; i.e. the planet Venus, as per Frege, “Sense and Reference,” 210.
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in their extensions,” to the extent that “a subset of autonomy cases ... can plausibly be 
said to involve privacy interests as well”10
Is it perhaps so that DeCew is correct in her reflection on the situation, and Parent 
is incorrect, insofar as he fails to acknowledge the possibility of overlap in conceptual 
extensions between privacy and other closely related concepts? Such a question has no 
straightforward answer. There is nothing in Parents argument that commits him to 
the (obviously false) view that a distinction of conceptual intensions always requires 
or implies a corresponding distinction of conceptual extensions. On the contrary, his 
position, in this respect, only concerns the claim that the extension of the concept of 
privacy does not overlap to the extent that others, such as DeCew, maintain that it does, 
or can. In Parents view, a legal case such as Eisenstadt only concerns liberty, while in 
DeCew s view it concerns both privacy and autonomy, the former as a subset of the lat­
ter. The differences in their respective accounts are not due to any simple conceptual 
misunderstanding, on either s behalf. They are instead due to fundamentally differing 
views on the nature of the relation between the concept of privacy and its near concep­
tual neighbors. On Parent s view, the concept of privacy must be set apart from related 
concepts, while on DeCews view it can figure in a less strictly segmented conceptual 
landscape.
Neither Parent nor DeCew offer any argument in favor of their own methodological 
commitments in this respect. And perhaps for good reason. For although it is possi­
ble to seek to determine the strength of these particular commitments, the situation 
is complicated by the vast amount of further methodological commitments on which 
they rely, and their various possible relative weightings and justifications. Prudence sug­
gests that where one seeks to defend some particular methodological commitment in 
relation to some question, one ought to defend all methodological commitments rele­
vant to that question, at least in those instances where they depart from widely shared 
assumptions. But each of these two issues—i.e. the question of relevance and the ques­
tion of whether or not a methodological commitment is sufficiently widely shared— 
themselves fall squarely within the realm of methodological, or meta-philosophical, 
concerns, rather than that of specific concepts and their connection to the world.
W hether or not such a move to the realm of methodological concerns is considered 
problematic or impractical, any attempt to catalog and account for all relevant com-
I0DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, 44.
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mitments of this sort, in order to determine which of the many differing accounts of 
privacy that utilizes a methodologically stronger approach, is a near impossible task, 
for two reasons. First, the amount of methodological commitments requiring investi­
gation in such a case is not only enormous, but also not exhaustively determined. It 
would be, like an attempt to exhaustively catalog all cognitive biases, a near hopeless 
undertaking, without any clearly defined end point. Second, and as noted in the quote 
from Williamson above, even if these initial practical problems could be overcome, or 
at least bracketed, it is nevertheless difficult to determine, with any certainty, the sorts 
of methodological commitments that may come to bear the most fruit in the long term.
Therefore, rather than attempt to sketch any such more or less exhaustive analysis of 
methodological commitments among the privacy philosophers discussed in the previ­
ous chapter, I will instead briefly note just two particular methodological concerns, and 
their respective complicating impacts on the philosophical discussion of privacy. The 
first concerns the differing extents to which individual philosophers rely on common 
judgments (often referred to as intuitions) about phenomena in constructing concep­
tual accounts of them. The second concerns the extent to which the constantly evolving 
nature of the common concept of privacy undermines attempts at exhaustive analysis.
5.1.2 The Status of Common Use
There is general agreement among philosophers on what the structure of a satisfactory 
account of privacy ought to look like: a logically consistent definition that is sufficiently 
consistent with ones other theoretical commitments, and that manages to strike a rea­
sonable balance between respect for common use of the term and well-developed rea­
sons for departing from such use where sufficient further benefits are derived from so 
doing. Parent summarizes this sentiment nicely:
D efining privacy requires a familiarity with its ordinary use, o f  course, but this is 
not enough since our com m on ways o f  talking and using language are riddled with  
inconsistencies, ambiguities, and paradoxes. W hat we need is a definition w hich is 
by and large consistent with ordinary language, so that capable speakers o f  English  
w ill not be genuinely surprised that the term  “privacy” should be defined in  this 
way, but which also enables us to talk consistently, clearly, and precisely about the 
family o f  concepts to which privacy belongs.11
11 Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 269.
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As noted in the previous chapter, various privacy scholars criticize Parent s account 
precisely for its perceived failure to accord with common use of and judgments about 
privacy. Davis, DeCew, and Nissenbaum all take issue with Parents insistence on un­
documented information as necessary for privacy. They provide a range of counterex­
amples and cases that suggest that privacy may properly pertain to situations involving 
documented information (in Parents sense, i.e. belonging to the public record), or—in 
DeCew s case—even situations that need not concern personal information at all. They 
all take issue with what they see as Parent s overly counterintuitive account of privacy:
I suggest, contrary to approaches like ... Parent s, that although an im portant pur­
pose o f  philosophical theory is to introduce greater conceptual rigor, a norm ative 
theory that strays too far from ordinary usage and popular sentim ent is thereby 
rendered unhelpful, or worse, irrelevant.12
The philosophical debate on privacy, in this respect, serves as a specific instance of a 
more general philosophical issue regarding the extent to which reliance on common 
judgments is methodologically appropriate.13 Philosophers differ in the weight they 
are willing to accord to common judgments in their arguments. Their strategies can, 
roughly and approximately, be plotted along a spectrum relating what I will here refer 
to as conceptual restrictiveness—i.e. a measure of the extent to which one is willing to 
forgo adherence to common use and judgments in order to thereby secure some specific 
theoretical gain or gains.
At one end of this spectrum are exceedingly conceptually restrictive theories, ac­
cording to which common judgments serve little or no purpose in the construction of 
a novel account, beyond setting the initial context. On such a view, once a sufficiently 
robust account (however defined) is in place, it can be utilized as a measure by which 
to gauge all purported instances of the phenomenon. Where common judgments and 
the novel account depart from one another, the common judgments are normally con­
sidered at fault, typically, according to this view, because they have mislabelled some 
phenomenon as the concept in question, when it is actually something else altogether. 
In the philosophical privacy discussion, Parents view is more conceptually restrictive 
than most others, given his repeated insistence that purported compelling counterex­
12Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 580.
13E.g. Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy; Alexander, Experimental Philosophy.
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amples to his account are not proper counterexamples, insofar as they mislabel some 
other phenomenon under the rubric of privacy.
At the other end of the spectrum are exceedingly conceptually permissive theories, 
according to which common judgments are essential and central to the construction 
of a novel account. On such a view, a novel account must adhere to certain minimum 
levels of theoretical acceptability, but beyond that, the more successfully it accords with 
common judgments, the more compelling the account. Where common judgments and 
the novel account depart from one another, the account is normally considered at fault, 
at least in all cases surpassing the minimum levels of theoretical acceptability (however 
defined). In the philosophical privacy discussion, DeCew’s view is more conceptually 
permissive than most others, insofar as she demonstrates a greater concern than several 
other scholars for subsuming common judgments about what is commonly referred to 
as “privacy” within her account of the concept.
The permissive end of the spectrum results in accounts that might be considered 
conceptually messier than those arising from the restrictive end. But, as Nissenbaum 
argues, such definitions arguably have greater real-world potential, in terms of being 
put to use outside strictly conceptual and philosophical discussions. Closer proximity 
between a novel concept and its common counterpart will, I presume, make adoption 
of the novel concept more likely to spread (regardless of whether or not one considers 
this to be a preferable state of affairs).
If viewed in terms of John Rawls’s theory of reflective equilibrium—understood as 
the end state of a series of iterative deliberations between ones “considered judgments” 
and ones general theoretical principles—the point is simply that different individuals 
according different weights to considered judgments will lead to divergent “equilib­
ria.”14 The final position of one’s view will depend on the initial weights one chooses to 
ascribe to one’s judgments and principles, respectively, where a difference in the relative 
weightings results in correspondingly differing accounts.
This sort of construal is applicable to numerous philosophical debates. To mention 
one example, there is an ongoing discussion about the role proximity ought to play 
in determining our ethical obligations to needy others. To some, most notably Peter 
Singer, proximity is irrelevant to ethical obligation. This means that, on his view, we 
all have just as strong an ethical obligation to aid a sub-Saharan African child dying
14 For Rawls’s own exposition of reflective equilibrium, see Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, esp. 20-21.
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of malnutrition as we have to aid a child drowning in a shallow pond just outside our 
office.15 Singer acknowledges the extreme counterintuitiveness of his view, but main­
tains that it is the common judgments that are at fault, rather than his theory.16 Others, 
notably Frances Kamm, seek to construct a theory of ethical obligation to needy others 
that takes account of a purported ethical relevance of proximity, as based on common 
judgments about it. She explicitly criticizes theorists like Singer for failing to properly 
acknowledge those judgments.17 Relative to one another, and in relation to ethical obli­
gations to needy others, Singer s view tends toward the conceptually restrictive end of 
the spectrum, while Kamm’s tends toward the conceptually permissive.
Somewhat relatedly, but within metaphysics, David Lewis has argued for what he 
terms modal realism, according to which possible worlds are real, as opposed to mere 
theoretical constructs or convenient fictions, and the term “actual” is taken to function 
indexically in relation to the world of the speaker.18 Although Lewis acknowledges the 
highly counterintuitive nature of this assertion, noting that it is typically met with an 
“incredulous stare,” he nevertheless insists that modal realism has sufficient advantages 
over the alternatives to justify discounting such judgments, inclining his view, on this 
matter, toward the conceptually restrictive end.19
Much as in the above case of the underdetermination involved in determining which 
inconsistent element to remove in the face of inconsistency, however, there is no com­
pelling argument that common judgments—whether considered universally or rela­
tive to a given context of discussion—ought to be valued to a certain degree or other 
in philosophical argumentation. Philosophers instead differ in their emphasis on such 
judgments, and usually only implicitly so. This makes it difficult to establish the relative 
strength of different accounts of privacy when compared one to another, particularly 
insofar as ascribing a certain weight to common judgments might easily be interpreted 
as begging the question against alternate accounts with different ascribed weights. There 
is, as in the foregoing case regarding the appropriate way to account for privacy in rela­
tion to closely related concepts such as liberty and autonomy, no immediately obvious 
means of resolving this methodological impasse.
15 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.”
16Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions.”
17Kamm, “Faminine Ethics”; Kamm, “Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?”; Kamm, “The 
New Problem of Distance in Morality.”
18Lewis, On the Plurality o f Worlds.
19Ibid., esp. 133-35.
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5.1.3 The Shifting Grounds of Privacy
Technological advances, and the corresponding evolution of social mores, also have a 
significant impact on privacy. There is both a general and a specific concern in this. 
The general concern is a largely skeptical one, similar to those noted above: to whatever 
extent philosopher choose to rely on common judgments in analyzing some concept or 
other, they will have to work from common judgments occupying a particular place in 
time. But these judgments are constantly evolving, as we acquire or stipulate concepts 
that reference new phenomena, or that reference old phenomena in new ways. General 
common judgments about a simple and widespread concept, such as family, presumably 
differ in many respects between, say, the nineteenth and the twenty-first centuries.20 
Unless one is willing to posit a highly implausible view of something like eternal con­
ceptual essences, this evolution necessarily renders all conceptual analyses relative to 
some given time period, as tied to the common use and judgments one chooses as the 
basis for ones investigations.
This consideration applies particularly forcefully to normatively loaded concepts like 
privacy, given fluctuations over time in the precise nature of its normative content. At a 
time t\ , for instance, it may be considered ethically problematic to have general knowl­
edge about another persons consecutive intimate relationships with others, while at a 
time t2 (some years or generations later), such features of social life may be considered 
sufficiently mundane to be legally and ethically uninteresting.
But there are also more specific concerns that affect privacy uniquely. For one, there 
are significant variations between common interpretations of privacy in different do­
mains of discussion. Privacy, with regard to US law, differs in many, if not all, respects 
from privacy with regard to family members in a shared abode. This is merely an in­
stance of the fact that any concept will, in any given situation, have a unique history of 
use relative to that situation, which informs and determines current and future use of 
the term relative to the situation. American lawyers who today speak of privacy as a legal 
concept will, for instance, do so in relation to either Prosser s four torts or the Supreme 
Court Griswold line of cases. They may speak of privacy as drawn directly from these 
sources, or as being contrary to them, but the concept they discuss will, nevertheless, 
be determined by its relation to these fundamental sources of its legal meaning in the 
US.
20 Cf. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 1132-35.
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This sort of talk about a US legal concept of privacy is potentially misleading, insofar 
as it might suggest a single, unitary interpretation of privacy within that domain. But as 
the previous chapter illustrated, there is significant disagreement among US jurispru­
dential scholars on the appropriate interpretation of the term. The various suggestions 
that exist for how it ought to be interpreted are, like their philosophical counterparts, 
widely incommensurable, and no fully consistent and unitary concept can be recon­
ciled from the past and current application of privacy in US law, or the discussion of 
the latter among scholars.21
The interaction between the US legal concept of privacy and the subsequent philo­
sophical discussion of the term is all the more complex when considering privacy in an 
altogether different jurisdiction, like that of the UK. One might, for instance, be inclined 
to suspect that if philosophical reflection on the term grew directly out of uniquely 
American legal circumstances and concerns, then it might also be the case that the 
philosophical discussion of the phenomenon is more or less restricted to US society, 
rather than universally applicable. There are, of course, many social and cultural simi­
larities between the US and the UK—not least due to the common language—but it is 
difficult to ascertain, with any confidence, the extent to which the differences between 
the two might yield different local stipulative interpretations of privacy. This is partic­
ularly so given the divergence of the legal treatment of privacy in the two jurisdictions, 
and its almost entirely independent development in each country over the past century. 
The issue, in this manner, ties back in to some of the previously noted methodological 
difficulties; if one, for instance, acknowledges a larger role for common judgments about 
privacy in ones account, are there sufficiently large differences in common judgments 
between the two jurisdictions to bring about correspondingly differing philosophical 
accounts of privacy?
5.2 A New Framework for Privacy
The sort of methodological concerns I have considered here are not meant to indicate 
the impossibility of conceptual work generally, even if their skeptical form might at first
21 Cf. Schneider, “Privacy Rights, Gene Doping, and Ethics,” 114-16, where privacy is categorized as an 
“essentially contested concept.”
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suggest such a conclusion. On the contrary, they are only meant to flag important limi­
tations to such work. More crucially, they flag specific limitations to the argument I am 
developing, in the following manner. The interest herein is to determine the strength 
of the claim that WADAs whereabouts requirements unacceptably invade the privacy 
of elite athletes in the UK. Doing so requires some sort of account of privacy, in or­
der to make sense of what is at stake in that context. Choosing any one of the existing 
competing philosophical accounts over others demands some form of justification. The 
above methodological concerns indicate that such justification is not available without 
a significant detour into more abstracted methodological issues (if even then). But the 
interest here is not in resolving any methodological disputes—in fact, these arise only 
insofar as they affect the main focus, i.e. the question of the normative status of the 
whereabouts requirements. And this is a practical issue of real-world policy.
As a result, instead of expanding on the methodological issues, with the hope of es­
tablishing which of the many competing philosophical accounts of privacy are stronger, 
I propose to side-step the question altogether. The focus of this thesis is on the privacy 
concerns arising from elite athlete whereabouts requirements. The impetus for this fo­
cus is the discomfort that many individuals—both athletes and observers—have ex­
pressed about the requirements; the sense that they go too far, regardless of the overall 
validity of their aims in so doing. The majority of the concerned parties, however, are 
not philosophers, and arguably not interested in such philosophical concerns as the 
various aforementioned methodological difficulties. This is, again, not to suggest that 
such concerns are unimportant or irresolvable; they remain central to a comprehensive 
philosophical account of privacy, and some have contributed to the various insights 
into the nature of privacy wrought by the philosophical discussion on the topic so far. 
But such concerns are probably not likely to sway most of those with personal stakes 
in the whereabouts issue. To such individuals, there is presumably little satisfaction in 
responses such as the following:
You may have som e valid legal or ethical concerns in the whereabouts case, but 
all/m ost/som e o f them  have nothing to do with privacy proper; they are perhaps 
about autonom y or som e similarly related notion, but not privacy proper.
To which a reasonable response, at least within the whereabouts context, would be 
something like “I do not care precisely how the discomfort I feel is labelled, so long 
as it is taken seriously.” This sort of statement illustrates a particularly important point
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when discussing privacy in relation to such a contextualized issue as the whereabouts 
requirements: a philosophically refined account of privacy that fails to encapsulate the 
general thrust of peoples self-identified privacy concerns in relation to some context 
or other fails to grapple sufficiently with the central and underlying normative issue, 
regardless of its possible further conceptual successes. The importance, in relation to 
elite athlete whereabouts requirements, lies not in technically precise declarations of 
sufficient and necessary conditions for the obtaining or not of privacy in a given case; it 
lies in evaluating the normative value of specific complaints typically worded in terms 
of privacy. The former is a purely conceptual concern, while the latter is to take seriously 
peoples qualms about a given social practice, regardless of the label they may or may 
not have erroneously applied to those qualms.
These considerations can also be stated somewhat more formally. If privacy refers 
to a concept that is subject to the standard considerations of conceptual analysis (stip­
ulation of necessary and sufficient conditions according to certain philosophical prac­
tices), let privacyc instead refer to the concept formed, in a given context, by the set 
of those concerns generally labelled as “privacy concerns” by participants within that 
context. An account of privacy will reflect (various possible) philosophical consider­
ations, while an account of privacyc will instead reflect certain common concerns in 
the context. Thus formulated, the ethically interesting question, at least in the where­
abouts context, is primarily about privacyc, rather than about privacy; it reflects what 
participants in the discussion are interested in discussing. And where methodological 
difficulties, such as those discussed above, conspire to make any meaningful consen­
sus on the nature of privacy implausible, privacyc provides a clear focus, relative to the 
context.
In this sense, then, it is perhaps more appropriate to state that this thesis deals with 
privacyc, than with privacy. More specifically, it concerns the legal and ethical accept­
ability of the whereabouts requirements on elite athletes, with the topic circumscribed 
not by some particular philosophical definition of privacy, but simply by those nor­
mative concerns identified by the discussion participants as pertaining to “privacy,” 
whether conceived of in a philosophically satisfactory manner or not.
In discussing contexts in this manner, it is worth noting that I am not proposing 
that they be individuated in some particular fine- or coarse-grained manner. Rather, 
a context can be as broad or as narrow as one chooses to conceive of it. Elite athlete
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whereabouts requirements generally constitute a broader context, of which the same, 
but restricted to the UK, or to athletics in the UK, or to athletics in the UK around the 
time of a specific competition, all constitute increasingly narrow contexts. More specif­
ically, I use context here simply to refer to the projected scope of use of ones account 
of privacy. One might, for instance, expect ones account to be utilized by practicing 
lawyers within some jurisdiction or other, in arguing their cases. Or one might expect 
it to be utilized only within philosophical and conceptual academic debates. Or one 
might, as I do here, expect it to be utilized by participants to the general discussion 
between WADA, ADOs, athletes and related parties, sport scholars, journalists, etc., in 
determining the legal and ethical acceptability of existing anti-doping regulations.
5.2.1 Conceptual Inflation
There is, of course, a risk of significant conceptual inflation where one allows a concept 
to run wild, without restrictions or limitations of any sort. This is perhaps particularly 
so in cases concerning concepts with strong emotive or normative components, such 
as privacy or liberty. The way such terms are normally invoked imbues them with a 
sense of importance and urgency that may lead those keen on promoting some view 
or other to label it under their heading, in order to thereby lend their view credibility, 
regardless of whether or not it is appropriate to do so. This is noticeable in, for instance, 
the large amount of claims purporting to constitute a human right of some sort. The 
label of “human right” is, with its various political and ethical connotations, attractive as 
a device to rhetorically strengthen a claim. At the same time, this sort of proliferation of 
human rights claims risks undermining the normative force of the concept, by watering 
it down, in making it applicable to an overly broad range of instances.22
To avoid such a scenario in the present case, it is therefore crucial to impose certain 
limitations on any appropriately contextualized account of a phenomenon like privacy. 
Allowing others to import whatever they choose into the contextually relativized con­
cept, by making new and outlandish claims under its heading, can not be permitted. As 
noted in the quote from Williamson above, removing one source of philosophical dis­
cipline does not thereby remove the requirement for some form of discipline. But the 
forms of discipline to be relied on here still need clarification.
22Cf. Tasioulas, “The Moral Reality of Human Rights,” 75; Raz, “Human Rights Without Foundations,” 1-3.
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At first glance, standard logical requirements still apply to a contextualized account 
of privacy: at least in the sense that there can be no instance of internal or external 
inconsistency, on pain of vacuity. There are, however, additional aspects to this when 
considering a contextualized account. First, where privacy is interpreted simply as a 
collection of context-relative concerns, inconsistency between the concerns need not 
lead to one of the inconsistent elements being rejected, as in most analogous instances 
of more traditional accounts. Instead, where the list of concerns is conceived of dis­
junctively, one need only add the corollary that the inconsistent elements not both be 
true.23 The standards can afford to be looser than in more traditional accounts, since 
the contextual approach constitutes less a proper philosophical definition of privacy 
than a summary consideration of various disparate elements within a context, which, 
like common cold, may not be bound together by much more than common linguistic 
practices. In fact, the requirements can be loosened yet further where one chooses to 
deal with the various concerns in isolation from one another, rather than as constitutive 
of a broad, disjunctive notion of privacy. On such an approach, the concerns are eval­
uated one after another. To be worth consideration, they must be internally consistent, 
but there is no further requirement that they be consistent with each other, so long as 
they are assessed independently.
Beyond this, there are certain minimal conceptual requirements on what can reason­
ably be considered as at all pertaining to a contextualized account of privacy. These do 
not, however, constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the obtaining of privacy 
in a context, but instead a form of framework or outer boundary for the discussion. This 
is necessary to limit the scope of the discussion, but it is not sufficient to define privacy, 
since the same or similar considerations also apply to a number of related concepts, 
such as autonomy and liberty. The two primary limitations that I will impose on the 
discussion herein are, first, a recognition of privacy as a negative concept—i.e. privacy 
as the absence of certain harms to the person, rather than as the presence of some pos­
itively defined state of affairs—and second, a recognition of privacy as a state of affairs 
that may or may not be worth protecting, depending on the most apposite balance of 
various further contextually relevant normative values. I discuss each of these in turn 
below.
23Formally: ((p  V g V r V ~^ p) A ->(p A —>p)).
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5.2.2 Privacy As a Negative Concept
Talk about privacy tends to consist primarily of objections to practices or technolo­
gies that are experienced as threatening to ones sense of privacy. There are numerous 
examples of this. A UK government watchdog opposes widespread reliance on high- 
definition CCTV cameras, on the basis that they may be used for potentially repressive 
surveillance of individuals.24 European data protection authorities stipulate that web­
sites in Europe are required to gather the “informed consent” of visitors to their site 
prior to tracking their online behavior through so-called cookies (small pieces of data 
that contain information about visitors), on the basis that covert tracking of such per­
sonal information is harmful to the tracked individual.25 And teachers are reminded 
to mind the public availibility of their Facebook profile pages and to not “friend” their 
pupils, lest doing so blurs the line between their personal and professional roles and 
responsibilities.26 In each case, the risk of some specific harm constitutes the basis for 
the resulting hesitation about a particular practice—a hesitation described, in all these 
instances, in terms of privacy.
In situations such as these, there is not normally any emphasis on establishing what 
privacy is supposed to be, so much as establishing that some state of affairs constitutes 
a threat to ones privacy. Similar examples occur in conceptual work, where “privacy” 
is sometimes glossed as the absence of some specific list of harms.27 And although most 
explicit philosophical definitions of privacy do seek to establish the conceptual contours 
of the phenomenon, they nevertheless tend to do so through negative definitions; pri­
vacy as the absence of certain sorts of harms to the person. Some legal commentators 
after Warren and Brandeis define privacy as being let alone. Parent and Davis define 
privacy as others not possessing certain sorts of information about an individual. Gavi­
son defines privacy as a state in which nobody has any information about a person, pays 
any attention to them, or has any physical access to them. And DeCew defines privacy 
as a state in which others do not have certain sorts of information about a person (like 
Parent and Davis), do not have access to them (like Gavison), and where they are free 
from certain pressures of conformity and coercion. Privacy, in each case, consists of the 
absence of certain states of affairs identified by the respective theorist.
24BBC, High-Def CCTV Cameras Risk Backlash, Warns UK Watchdog.
25Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2010.
26 Vasagar, Pupils Are Not Your Facebook Friends, Net Privacy Expert Warns Teachers.
27Cf. Allen, Privacy and Medicine.
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This feature of the discussion on privacy—its tendency toward negative definitions— 
is shared with various other discussions regarding similarly broad concepts. It seems 
generally easier, for instance, to define the absence of health, than to define its presence, 
except of course in those simple reverse instances where its presence is defined nega­
tively as the absence of some specific harmful states of affairs. Health as the absence of 
disease, injury, and pain.28 Liberty as the absence of external coercion.29 Privacy as the 
absence of harms arising from that which is, loosely speaking, “nobody elses business.” 
There are plausible explanations for this sort of general tendency toward negative 
definitions. It seems, for instance, that people have an easy time recognizing when they 
disapprove of a real or hypothetical situation, even in those cases where they experience 
significant difficulty specifying or justifying the reasons underlying their disapproval.30 
Such difficulties can arise regardless of whether the disapproval is widespread or varies 
significantly between individuals. In many cases, it seems that people often judge sit­
uations as ethically problematic due to subtle physiological cues or “gut feelings” that 
form the basis of their subsequent opinions on the matter, regardless of their ability to 
defend those opinions in argument. If this is so, it may help account for the widespread 
tendency to worry about purported privacy harms prior to any specification of how 
privacy ought to be interpreted. A feeling that something is wrong with some scenario 
under consideration entails ethical disapproval that, depending on environmental fac­
tors, may then be identified as a privacy issue. As a corollary to the discussion so far it 
can be claimed that, generally speaking, the experience of the threat of a privacy harm 
precedes reflection on the proper interpretation of privacy itself.
This, I contend, is also illustrative of the nature of the philosophical discussion on 
privacy. A number of harms, experienced to a varying degree by different individu­
als as privacy harms, inform the bulk of common interpretations of privacy. Philoso­
phers attempting to make sense of the conceptual terrain then seek to distill certain 
core characteristics uniting or underlying these specific harms. But in their varying 
choices of which harms to investigate—as well as how, methodologically, to go about 
their investigations—they are led to different philosophical accounts of privacy. The 
wide and disparate natures of the resulting accounts arise, primarily, from the wide and
28Cf. Murphy, Concepts of Disease and Health.
29 Cf. Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty.
30Haidt, Koller, and Dias, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?”; Haidt and Hersh, 
“Sexual Morality”; Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.”
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disparate natures of the underlying harms. There are good reasons to suspect that it is 
so difficult to provide a philosophically satisfactory account of privacy because, as some 
of the skeptics maintain, the common notion itself is inherently confused; there is little 
or no solid conceptual ground on which to build.
This is, however, only an immediate problem for an account of privacy purporting 
to tell the entire story about the concept; claiming to reveal its “essence.” Adopting the 
sort of contextual approach I propose—whereby the term “privacy” is intended merely 
as shorthand for the absence of a number of (possibly conceptually unrelated) contex­
tually relevant normative concerns—no such certainty is needed in order to evaluate 
the normative strength of those concerns.
Such a view will, of course, result in accounts of privacy that differ from one context 
to the next. Privacy in the context of US jurisprudence will presumably differ from pri­
vacy in the context of UK jurisprudence, and each will presumably differ from privacy 
in the context of, say, family relations. There may be overlap, even significant overlap, 
between the different contexts, as concerns about certain harms may easily arise across 
separate contexts. But there can still be important differences. Abortion is, for instance, 
identified as a central privacy concern in US law—as a deeply private choice about the 
sort of life one desires to lead—but not generally in UK law (apart from through re­
lated data confidentiality law and similarly tangential issues). The focus, in a contextual 
account of privacy, will not be on establishing whether or not such identification is con­
ceptually appropriate, but on establishing the means by which the normative concerns 
in question can be evaluated, in order to ascertain their normative value.
I will, therefore, proceed by taking privacy in the whereabouts context as pertain­
ing to those so-identified harms (to be specified in the following chapter) that athletes 
and other participants to that general discussion worry about in relation to it. Privacy 
is, within this context, simply the absence of these harms. The more likely the harms 
are, the greater the threat to privacy. But there is no invasion of privacy unless one or 
more of the harms are realized. And, perhaps more importantly, there is no unacceptable 
invasion of privacy unless the realized harms lack sufficient independent legal and/or 
ethical justification.
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5.2.3 Privacy As a Balancing of Conflicting Values
Privacy is an inherently social phenomenon; there is little sense talking about privacy 
in relation to a possible world that contains only one person. Apart from possible fur­
ther stipulations, such as those involving past or future others, such a person can not 
really be said to lose or gain privacy, to keep some things rather than others private, or, 
perhaps most importantly, to suffer an invasion of their privacy. The interest in privacy, 
as well as the possibility of suffering from any of a variety of different purported pri­
vacy harms, only truly arise in relation to situations involving two or more individuals. 
Social interaction, of some sort, is a prerequisite to privacy.31
There are various social practices that aim to regulate social interaction in one man­
ner or another. The law of a country seeks to codify those practices that are considered 
sufficiently important to warrant explicit regulation. But even legally unregulated social 
practices are shaped and controlled, to a large extent, by such phenomena as social con­
formity, expectations, taboos, and general cultural mores. Within this legal and ethical 
network of regulatory mechanisms, inter-regulatory conflicts inevitably arise. A partic­
ular criminals right to a fair trial may be at odds with a general desire for vigilante-style 
violent justice for a particularly hateful crime. A promise to a relative may clash with 
a requirement to speak the truth in a court of law. Or a feeling that one is entitled to 
a certain degree of privacy, despite choosing to be in the public eye, may conflict with 
a widespread feeling that the public is entitled to a certain degree of insight into ones 
personal dealings, possibly as a direct result of one s choosing to be in the public eye.
Some of these regulatory mechanisms might be considered stronger than others. 
There are claims that some rights, such as the human right not to be tortured, are ab­
solute, not permitting of any exception, and automatically overriding other rights.32 
Whether absolute rights can be properly said to exist or not, most of the regulatory 
mechanisms will be defeasible, in the sense that they may or may not be enforced, legally 
or ethically, in a given instance, depending on further contextual particulars. The claim 
that privacy is unacceptably invaded in a certain instance involving others wanting to 
know about a public person may be normatively stronger than the others’ desire to 
know, while simultaneously being weaker in other comparable instances. Neither of
31 Cf. Fried, “Privacy,” 482; Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 483-84.
32Brecher, Torture and the Ticking Bomb; Matthews, The Absolute Violation.
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the claims have, as such, a specific context-less value; they are each pro tanto defeasible 
claims given specific values in light of the particulars of each instance.
Indeed, in any given context, those harms identified as privacy harms need to be 
assessed in order to ascertain to what extent they might be acceptable. Such an assess­
ment takes the form of a categorization of those values that impact on the harms in 
the context. These values arise from two sources. First, there are the values that form 
the rationale for being concerned about privacy in the first place, i.e. the specific rea­
sons individuals give for being opposed to the harms. This may be due to non-specific 
concerns, such as general discomfort or a vague feeling that something is “nobody elses 
business.” Or it may, for instance, be due to one s view on more abstracted ideals, such as 
justice or fairness. Second, there are the values that form the basis for the privacy harms 
themselves, i.e. the justifying reasons for the acceptability of the harms. These may also 
be more or less specific, and can arise from any of a variety of sources, whether legal, 
ethical, financial, or political.
As an example, consider again the case of a public person claiming an unacceptable 
invasion of privacy, where that person has nevertheless chosen to be in the public eye, 
say by running for public office. There are many potential sources of value underlying 
such a claim. These may include feelings of ethical propriety, such as the feeling that 
there are already reasonable boundaries between private and public in place, and they 
need respecting. Or they may include reference to a legal right, such as the sense that 
one is entitled to a certain domain of private life as set out in the law.33 Or perhaps they 
include sentiments relating to fairness, such as the view that although choosing to run 
for public office will presumably decrease privacy to some extent, this decrease ought 
not to be out of proportion with what arguably similarly public persons, such as teachers 
or company executives, are subject to.
Likewise, the claim that there is an entitlement to a certain degree of public insight 
into the personal dealings of an individual running for public office has various po­
tential sources of value. These might include, for instance, the perceived need to hold 
elected representatives to a certain ethical standard, or at least to ensure that they are
33Strictly speaking, a legal right is not a value in itself, although it protects a value. Likewise, a violation of 
a legal right is not a harm in itself, it is only a harm insofar as the value that the right protects is harmed. 
This distinction, however, has no practical impact on the issues considered here; the existence of a legal 
right protecting some value or other is a powerful, if indirect, indicator of the importance of the value, 
and can therefore figure as part of a justification for the unacceptability of permitting its harm.
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the sorts of people that they seek to present themselves as to the electorate, i.e. that they 
are truthfully representing their political claims and expressed ideals.
Identifying the specific values at play in a given context will, however, not provide 
any particular assessment on whether one set of values trumps the other or not. Rather, 
the aim is at first just to recognize which values are being weighed against each other, 
in order to thereby derive a functional account that can, in turn, be applied to individ­
ual instances in order to render a final judgment on which of the values is stronger, 
in relation to that particular instance. So, we might assume, say, that some particular 
politicians interest in privacy trumps a public interest in their sexual relations with 
their spouse. But if they were to campaign on a platform of, say, anti-homosexuality, 
we might nevertheless also assume that the public interest in their sexual relations with 
a person of the same gender would trump their interest in privacy. Even if we assume 
that the underlying conflicting values remain the same between the two instances, it is 
still reasonable to presume that differences, like these, in the contextual particulars can 
lead to correspondingly differing final judgments.
I have argued above that a contextualized account of privacy is limited in two re­
spects. First, it is circumscribed to those harms that are identified, within the context, 
as privacy harms. Second, establishing the normative strength of privacy, so identified, 
is restricted to a balancing of the values underlying each of the support for and the 
opposition to those harms. Such an identification of values will not, in itself, yield a 
normatively definitive answer to the acceptability of the privacy harms in the context, 
but it will yield a functional account that can then be applied to individual instances, in 
order to ascertain whether or not privacy is unacceptably invaded with regard to that 
particular instance. I still need to say something, however, about the practical imple­
mentation of these two steps; precisely how are contextual privacy harms, and their 
supporting and opposing underlying values, to be identified?
5.2.4 Determining Privacy Harms
Within a contextualized account of privacy, of the sort proposed here, how ought one 
to go about identifying those contextual harms that fall under the heading of (a con­
textualized notion of) privacy? Is the identification process limited to explicit claims of 
harms from discussion participants, or can the scope be expanded to include what one
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takes to be implicit claims, or related claims in other discussions? Or ought one per­
haps instead to apply some list of different categories of typical privacy harms, in order 
to thereby ascertain which ones are relevant in the context in question and which ones 
are not? And if so, how amenable is such a list to interpretation and change—is it best 
viewed as being fixed and closed, or flexible and open-ended?
The answer to these sorts of questions will, in all likelihood, vary with the specific re­
quirements of the context under investigation. As a general rule, however, a charitable 
assessment of reasonableness will arguably suffice in most situations. If certain contex­
tual privacy harms seem to be reasonable, within the context, even where they are not 
explicitly mentioned in the discussion, then there is no prima facie basis on which to 
oppose their inclusion in the discussion. Equally, as a methodological tool, there is no 
reason to either object to relying on a reasonable pre-conceived list of certain categories 
of privacy harms, nor to the notion that such a list might undergo important changes 
across time and cultures.
One might object that the standard of reasonableness I am considering here smug­
gles serious methodological difficulties, of the sort noted previously, into the discussion. 
If the measure of contextualized conceptual inclusion is based on a specific interpreta­
tion of reasonableness, then, one might insist, that interpretation itself stands in need of 
independent justification, to demonstrate that it is stronger than alternative interpreta­
tions of reasonableness. There are two general fears here: that one s contextual account of 
privacy may be over-inclusive of harms, or that it may be under-inclusive (or, perhaps, 
both, in relation to specific harms both included and not included in the account).
Such an objection, however, only applies to a strict interpretation of reasonableness,
i.e. something like necessary and sufficient conditions for the obtaining of reasonable­
ness. But the notion can instead be interpreted as merely a rough heuristic tool to enable 
further discussion, rather than a strict measure of some theoretical criteria. The bound­
aries of the discussion—as set by limiting one s contextual account of privacy to certain 
harms, and its normative appraisal to a balancing of the underlying conflicting values, 
together with the requirement that the harms themselves be at least internally logically 
consistent—is arguably sufficient for such purposes. The further appeal to reasonable­
ness in identifying the harms in a given context, is then simply an appeal to a non­
specific standard of inter-personal plausibility. If some harm seems, to some amount of 
individuals, to constitute a privacy harm in some context, then better to allow its claim
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to that label and seek to establish its normative weight, than to argue that it ought not 
to be considered at all. Similarly, although it may be difficult to ensure that one has 
considered all reasonable claims of privacy harms within a given context, there is no 
compelling need to prove that one has cataloged all such harms exhaustively. Where 
others find such claims missing, their raising of the issue suffices for it to be taken into 
consideration in further discussion. But prior to such a response, there is no particular 
reason to presume any requirement that one seeks to pre-empt every possible expansion 
of the discussion.
Beyond these general considerations, I claim methodological agnosticism toward 
methods of identifying the relevant contextual harms. Although preferring a certain 
method myself, I make no claim as to its purported superiority over alternative means 
of effecting similar analyses. More specifically, I will opt for the following approach. 
In considering a given context, such as that of elite athlete whereabouts requirements, I 
find it pedagogically illuminating to approach it through a pre-conceived list of different 
categories of privacy harms, in order to determine which ones can be made to apply, in 
some form or other, to the context. I conceive of this list as open-ended, amenable to 
various sorts of cultural and temporal variations, but useful as a rough starting point 
for further reflection. If additional concerns are raised in the discussion itself, but not 
mentioned in this list, then they may be included for consideration as well.
There are many ways in which this sort of list of categories of privacy harms might 
be populated. The general considerations of privacy so far illustrate a broad array of 
candidate harms, ranging through publication of personal details, insecure databases 
containing personal information, and personal data being put to uses not explicitly ac­
knowledged by the person to whom the data pertain, to instances involving blackmail, 
the unintended or undesired exposure of ones nudity to others, or even interference by 
ones government in those decisions—such as procreation and child-bearing—that are 
seen as particularly personal.
There are various ways of organizing these sorts of harms.34 I follow Daniel Solove, 
in his distinctions of category, as I find them reasonably exhaustive in their general 
treatment of privacy issues. Briefly, Solove divides various privacy harms into four over­
arching categories, the majority of which pertain to personal information. More specifi­
cally, his major categories consist of the harms that may arise as part of (a) the collection
34Cf. Allen, Privacy and Medicine.
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of personal information, (b) the processing of personal information, (c) the dissemina­
tion of personal information, and (d) certain forms of personal invasion.35 Each of these 
requires a few words of further explanation.
As regards the collection of personal information, Solove notes potential privacy 
harms arising from two sources: surveillance and interrogation. The former concerns 
harms that arise when individuals are subject to observation by others in a non-re- 
ciprocative manner, while the latter concerns harms that arise when individuals have 
questioned pressed against them in a manner that disregards their level of comfort with 
the questioning. In relation to the processing of personal information, Solove identifies 
numerous potential privacy harms. Data aggregation can, as Nissenbaum argues, give 
rise to information that is more personally intrusive and harmful than the discrete bits 
of data on their own. Linking specific data profiles to real individuals has a similar impact. 
Insecure data storage or processing yields an inherent risk of ones data being discovered 
by parties who ought not to be privy to it. Ones personal information may be utilized 
for vastly different, and potentially embarrassing or debilitating, purposes other than 
those one initially agreed the data could be used for. And, finally, harms may arise from 
denying individuals access to information held about them, including but not limited to 
their inability to thereby correct mistakes in the information.36
The dissemination of personal information, in Soloves view, also involves a number 
of potential privacy harms. Confidence may be breached (the harm arising from the be­
trayal of trust inherent in the relationship of confidence), or information may be publicly 
disclosed against ones desires (the harm arising from ones lack of control over the de­
cision to disclose). People typically feel deeply humiliated by incidences of exposure of, 
for instance, their nakedness, their toilet behaviors, or their sexual behaviors. Where 
there is increased accessibility to information about individuals—such as if the infor­
mation is made retrievable by anybody with an internet connection—worries about the 
aims to which the information may be put increase. Blackmail constitutes a legally well- 
recognized harm to an individuals privacy, as does appropriation o f a persons name or 
likeness. There is a similar harm in distortion, whereby an individual is presented to the 
public in a false light.37
35 Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy.”
36Ibid., 491-523.
37Ibid., 523-48.
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Finally, Solove notes two potentially harmful forms of personal invasion, which, like 
DeCew s third privacy “cluster,” need not pertain to information at all. The first concerns 
the widespread feeling that each individual is entitled to a personal zone within their own 
home or some similar (physical or metaphorical) realm. This realm might be breached 
by various forms of nuisance and harassment, including loud noises, noxious odors, 
undesired telemarketing calls, or e-mail “spam.” The second concerns each individuals 
ability to make certain crucial decisions about their own life, without undue interference 
by government or other similar institutions. This reflects the privacy concerns central 
to the Griswold line of cases.38
All of these various potential privacy harms are recognizable in different aspects of 
the legal and philosophical discussion of privacy. Although they are not all accepted 
by all the participants in those discussions, they do appear sufficiently frequently to 
warrant their inclusion in a list, such as this, of potential privacy harms for contextual 
application. Although this overview is necessarily brief, I will develop those harms that 
are relevant to the whereabouts context in more detail in the following chapter.
5.2.5 Determining the Underlying Values
As noted above, there are many potential sources for those values underlying either 
support for or opposition to privacy harms in relation to any given context. One com­
mon source of privacy complaints arises from contrasts between more or less analogous 
contexts that, despite being analogous, nevertheless differ in the extent of the privacy 
harms involved. They may concern, for instance, the potential exposures and invasions 
suffered by celebrities who are followed by tabloid press, as opposed to those of teachers 
or scholars. Or they may concern the extent of surveillance by CCTV security cameras 
in the UK, compared to the extent of similar measures in France. Or they may concern 
the tracking of the whereabouts of elite athletes, compared to similar forms of tracking 
of criminals. Contrasts such as these can help draw out normative intuitions about the 
contexts in question, in requiring either supporting argumentation for the acceptability 
of the differences in the privacy harms between them, or supporting argumentation for 
the view that the contexts are not sufficiently analogous, in the necessary way (however 
defined). If, for instance, elite athletes are found to be subject to more invasive tracking
38Ibid., 548- 58.
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than are some convicted criminals, then either the difference in the level of invasive­
ness needs some sort of normative justification, or there is a need to demonstrate that 
the two contexts are not sufficiently analogous to draw any normative conclusions from 
such a comparison.
Contrasting privacy harms in a given context with sufficiently comparable contexts 
in this manner has two important benefits. First, it can lead to insights into the sorts 
of underlying values at stake in the context of interest, both in support of and in oppo­
sition to the harms. Second, in those cases where privacy complaints arise specifically 
from comparisons of contexts—e.g. from claims that it is unfair to impose certain pri­
vacy harms on a subset of a population group when those harms are not also imposed 
on the population group as a whole—performing such comparisons allows an initial 
rough appraisal of those privacy harms that are worth investigating in closer detail, and 
those that do not differ to a sufficient extent between the contexts to warrant further 
examination. This is a general issue of normative coherence; if, say, society in general 
is unconcerned by some privacy harm, it will, everything else being equal, be more dif­
ficult to establish the normative unacceptability of that harm within some subcontext.
To take a more concrete example, if the general British public is not overly con­
cerned with the way in which their government collects and processes their sensitive 
personal data, then everything else being equal, it will be more difficult to argue for the 
claim that the way in which the government collects and processes the sensitive personal 
data of a subset of that population, such as pregnant women, is unacceptable. Unless it 
can be shown, through further argumentation, that the set of pregnant women in the 
UK constitues some sort of ethically relevant exception to the general rule, the lack of 
concern in the broader context tells against concern in the narrower context. Norma- 
tively speaking, the greater the difference of privacy harms between the contexts, and 
the more similar they are in all other respects, the greater the normative impact. If it 
is, for instance, considered acceptable to demand whereabouts information from elite 
athletes, but not from academics or professional musicians or individuals competing 
for an attractive job position, then these differences arguably require either a thorough 
justification of their ethical underpinnings, or revision.39
In addition to this sort of comparison of contexts with each other, however, a given 
context will often also have a certain amount of inherent value conflicts, which may
39Cf. MacGregor and McNamee, “Philosophy on Steroids,” 406-8.
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be explicitly or implicitly obvious in the discussion otherwise. The context may, for in­
stance, at its base pit questions of personal dignity against free speech, or freedom from 
social control against a need to implement effective anti-terrorist capabilities, or some­
thing similar, without requiring any recourse to comparison contexts.
Some of the sorts of values of interest here—particularly those supporting protec­
tions of privacy—have already been discussed in the foregoing chapter. They range from 
Frieds account of privacy as necessary to such values as friendship, trust, and love, 
through to Gavisons pre-empirical account of privacy as inherently linked to a wide 
array of further values, including democracy, individual autonomy, creativity, mental 
health, and the ability to have meaningful relationships.
Values opposing protections of privacy have also been noted. Warren and Brandeis, 
for instance, recognized that the right to free speech restricted the scope of their pro­
posed right to privacy, insofar as there exist private issues that rightly concern the gen­
eral public (such as those involving elected public officials acting in a manner inconsis­
tent with their public claims). A similar balancing between public disclosure of personal 
information and free speech is often undertaken in both US and UK courts. But it is also 
possible to oppose protections of privacy regardless of the existence of any particular 
conflict of legal entitlements as such. So, for instance, some forms of protection of pri­
vacy might be resisted on account of the fact that privacy can be used to conceal bad 
things, such as the committing of crimes, or ones engaging in ethically reprehensible 
(although not illegal) behavior, or, for that matter, doping out of competition in order 
to gain a competitive advantage.
As already noted above, determining the values at play in a given context does not, 
in itself, yield any specific judgment on which values win out over the others. It will, 
however, provide a clearer account of the central normative contention(s), which can 
then be applied, as a functional account, to any given instance of the context in question, 
where the particular features of that instance will determine the relative weights of those 
values. In this manner, one can provide a final normative judgment on any individual 
instance within the context. The following chapter aims to provide an overview, in the 
above manner, of the privacy harms, and their corresponding underlying values, that 
pertain specifically to the whereabouts context.
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Es t a b l is h in g  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  p r iv a c y  in the whereabouts context requires two things. First, it is necessary to identify those privacy harms that pertain to the context. Second, it is necessary to identify those values within the context that 
might be used to generate support for or opposition to any such harms. Doing so will 
provide a sufficiently comprehensive contextual account of privacy to allow for a sub­
sequent appraisal, in the following chapter, of the claim that WADAs whereabouts re­
quirements unacceptably invade the privacy of elite athletes.
6.1 Harms
As noted in chapter 1, there are various potential privacy harms for elite athletes that do 
not pertain to WADAs whereabouts requirements. WADA stipulates, for instance, that 
urine samples must be provided in “full view” of a doping control officer, in order to 
ensure that the athletes do not tamper with the sample through catheterization or simi­
lar.1 Although this constitutes a harm of exposure, it is shared by all out-of-competition 
and in-competition doping tests involving urine samples, and does not arise from the 
issue of whereabouts requirements as such.
^ A D A , IST3, § D.4.9.
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Equally, there are various harms arising from the whereabouts requirements that do 
not pertain to privacy. The requirements are, for instance, by WADAs own admission 
burdensome on athletes, in the sense that they can take some time to complete.2 This 
is an unfortunate feature of the system, but not one that activates a direct concern for 
privacy; that whereabouts submissions take time does not constitute a measure of the 
seriousness of any normally recognized privacy harm, nor have athletes or other parties 
to the discussion couched it in such terms. As a result, I will not treat it further.
The focus here lies instead on the domain formed by the conjunction of these two 
areas, i.e. elite athlete privacy concerns on the one hand and WADAs whereabouts re­
quirements on the other. Within this suitably delimited domain there are a number of 
privacy harms, which arise as a direct or potential result of the whereabouts system:
1. Elite athletes are subject to extensive and ongoing whereabouts surveillance by 
ADOs.
2. Elite athletes are subject to regular interrogation by ADOs as to their whereabouts, 
in the form of their quarterly whereabouts report.
3. The whereabouts information of elite athletes is aggregated with other sources of 
information to provide a more complete athlete doping risk profile.
4. The whereabouts information of elite athletes may be subject to data insecurity 
risks.
5. The whereabouts information of elite athletes may be utilized for unrelated pur­
poses, such as the tracking of political dissidents within a country.
6. Three whereabouts failures within an eighteen-month period constitute an anti- 
doping rule violation that is subject to public disclosure, as acknowledged by elite 
athletes in their consent to WADAs regulations.
7. Elite athletes are subject to a further risk of breach o f confidence, if their where­
abouts information is publicly disclosed in situations other than those acknowl­
edged in WADAs regulations.
2WADA, Whereabouts Requirements, 1.
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8. Elite athletes are subject to the risk of blackmail in relation to their whereabouts 
information.
9. In determining their daily sixty-minute time slot, elite athletes may be subject to 
unwanted intrusion into their homes by doping control officers.
Of these various privacy harms, 1 and 2 constitute integral features of the where­
abouts system; 3, 6, and 9 are common features of the system, but ones that only arise 
in certain situations; and the remaining items 4, 5, 7, and 8 are possible but unlikely 
features of the system. I consider each of these points in detail below.
6.1.1 Surveillance
Surveillance concerns being the subject of undesired prolonged observation by others. 
Such observation is particularly emotive in non-public situations; people tend to expe­
rience significant discomfort or anxiety if they believe that they are being watched or 
bugged in their homes or workplaces, that their phones are being tapped, or that their 
general telephone or internet use is being actively monitored by others. But analogous 
concerns can also arise in more public situations, where people expect to be seen and 
heard by others. Individuals in public tend to experience significant discomfort if ob­
servation of them is out of proportion with general social customs, such as if strangers 
stare at them, eavesdrop on their conversations, or follow them from a distance.
The potential harm of surveillance takes different forms, depending on if the surveil­
lance is obvious to or hidden from the person or persons who are subject to it. Instances 
of obvious surveillance have a well-established impact on social behavior, restricting it 
within, or at least aligning it more closely with, widespread norms and attitudes. Con­
formity is a powerful social pressure that can prohibit individuals from experimenting 
with their looks and views, freely expressing their opinion, or even asking others for 
help.3 As Julie Cohen puts it, “Pervasive monitoring of every first move or false start 
will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream.”4
3 For the classic psychology experiments on group conformity, see Asch, “Effects of Group Pressure upon 
the Modification and Distortion of Judgments”; for an empirical appraisal of the last point, see Karabenick 
and Knapp, “Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking.”
4Cohen, “Examined Lives,” 1426.
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Surveillance that is hidden from the person or persons subjected to it functions in a 
slightly different manner. Situations in which people know that surveillance of them is 
possible, but are uncertain whether or not they are being observed at any given moment, 
are akin to Jeremy Benthams Panopticon prison model.5 Bentham suggested that one 
might increase the control of prisoners through a prison design that would allow guards 
to observe the former from a central “inspection lodge,” without the prisoners knowing 
whether or not they were being observed at any particular moment.6
The form of social control that arises from such observation is today well-recognized, 
and at times strongly supported. It serves, for instance, as an important motivating fac­
tor behind the widespread use of CCTV security cameras throughout the UK. The ar­
gument, which is endorsed by a significant portion of the British public, maintains that 
CCTV cameras increase public safety by deterring crime and delinquency in public 
places.7 There are, however, important drawbacks with the system (although Bentham 
himself rejected liberal critique of his ideas).8 Perhaps most salient among these is the 
potential for abuse by totalitarian-style governments or organizations, which might use 
surveillance to impose a highly restrictive view of acceptable behaviors on a large group 
or population, and effectively identify and punish detractors from that imposed norm.9
These forms of social control would presumably not arise in a scenario concerning 
hidden surveillance, where there was no knowledge of even the possibility of being sub­
ject to that surveillance. Such a practice would be questionable on the basis of various 
other privacy harms, such as utilizing the personal information thus collected for var­
ious other purposes. But even barring such complications, it is reasonable to maintain 
that the power asymmetry that would arise betwen the observers and the observed in 
such an instance, in virtue of the latter having access to potentially vast stores of infor­
mation about the former, is in and of itself problematic.10
Of these three surveillance scenarios—constant overt surveillance, Panopticon-style 
survillance, and entirely covert surveillance—the whereabouts context corresponds to
5Bentham, Panopticon, or the Inspection House.
6Ibid., 5.
7Morrison and Svennevig, The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy, 41-42,90.
8Bentham, Panopticon, or the Inspection House, 127-28.
9The potentially devastating repercussions of a Panopticon-style surveillance society is given its perhaps 
most dramatic and well-known characterization in Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four; cf. Moller, “One Step 
Too Far.”
10Cf. Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 495.
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the second, Panopticon-style form that, although hidden from those subject to it, is 
nevertheless known by them to exist. Elite athletes know that they are subject to the 
requirements, but have no knowledge about when the requirements will be utilized by 
their relevant ADO in order to (a) ascertain whether or not the information they have 
provided them with is correct, and (b) test them to determine whether or not they are 
doping.
As previously noted, WADA particularly emphasises the importance of no advance 
notice out-of-competition doping testing. This is done in order to tackle the sort of dop­
ing practices that can be used during training periods, but that retain their performance- 
enhancing effects on the athlete at later stages, such as during competitions, despite no 
longer leaving any detectable traces. This emphasis of WAD As is only made practically 
feasible by the collection of reliable elite athlete whereabouts information. Without the 
requirements, WADA argues, there is no effective means of maximizing compliance 
with anti-doping regulations.
This situation is similar in many respects to that of CCTV camera use in public 
places. Both contexts rely on surveillance as a primary means of deterring undesirable 
behaviors; crime and delinquency in one case, doping in the other. In the context of 
CCTV, people who commit a crime in a public place can not be certain that anybody 
will see them doing so—it may be that nobody is watching the camera footage, that they 
are not recording and storing the images for subsequent retrieval, that they are turned 
off or faulty, or that they are pointed in such a manner that the crime can not be ob­
served or inferred from the images. In the whereabouts context, athletes who dope can 
not be certain that anybody will discover the illicit behavior—it may be that there is no 
plan to perform any no advance notice out-of-competition doping test on them any­
time soon, or that such plans are disrupted by, say, revisions of testing strategies in light 
of the suspicious behavior of other athletes in the same RTP and a resulting reallocation 
of testing resources. The criminal who would have been caught on CCTV need not be 
so, much like the doping athlete who would have tested positive need not be subject to 
any out-of-competition doping tests during the relevant time periods.11
For most individuals, however, the existence of CCTV security cameras arguably 
imposes a worry about ensuring that they not behave in an unacceptable manner while
11 For the argument that general CCTV camera deployment is more ethically problematic than elite athlete 
whereabouts requirements, see Hanstad and Loland, “Elite Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information On 
Their Whereabouts.”
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under the gaze of the cameras. Similarly, for most athletes, the collection and active 
monitoring and utilization of their whereabouts information by their relevant ADO ar­
guably impose a worry about ensuring that they do not fall foul of WADAs anti-doping 
rules by breaking them and risking getting caught.
This, however, constitutes a point at which the analogy breaks down. CCTV is meant 
to monitor behavior in public places, but not to ensure compliance with prior promises 
submitted to, say, ones place of work or significant other. WADAs whereabouts re­
quirements, on the other hand, bind athletes to behave according to specific rules, in 
addition to ensuring that they either remember to keep to their itinerary as per their 
prior whereabouts submissions, or remember to update their itinerary wherever they 
depart from those submissions. Non-athletes are subject to the monitoring of (certain 
aspects of) their behavior through CCTV, while athletes are subject to the monitoring 
of (certain aspects of) their previously expressed intentions as well as to (certain aspects 
of) their behavior. As a result, athletes are arguably under a significantly more taxing 
form of surveillance—they are not only required to behave according to a set of expec­
tations, they are also required to keep in mind precisely what they have expressed at an 
earlier stage—up to three months in the past—regarding their projected whereabouts, 
in order to either adhere to those plans, or revise them accordingly.
This state of affairs constitutes an unprecedented level of surveillance, compared to 
other social groups and practices in British society. Individuals who, like athletes, com­
pete for analogous social goods—such as students applying for prestigious university 
positions, academics applying for scarce funding resources, or professionals applying 
for desirable and relevant employment—are not subject to any remotely similar regu­
lations. The same applies to individuals who, again like athletes, arguably serve as im­
portant role models to young people—such as teachers, artists, or public officials. Even 
those individuals who have a direct responsibility for the health and/or safety of large 
parts of the general public—individuals like doctors and other healthcare professionals; 
commercial airline pilots; or members of the police force, fire brigade, or military—do 
not have any similarly taxing levels of surveillance imposed upon them.
There are individual exceptions within these groups. In the case of Whitefield v. Gen­
eral Medical Council,12 for instance, the Privy Council found that the claimant—a doc­
tor suffering from serious depression and alcohol consumption—constituted a suffi-
12 [2002] UKPC 62, [2003] IRLR 39.
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cient risk to his patients to justify a requirement of absolute abstinence. The doctors 
compliance with the requirement was to be determined by random breath, blood, or 
urine tests, with the doctor risking a loss of his medical license if he at any point failed 
to comply, or to pass such a test. The judgment in the case did not specify precisely 
how he was to be made subject to the random tests, but it is plausible to assume that 
it was not through a system resembling WADAs whereabouts system. And even if it 
were so, there remains a fundamental difference: the doctor in Whitefield had certain 
requirements imposed on him as the result of serious problems that existed prior to the 
imposition, while athletes have analogous (if not more taxing) requirements imposed 
on them simply in virtue of bei ng elite athletes, regardless of whether or not there is any 
indication that they have had prior problems with doping.
The only group in British society that is subject to a level of surveillance plausibly 
comparable to that imposed on elite athletes is criminals who are placed under curfew 
according to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The act stipulates that the whereabouts of 
such individuals are to be tracked, where necessary, through the use of electronic m on­
itoring.13 In practice, this typically means ensuring they are within specified premises at 
specified time intervals, by fitting them with an ankle monitor that detects if they either 
tamper with the monitor or leave the premises during the specified times.14
Where individuals under curfew may fail to follow the imposed regulations, they risk 
significantly harsher sanctions than do athletes who fail to adhere to the information 
they provide as part of their whereabouts reports. Again, however, athletes arguably 
have a more taxing requirement to keep in mind the specifics of their reported where­
abouts information. This will obviously differ from one individual athlete to the next— 
a highly repetitive schedule for an athlete arguably removes the cognitive burden of 
needing to either remember or constantly remind oneself what whereabouts informa­
tion one has registered. But the imposition of, for instance, ever changing competition 
schedules—due to, among other things, the actual placement of athletes in the compe­
titions, determining whether they go on to compete at a higher level or not—is arguably 
more cognitively taxing to keep track of than is the comparatively simple requirement 
that one must always be at the same specific place within the same specific time frame.
13Criminal Justice Act 2003, §§ 215,253.
14Waddington, ‘“A Prison of Measured Time’?” esp. 185-86.
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As a result, elite athletes are, compared to most other people in British society, subject 
to an unprecedented level of surveillance. Apart from a subset of UK criminals, elite 
athletes form a unique set, regarding the extent to which their movements and actions 
are monitored by others. While there are concerns about the widespread reliance on 
CCTV security cameras generally, especially as regards their potentially chilling effect 
on the general public, the form of surveillance to which athletes are subject forms an 
additional and unique burden on them.
6.1.2 Interrogation
Interrogation concerns being actively pressed by others to divulge information. It is sim­
ilar to surveillance in that it constitutes a form of gathering of personal information—as 
opposed to the processing or dissemination of such information—but it differs insofar 
as it only pertains to direct communication between two parties, the interrogator and 
the interrogated. Surveillance, on the other hand, does not require any similar form of 
communication between observer and observed. It can, therefore, be conducted with­
out the knowledge of the individual subject to the surveillance, while interrogation can 
not be conducted without the knowledge of the individual being interrogated.
Like surveillance, interrogation can range from the relatively benign to the highly 
opprobrious. This seems to be determined, in large part, by social norms concerning the 
limits of acceptability regarding the questioning of others. It is, for instance, common 
to ask people various types of questions when getting to know them personally, when 
interviewing them for a potential position of employment, or when seeking to compile 
statistical information about a group of people. But the range of acceptable questions 
is circumscribed by social mores, such that it is not normally considered acceptable to, 
for instance, ask casual acquaintances about their sexual preferences, or job interviewees 
about their political or religious beliefs.
What is the specific harm involved in having socially awkward questions pressed 
against oneself? It is, after all, possible to refuse to answer, particularly where one is well 
aware that the questions are outside the range of general acceptability. Yet many never­
theless feel that there is a privacy harm involved regardless of whether the questions are 
answered truthfully, evasively, or even not at all, as noted in the aforementioned quote 
from Scanlon:
154
6.1. Harms
If you press personal questions on m e in a situation in w hich this is convention­
ally forbidden, I can always refuse to answer. But the fact that no inform ation is 
revealed does not remove the violation, w hich remains just as does the analogous 
violation w hen you peek through m y bathroom  w indow  but fail to see m e because 
I have taken som e m ildly inconvenient evasive action.15
There are various means by which such a harm might be instantiated. First, the very 
act of asking certain types of questions itself influences the tone and possible interpre­
tation of a conversation. Refusing to answer a probing question does not constitute a 
simple declining to open a new avenue of discussion; it carries with it various potentially 
unintentional connotations. Depending on the way the refusal is phrased, it may be in­
terpreted as if the person expressing the refusal is trying to hide something in doing 
so. Once this sort of question has been asked, any type of response is pregnant with in­
terpretative possibilities. Solove plausibly suggests that this is an important motivating 
factor underlying the social opprobrium against asking such questions.16
Second, and somewhat relatedly, it is common to assume that skilled interrogators 
will be able to convey a certain image of an interrogated individual through the types 
of questions they ask, and the manner and order in which they ask them. This need not 
be as simple as asking obviously leading or insinuating questions of the sort “Do you 
still beat your wife?” It can also be accomplished through complex strategies intended 
to draw out anything from a complete confession of some act to mere inference or in­
nuendo that the person being questioned is not reliable in certain crucial respects.17
The whereabouts context is, however, not as problematic as scenarios such as these. 
It is more akin to filling out a form requesting sensitive personal information, on the 
assumption that the information will be responsibly dealt with by those to whom it 
is submitted. Where it is not responsibly dealt with, in either situation, various other 
privacy harms such as data insecurity or blackmail may arise. But these harms do not 
arise from the initial interrogative information request as such.
There are, however, some important differences between the whereabouts require­
ments and filling out a form requesting personal information. These pertain primarily 
to the nature of the whereabouts requirements qua requirements. Elite athletes must 
submit their planned whereabouts for the upcoming annual quarter in advance every
15Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy,” 317.
16Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 500.
17Cf. ibid., 501.
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three months to their relevant ADO. They are required to ensure that the information 
is complete, correct, and up-to-date at all times. Failure to submit the information, or 
submitting incomplete whereabouts information (such that it is not obvious from the 
information how a doping control officer would be able to locate the athlete at any given 
time) count as a filing failure or, in particularly egregious instances, an anti-doping 
rule violation such as sample evasion. The former constitutes a whereabouts failure— 
of which an athlete may have up to three in any eighteen-month period before facing 
sanctions—whereas the latter results in immediate sanctions. Failure to keep submitted 
and complete whereabouts information up-to-date is subject to similar considerations, 
the ultimate severity of any imposed sanctions depending on the athletes “degree of 
fault.”18
In either instance, the strict liability nature of WADAs whereabouts rules means that 
failure to comply with the rules will eventually result in a ban for the affected athletes. 
They will, in other words, be actively prohibited from participating in their sport for the 
length of the ban, whether the nature of their engagement in that sport was more akin 
to full-time employment or part-time interest. Refusing to answer WADAs questions 
regarding whereabouts are, therefore, tantamount to excluding oneself from continued 
participation in one’s sport.
There is no other form of employment or hobby in British society that is subject to 
similar requirements to submit personal information to one’s employer or organization, 
on a regular basis, and subject to harsh sanctions where it is not accurate, complete, 
and up-to-date. There is a strong similarity, however, between the interrogative nature 
of WADA’s whereabouts requirements and that of the UK system of state benefits. A 
benefit like, say, Child Tax Credit is paid out to those families with children in the UK 
who earn less than a certain amount of annual taxed income.19 To apply for Child Tax 
Credit, it is necessary to submit relevant personal information to Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC), such as one’s address, the amount and age of children in one’s 
household, and one’s projected annual earnings. These sorts of factors determine the 
final amount of the tax credit paid.
To ensure that a household qualifies to receive a Child Tax Credit, the HMRC under­
takes regular checking of the information provided to them, to establish that it is com­
18WADA, WADC2, §§ 10.3.3.
19HMRC, What Are Tax Credits?
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plete, accurate, and up-to-date. Where this is not the case, they may charge a penalty fee 
from the tax credit recipient. This can occur in instances where people intentionally or 
“negligently” give them incorrect information, where they fail to inform them of rele­
vant changes in their circumstances within a month of the changes occurring, or where 
they fail to provide any supporting documentation requested by the HMRC.20 Partic­
ularly egregious cases, such as those involving outright tax credit fraud, are subject to 
civil or criminal investigations, depending on the severity of the fraud.21
This is strikingly similar to the case of WADAs whereabouts requirements in several 
respects, although there are some differences between the two. The first concerns the 
historical nature of the social good provided in each instance, and the potential socio­
logical ramifications of this. Wherever state benefits have existed, they have taken the 
form of aid to qualifying individuals. In many countries, such as the UK, qualification 
is not determined automatically, but only upon receipt of a formal application from 
those individuals seeking access to the benefit. In such cases, the provision of personal 
information is inherent to the nature of the social good, and therefore expected by all. 
WADAs whereabouts requirements differ insofar as they are a much more recent im­
position on athletes; the world of elite sport is significantly older than the existence of 
the whereabouts requirements. Athletes seeking access to the social good provided by 
participation in elite sport are subject to requirements that would not have been levied 
against elite athletes of their parents’ or grandparents’ generation. This constitutes a 
significant shift of expectations on affected indiviuals, and may be a primary reason 
underlying the strong initial protests against the system. WADA itself seems to sug­
gest as much in claiming that athletes will be more accepting of the new whereabouts 
requirements “once things settle down.”22
It is not entirely clear whether this sort of distinction between a longstanding system 
and a more recently implemented one has, or ought to have, any normative force in 
considering the potential interrogative harms of WADA’s whereabouts requirements. 
But even if this is deemed not to be the case—even if WADA is correct in assuming 
that the issue has more to do with resistance to change than with any ethical flaws in 
the system itself—there are nevertheless some further concerns with the whereabouts 
requirements.
20HMRC, Tax Credit Penalties.
21 HMRC, Tax Credit Fraud.
22 As quoted in BBC, Athletes Air Issues Over Testing.
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These arise, in particular, because of the highly resource-intensive nature of out-of­
competition doping testing. At competitions, ADOs can test a multitude of athletes at 
one location in a short time span. Outside those competitions, however, they need to 
actively locate the various individual athletes for testing. This sort of activity requires a 
strategic allocation of the available resources, primarily by planning, in advance, whom 
to test at what times. As a result, unreported changes to an athlete s whereabouts would 
constitute a potentially significant waste of resources, in sending a doping control officer 
to perform a doping test on an athlete when they are not at the location specified in their 
whereabouts submission.
This state of affairs indicates why it is not possible for ADOs to—like the HMRC in 
the case of Child Tax Credits—accept changes to ones registered information only after 
the fact. It also explains why it is not practically feasible for WADA to rely on a GPS- 
based tracking system as a means of monitoring athlete whereabouts (as was suggested 
by Kliift). Since this would only provide real-time information, and no indication of how 
it might come to change in the future, it would be difficult for doping control officers to 
effectively plan their out-of-competition tests in advance and according to a reasonable 
distribution of test resources23
It is important, however, to distinguish between the interrogative demands on elite 
athletes, and the burdens entailed by the extent of the whereabouts surveillance on 
them. The latter require keeping in mind prior whereabouts information, the former 
only requires keeping in mind a particular deadline by which one must resubmit up­
coming whereabouts information. Strictly speaking, therefore, there remain compelling 
similarities between interrogation in the whereabouts context and interrogation in the 
context of state benefits. Both require a good deal of personal information, within speci­
fied and rigidly monitored time frames (whereabouts in advance, state benefits in retro­
spect). Failure to adhere to the requirements, in either case, risk leading to discontinued 
access to the social good provided by each, respectively. Some elite athletes may depend, 
for their livelihood, on continued access to the world of elite sport, but so some peo­
ple receiving state benefits may depend, for their livelihood, on continued access to the 
benefits.
23Cf. Halt, “Where Is the Privacy in WADAs ‘Whereabouts’ Rule?” 287-88.
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6.1.3 Aggregation
Aggregation is a type of information-processing; it differs from surveillance and inter­
rogation in only applying to information that has already been collected in one manner 
or another. It concerns the bringing together of various discrete bits of information, in 
order to thereby create a more complete data profile. This occurs in various contexts, 
such as when a company relies on its own customer database in conjunction with credit 
reports to determine those customers who they deem most suitable to market their lat­
est product to, or when the National Health Service combines medical reports about an 
individual from various surgeries and hospitals to construct a fuller medical profile.
Like surveillance, the incidence of aggregation has increased drastically with certain 
developments in technology. Digitized databases and widespread internet communi­
cations allow for the potential concatenation of all manner of different forms of infor­
mation about a person at near-instant speeds, where it might have taken weeks or even 
months to accomplish a similar gathering of physical records in the past. The same holds 
true of peoples internet behavior, which has the potential to be monitored in various 
ways by the owners of any website a person visits, through the deployment of website 
cookies that can track different aspects of a persons internet use.24
Aggregation serves various purposes, including the possibility of utilizing the aggre­
gated information about people to provide them with a more tailor-made experience, be 
it in relation to medical services, education and employment opportunities, or choosing 
to display to them those ads that they are most likely to find interesting. The potential 
harm of aggregation arises from the fact that discrete piece of personal information may 
tell very little about a person while kept discrete, but may yield a much more revealing 
picture of them than they prefer upon combination into a central data profile. This is 
the problem Nissenbaum noted, in discussing her concept of “privacy in public”:
The value o f  aggregates is that they are m ultidim ensional and as such provide m ore 
inform ation than pictures that are less filled out. Beyond this, however, an aggre­
gate can incorporate a richer portrait o f  the individual than even the bits taken 
together ... as it may include not only inform ation explicitly given but inform a­
tion inferred from that which has been given. ... Dem ographic profiles, financial 
profiles, and consum er profiles identify people as suitable targets for proposed
24Cf. Kosinski, Stillwell, and Graepel, “Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records 
of Human Behavior.”
159
6 . P r iv a c y  in  t h e  W h e r e a b o u t s  C o n t e x t
“treatments.” U sed in this way, a profile may be seen as a device that offers a way 
o f targeting people as the likely m eans to fulfilling som eone elses end.25
In the whereabouts context, aggregation arises in the form of the stipulation that 
ADOs undertake a doping risk profile for each athlete in an RTP, in order to perform 
“target testing” of those athletes deemed to be at higher risk of doping. WADA suggests 
various criteria by which this might be determined. Some of these pertain to where­
abouts information, such as prior whereabouts failures or whereabouts information 
indicating that the athlete moves to a “remote location.”26 But many pertain to other 
sources of information, such as abnormal biological parameters, sudden performance 
improvements, financial incentives, or even “reliable information from a third party.”27 
In submitting their whereabouts information to WADA, elite athletes are thus aware of 
the fact that the information they provide will be aggregated with various other sources 
of information about them, in order to enable a more intelligence-led allocation of test­
ing resources.
This state of affairs is reminiscent of the manner in which a police force might rely 
on various sources of information to compile a more complete picture of criminal con­
duct. This is particularly so in regard to the intelligence-led nature of both scenarios. 
They differ, however, in that suspected criminals under investigation need not be at all 
aware that information about them is being aggregated, whereas athletes are made fully 
aware of this being the case, in regard to the anti-doping work undertaken by the var­
ious ADOs. In this manner, the whereabouts context is again more analogous to that 
of state benefits, where various government institutions and organizations may share 
and aggregate data in order to ensure that the same individuals are not, for instance, re­
ceiving a high income at the same time as they are claiming benefits intended for those 
with a lower income. Both this and the whereabouts context suffer from serious poten­
tial privacy harms where such aggregated data profiles are used for other purposes than 
those indicated. But where the aggregation functions as a tool to accomplish objectives 
known to and, for the most part, accepted by those whose data is being aggregated, it 
is difficult to see how or why either case would constitute a greater privacy problem, 
in this respect, than the other. On the assumption that this form of aggregation is not
25Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age,” 589-90.
26WADA, IST3, § 4.4.2.
27Ibid., § 4.4.2.
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particularly problematic in the context of state benefits, it therefore follows that it is also 
not particularly problematic in the whereabouts context.
6.1.4 Public Disclosure
Public disclosure is a means of disseminating information, rather than a means of col­
lecting or processing it. It concerns those situations where a true piece of information 
about a person is made available to the public at large. Taken as a privacy harm, it con­
cerns those instances of dissemination to the general public that are damaging to the 
reputation of the person to whom the information in question pertains. In this respect, 
it is one of the privacy harms that is in most direct competition with freedom of speech 
or press; the former puts certain limits on what can be truly said about others, while the 
latter pushes against those limits in the interest of public elucidation. Legally speaking, 
the primary test to determine, in any given case, which of the two is to take precedence, 
is the newsworthiness test; where something is deemed sufficiently newsworthy, for 
whatever reasons, the harms of public disclosure are considered overridden.
Public disclosure differs from libel, in the sense that it only concerns true informa­
tion about a person, whereas libel pertains to the dissemination of false information. It 
differs from blackmail in that there is no initial threat of disseminating the information, 
in return for some desired reward, in the case of public disclosure.
As already noted, the primary harm involved in public disclosure is the damage it 
does to a persons reputation. This can arise in a variety of situations, and lead to a 
number of indirect or secondary harms. It may, for instance, be the case that convicted 
criminals, who have completed their sentence and subsequently move to a new town in 
order to “start over,” are recognized as former criminals by some of their new neighbors. 
Where those neighbors proceed to inform the rest of the community, the persons rep­
utation risks serious damage, to the point that it may not only be impossible for them 
to succeed in their plans to start over, they may also be at risk of social repercussions or 
even vigilanteism, depending on perceptions of their former crimes.
The same sorts of considerations apply to criminal suspects. The British press rou­
tinely publishes the names, addresses, personal histories, and photographs of criminal 
suspects. A recent well-known examples of this concerns the murder of Joanna Yates.
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The initial suspect, Yatess landlord Chris Jefferies, was discussed avidly in the media.28 
He was later released from police custody, and Yates’s neighbor Vincent Tabak was even­
tually convicted of the murder instead.29 Despite having no criminal charges against 
him, the discussion of Jefferies as a murder suspect in the media was sufficient to not 
only create long-lasting damage to his reputation, but to constitute a significant security 
risk to him in his subsequent dealings in public.30
WADA takes a slightly more careful approach than that of the British press, in this 
respect. According to their regulations (and as noted above), ADOs are required to 
publish information about those anti-doping rule violations over which they have ju ­
risdiction, only once they have been determined:
N o later than twenty (20) days after . ..  an anti-doping rule violation has [been de­
term ined!, • •• the A nti-D oping Organization responsible for results m anagement 
m ust publicly report the disposition o f  the anti-doping matter including the sport, 
the anti-doping rule violated, the nam e o f the A thlete or other Person com m itting  
the violation, the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited M ethod involved and the 
Consequences im posed. ... Publication shall be accom plished at a m inim um  by 
placing the required inform ation on the A nti-D oping Organizations Web site and 
leaving the information up for at least one (1) year.31
This procedure only applies to full anti-doping rule violations, however, and not to 
individual whereabouts failures. According to WADA, information pertaining to the 
latter is not to be disclosed “beyond those persons with a need to know unless and until 
that Athlete is found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation.”32 The poten­
tial harm here, of public disclosure, is therefore not unique to the whereabouts system, 
but shared by all anti-doping regulation. And even if it were unique to the whereabouts 
requirements, it would still be difficult to recognize any specific privacy harm beyond 
that suffered by, for instance, many criminal suspects whose identities are routinely re­
ported in the press. Elite athletes found guilty of an anti-doping rule violation have their 
information made public, but those suspected of an anti-doping rule violation suffer no 
similar fate. There are two potential complications here. The first occurs when an athlete 
is found guilty of an anti-doping rule violation, despite being innocent. The reputation
28See e.g. BBC, Landlord Arrested in Jo Yeates Murder Inquiry.
29BBC, Vincent Tabak Found Guilty of Jo Yeates Murder.
30BBC, J o  Yeatess Landlord Christopher Jefferies “Getting on with Life”.
31WADA, WADC2, §§ 14.2.2,14.2.4.
32 WADA, IST3,§ 11.6.4.
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damage that can occur from this is important and problematic, but again no more so 
than that suffered by criminal suspects who later turn out to be innocent bystanders. 
Second, there are significant potential problems where information about whereabouts 
failures are, for instance, leaked to the press, in order to discredit an individual athlete, 
prior to them being found guilty of any anti-doping rule violation. Insofar as this, how­
ever, is expressly against WAD As rules for the conduct of an ADO, it instead comes 
under the heading of breach of confidence, considered below.
6.1.5 Intrusion
Intrusion is different from the other privacy harms currently under consideration, in­
sofar as it need not pertain to information at all. Some scholars, such as Parent, would in 
fact deny its claim to the label of a privacy harm altogether, instead restricting their ac­
counts of privacy to specific aspects of personal information. In constructing an account 
of privacy relative to the whereabouts context, however, it is important to consider ev­
ery instance of what might be considered a privacy harm by parties to the discussion 
within the context.
Intrusion concerns the perceived sanctity of zones of personal space, both physical 
and metaphorical. Most typically applied to the home, it can also apply to ones belong­
ings or person, and the physical space around these, or even to non-physical zones such 
as one s email account or telephone number. The exact nature of these zones—the extent 
to which they are protected—depends on various environmental factors. There are, for 
instance, lower expectations of physical personal space in crowded areas like elevators 
and public transport than there are in less dense areas like parks or nature reserves. Rel­
ative to these environments, however, there are various social norms—norms that, to 
some extent, differ from one culture to another—that dictate the acceptability of getting 
within a specific physical range of another person.
The harms arising from intrusion primarily concern the fact that it is perceived as 
disruptive to ones normal or intended behavior or activities, or as interrupting ones 
solitude. Telemarketing calls, spam email, or unsolicited interaction from other peo­
ple in public can all be considered instances of intrusion. The same might be said of 
an overly enthusiastically sociable neighbor or acquaintance, who takes any opportu­
nity to make a social call, whether invited or not. It also applies to more legally serious 
instances, such as nuisance, or even trespass.
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There is arguably a harm of intrusion in doping tests, where an elite athlete is required 
to provide a urine or blood sample (in addition, the former also contains the harm of 
exposure, as noted earlier). This applies to anti-doping work generally, however, and 
is not specific to the whereabouts system. Relative to the former, the primary harm of 
intrusion is, in most instances, a practically unavoidable one.
Elite athletes are, however, required to provide their ADO with a sixty-minute time 
slot for every day, between the hours of six in the morning and eleven at night. In or­
der to ensure that the risk of missing a no advance notice test during this time slot 
is minimized, many athletes in fact choose to set it to between six and seven in the 
morning, at their own home. Since most athletes sleep at home every night, doing so 
removes the potential burden of needing to remember different locations for different 
days or periods. It may also, however, increase feelings of intrusion whenever doping 
control officers arrive for no advance notice out-of-competition doping tests.33 Some 
athletes, particularly if they happen to feel strongly about such visits to their own home, 
may make alternative arrangements, setting their sixty-minute time slot to their school, 
workplace, or training facility. This may help avoid some of the harm of intrusion, but 
does not mitigate it entirely, insofar as doping control officers can and also do test ath­
letes outside their specified sixty-minute time slot (they can not register a missed test 
at such times, but failure by an athlete to be at a specified location might still count as a 
filing failure). Furthermore, it is important to consider the additional cognitive burden 
of having a more varied, as opposed to a more fixed, whereabouts schedule, as per the 
discussion on surveillance above.
Finally, to the extent that the harm of intrusion might occur in relation to a desire 
or need for solitude, regardless of extraneous physical considerations, it is important to 
recognize that it can still be significant. One unfortunate example of this consideration 
is the case of Belgian cyclist Kevin van Impe, who was visited by a doping control officer 
for the purpose of performing a no advance notice out-of-competition doping test while 
he was in the process of making arrangements for the funeral of his recently deceased 
prematurely born infant son.34 There are no stipulations in WADAs anti-doping reg­
ulations about any mitigating circumstances, and the officer in the case was adamant: 
a brief postponement of the test would count against the rider as a refusal to provide a
33Fordyce, Inside the Anti-Doping System.
34Quenet, Drug Testers Impose on Funeral Arrangements.
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sample; an anti-doping rule violation, rather than just a whereabouts failure. This level 
of severity is not only unprecedented when compared to other social practices (with 
the possible exception of criminal arrests and other police work, such as testing sus­
pected drunk drivers), it is also highly ethically problematic. If it is at all indicative of 
something like a standard approach to anti-doping work within ADOs, it would seem 
to imply that there are few things in the life of an elite athlete that could be considered 
secondary to the need to be available for out-of-competition doping tests. The severity 
of the requirements, thus interpreted, is highly questionable.
6.1.6 Other Privacy Harms
In addition to the above potential privacy harms, there are a number of lesser harms 
worth noting. These harms are lesser not in the sense of their potential for damage— 
which can be significant—but in the sense that they are not particularly likely to occur 
in the whereabouts context.
The privacy harm of data insecurity arises wherever there are insufficient protec­
tions in place for sensitive personal information. The concerns here range over a variety 
of potential instances and consequences, including risks of identity theft, disclosures, 
blackmail, etc. Even where there are no other qualms about providing personal infor­
mation to some organization, there may nevertheless be significant hesitation to doing 
so where the information is seen as being at risk of falling into unauthorized hands. The 
DPA 1998 requires a certain level of security measures to be in effect wherever sensi­
tive personal information is collected, stored, or processed, for precisely these sorts of 
reasons.
In the whereabouts context, WADA stipulates a number of rules and regulations 
regarding the handling of the athlete data that the various ADOs collect. In particular, 
their ISPPPI sets out their approach to these issues. Among other things, the ISPPPI 
requires ADOs to designate one person to be accountable for both compliance with the 
Standard, as well as with “all locally applicable privacy and data protection laws.”35 In 
addition, the same person must ensure such “security safeguards” as are necessary to 
protect against “the loss, theft, or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification
35WADA, ISPPPI, § 9.1.
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or disclosure” of personal information, with the further stipulation that the extent of 
the security correspond to the sensitivity of the personal information in question.36
Without direct access to the particular software implementation of WAD As and the 
ADOs relevant databases, and a thorough understanding of computer security, it is 
impossible to estimate the potential risk of data insecurity in relation to the whereabouts 
context. While athletes have complained about flaws in the technical implementation of 
the whereabouts-logging software (as noted in chapter 2), bugs are a relatively common 
feature of software in ongoing development, and not necessarily an indicator of any lack 
of data security.
The concern about data insecurity is, however, made more pressing by a recent white 
paper from computer security company McAfee, detailing extensive computer hacking, 
consisting of “targeted intrusions into more than seventy global companies, govern­
ments, and non-profit organizations during the last five years.”37 Specifically, McAfee 
notes WADA as being compromised in August 2009 and suffering repeated intrusions 
over the subsequent fourteen months.38 WADA has responded to the statements, ac­
knowledging a security breach to its email system in February 2008, but maintaining 
that the ADAMS database has never been compromised, and that it has “no evidence 
from its security experts of the intrusions as listed by McAfee and the Agency has yet 
to be convinced that they took place.”39
Although this sort of publicity is unlikely to increase elite athlete confidence in the 
management of their whereabouts information, the risks are arguably not greater than 
those to other organizations, particularly those organizations that transfer personal data 
abroad (as is the case for e.g. many internet businesses with customers in the UK and 
with their primary bases in other countries). As a potential target for hacking attempts, 
there is no indication that WADA is either more likely to be chosen as a target, or that 
it has any less robust protection measures in place than do comparably situated orga­
nizations. Unless it could be shown that WADA has been negligent in its protection of 
athlete information, the concerns about data insecurity do not differ to any particularly 
large extent between elite athletes and the general public.
36WADA, ISPPPI, § 9.2-9.3.
37Alperovitch, Revealed: Operation Shady RAT, 1.
38Ibid., 8.
39 WADA, WADA statement regarding McAfee report.
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One of the potential downstream risks of data insecurity is that the information ob­
tained by an unauthorized party might be put to use for some unrelated purpose. But 
the same sort of concerns might also apply where, for instance, the government of a 
country pressures the country’s NADO to divulge its athlete whereabouts information, 
in order to more efficiently monitor political dissidents. Such a scenario constitutes an 
instance of the privacy harm of secondary use, in which possibly legitimately collected 
personal information is utilized for some illegitimate purpose, in the sense that the in­
dividual to whom the personal information pertains has not approved of or authorized 
such use.
The DPA 1998 explicitly protects an individual’s data from being processed for any 
purposes “likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to an­
other,” where that damage or distress is considered unwarranted.40 Although this will 
not protect against all instances of secondary use—particularly insofar as the extent of 
“substantial” and “unwarranted” damage or distress is left unspecified—it does protect 
against the most problematic instances, such as, arguably, the tracking of political dis­
sidents. Then again, there are no clear indications that such concerns apply to British 
society in the first place.
In the whereabouts context, particularly where restricted to the UK, it is unlikely 
that serious problems of secondary use of athlete information will normally arise. Much 
like in the case of data insecurity, WADA has clear guidelines on how to minimize the 
risk of such problems, stating, among other things, that ADOs must only use where­
abouts information for “purposes of planning, coordinating or conducting Testing,” as 
well as that they must inform all affected athletes about the “purposes for which [their] 
Personal Information may be used and how long it may be retained.”41 Where these 
stipulations are followed, athletes are arguably not subject to any greater particular risk 
of secondary use than are non-athletes, with regard to their collected personal informa­
tion.
As noted above, an athlete guilty of an anti-doping rule violation, including three 
whereabouts failures within a time period of eighteen months, will be subject to a public 
disclosure, by their relevant ADO, regarding the nature of the violation. Such disclosure 
does not, however, apply to the individual whereabouts failures themselves, at least not
40DPA 1998, § 11.
41 WADA, WADC2, § 14.3; WADA, ISPPPI, § 7.1.
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where they do not amount to a fully-fledged anti-doping rule violation. WADA requires 
such whereabouts failures to remain restricted to those parties “with a need to know.”42 
Where there is a failure to abide by these rules, there may be an attendant privacy 
harm of breach of confidence. This sort of harm arises where there is a prior relation­
ship between two parties that is based on trust (usually of a contractual nature), and 
where one party breaks the trust by publicly disclosing information inherent to the 
relationship, despite a prior explicit or implicit promise not to do so. It is similar to 
public disclosure, in the sense that true information about an individual is made pub­
licly available, but it differs insofar as the harm in a public disclosure merely consists of 
the damage to the affected individual’s reputation, while the harm in a breach of confi­
dence primarily concerns the breaking of trust (although there may also be additional 
reputation damage involved).
The nature of the agreement between WADA and elite athletes, in relation to anti- 
doping work, is contractual. In order to be allowed to participate in their relevant sports, 
elite athletes are required to recognize and adhere to WADA’s rules and regulations. As 
part of their whereabouts submissions, they are required to include explicit consent to 
the sharing of their whereabouts information between different ADOs, as per WADAs 
stipulations.43 But the ADOs themselves are also contractually bound to WADAs reg­
ulations, in a similar manner, including the stipulation that individual whereabouts 
failures not be publicly disclosed.
There are instances where these rules have been flouted by ADOs, in a manner that 
highlights the harm of breach of confidence as potentially problematic in the general 
whereabouts context. Moller has, for instance, described in great detail the situation 
surrounding the unprecedented expulsion of Danish cyclist Michael Rasmussen, while 
in the yellow jersey, from the 2007 Tour de France.44 Despite at the time not being 
subject to any anti-doping rule violation, Rasmussen was discredited by severe media 
pressure after it came to light that he had certain whereabouts warnings that could have 
been taken to indicate cheating. As a result, the Tour de France race director, Christian 
Prudhomme, pressured Rasmussens cycling team, Rabobank, into pulling him from
42WADA,/ST3, § 11.6.4.
43Ibid.,§ 11.3.1.
44M0ller, The Scapegoat.
168
6.1. Harms
the race, claiming that “we cannot say that Rasmussen cheated but his negligence and 
lies had become unbearable.”45
The ethically interesting question in the Rasmussen case concerns how the media re­
ceived information about his whereabouts warnings in the first place, given that such in­
formation was considered to be confidential at the time (and still is, as per the ISPPPI).46 
W hen Moller interviewed the Danish journalist who had first broken the news about 
the warnings, his answer indicated that he was being fed privileged information by of­
ficials within the International Cycling Union and WADA, leading Moller to conclude 
that the sports organizations “that promote themselves as fighting for fair sport do this 
by unfair means and are apparently ready to betray athletes whose interests they were 
originally formed to protect.”47
Moller presents a compelling outlook on the case, but regardless of whether his char­
acterization of it is entirely correct or not, the fact that personal athlete information— 
recognized by WADA and ADOs as confidential—was leaked to the press in some form 
or other, means that there was a breach of confidence in the Rasmussen case. The further 
indication that the leak may have come from higher up in the ADO echelons increases 
the ethical seriousness of the case, insofar as it suggests a potentially precedential will­
ingness to flout the established and contractually enforced rules. This is all the more 
notable insofar as WADA and ADOs have, in general, given no indication that they 
would tolerate any similar form of flouting of the rules from athletes.
It is difficult to say with any certainty how prevalent this sort of problem is. But it 
remains problematic not least in the picture it reinforces in other athletes; namely that 
ADOs may well hold themselves as beyond ethical scrutiny, in at least certain respects, 
and entirely in contradiction with the rules and regulations that they themselves es­
pouse. The Rasmussen case constituted, in the breach of confidence that it involved, a 
serious privacy harm. But the precedent it sets for athletes generally also constitutes a 
privacy threat, in the risk that other athletes be subjected to similar practices.
Finally, as with any store of sensitive personal information, there is a (small) risk 
of blackmail of elite athletes in relation to their submitted whereabouts information. 
W hether initiated by an ADO or a third party who is given, or who illegitimately ac­
cesses, the information in question, the harm of blackmail to an affected athlete is, like
45As quoted in ibid., 25.
46Moller, The Scapegoat, 65-72; WADA, ISPPPI, § 8.3.
47Moller, The Scapegoat, 136.
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the harm of blackmail generally, significant. Unlike many of the other potential privacy 
harms under consideration, blackmail constitutes a criminal offence in the UK, and is, 
therefore, legally punishable by significantly harsher sanctions than those others. At the 
same time, however, it is not normally the case that an athlete who is subject to WADAs 
whereabouts requirements is at greater risk of blackmail than any other individual who 
provides similarly sensitive information to some other organization.
There are, however, important exceptions to this generalization. Where an ADO is 
willing to share confidential information with third parties, as in the Rasmussen case, it 
is possible that instances of blackmail might arise. It could, for instance, be the case that 
an investigative journalist privy to the information sees it as an opportunity to pressure 
an individual athlete into, say, financial compensation in order to keep the information 
out of media circulation. There is no publicly recorded instance of this sort of scenario 
with relation to whereabouts failures, but the possibility exists, as a downstream risk 
of a breach of confidence. Given the lengths to which many professional athletes seem 
willing to go to excel within their sport, it can not be concluded that an athlete, in such 
a scenario, would not choose to provide the financial compensation rather than tarnish 
their sporting career by bringing criminal charges, with the corresponding publicity 
such an action would inevitably involve. Nevertheless, such a case is still not unique to 
the whereabouts context, given that similar considerations apply to many instances of 
blackmail arising in entirely non-sports-related contexts.
Of all these lesser potential privacy harms in the whereabouts context, none are com­
monplace. Most of them can also be equated with equal or analogous risks for non- 
athletes. The circumstances surrounding the breach of confidence involved in the Ras­
mussen case, however, indicate the possibility of certain systemic failures regarding the 
lengths to which WADA and ADOs might be willing to go in pursuit of their goal of 
doping-free sport. Little can be said with certainty, however, in regard to any potential 
universal conclusions drawn from such a particular instance.
6.2 Underlying Values
Having performed an initial evaluation of the potential privacy harms arising from 
WADAs whereabouts requirements, it is time to turn to the values underlying the vari­
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ous positions in the debate on whereabouts, not least in order to determine those harms 
with sufficient relevance to warrant further discussion.
Some people oppose the imposition of the whereabouts requirements on the basis 
that they invade athlete privacy, while others support the same imposition regardless 
of any potential effects on that privacy. Identifying the underlying values that form the 
basis of and inform these various positions will, in so doing, allow for the construction 
of a suitably contextual functional account of the privacy issues at stake in the where­
abouts context. In the following chapter, this functional account will then be used as the 
basis for a final evaluation of the legal and ethical acceptability of WADAs whereabouts 
requirements.
6.2.1 Values Supporting Privacy Protection
As noted in chapter 2, a number of athletes and other interested parties have complained 
about WADAs whereabouts requirements, couching the complaints in the language of 
privacy. Murray has characterized the requirements as “draconian,” Nadal has referred 
to the system as an “intolerable hunt,” FIFA, UEFA and the BCCI have all officially 
criticized the “invasion of privacy” that they consider the rules to involve, and Moller 
has rejected the “rigorous surveillance regime” that the system imposes.48
All these complaints share a strong disapproval of WADAs whereabouts require­
ments, in the sentiment that they are not only out of proportion with the practical needs 
of anti-doping work, but that they constitute an unacceptable departure from what I will 
call common standards of privacy. A common standard refers here to the culturally and 
temporally contingent and variable attitudes, among the general public, about the ac­
ceptability of some form of privacy harms. So, for instance, a common standard in the 
UK states that it is an unacceptable privacy harm for strangers to search through ones 
luggage (an instance of intrusion, in the terminology used to characterize privacy harms 
above). This standard, however, also admits of important exceptions; police who, say, 
suspect some form of crime, or airport security staff taxed with ensuring the reasonable 
safety of all airline passengers.
48Eason, Andy Murray Criticises New Anti-Doping Rules; FIFA, FIFA and UEFA Reject WADA “Where­
abouts’’ Rule; Indian Express, BCCI Rejects Anti-Doping Clause, Stands By Its Players; Moller, “One Step 
Too Far.”
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This notion of a common standard is, as any concept based on the widespread views 
or practices of a population, vague and open to interpretation. But the point of the con­
cept is not to yield an exact extension, and it therefore requires no precise conceptual 
boundaries. On the contrary, the point of the concept is just to illustrate the extent to 
which a given instance is removed from general practices; the standard functions as a 
sort of comparator, rather than as an arbiter, of any given instance. Thus, it is, for in­
stance, plain that the surveillance involved in WADAs whereabouts requirements is, on 
average, further removed from the common standard than is the surveillance of, say, 
civil servants, on average.
As noted above, common standards do permit of exceptions. The question can then 
be reformulated as follows: do the privacy harms arising from the whereabouts require­
ments constitute acceptable exceptions to the departures from the relevant common 
standards that the requirements involve? That is, like in the case of airport security staff 
searching personal luggage, might WADAs whereabouts requirements be acceptable, 
in light of their overall aims?
Although WADA answers this question affirmatively, the consensus of the afore­
mentioned critics is the opposite. On their collective view, whatever the acceptability 
of the aims that WADA has in implementing their rules and regulations, they consider 
the implementation of the requirements themselves to be unacceptable as exceptions to 
the relevant common standards. This sort of concern is, by and large, a concern regard­
ing fairness. Where a particular subset of some population is held to more stringent 
demands than the population generally, considerations of fairness impose a need to 
provide justification for the demands. Such justifications can vary widely in nature; they 
might, for instance, be financial, legal, ethical, political, or sociological. But where there 
are significant differences in the treatment of different groups, some form of justifica­
tion is nevertheless necessary in order for the differences in treatment to be considered 
generally acceptable.
In the whereabouts context, the primary thrust of the opposition to WADAs re­
quirements is precisely that they are perceived as incompletely justified, on an under­
lying and (generally) implicit basis of fairness. Fairness dictates that where the general 
population enjoys certain protections from privacy harms, elite athletes ought to en­
joy them as well, or, at least, enjoy them to a larger extent than the imposition of the 
whereabouts requirements makes possible. If, for instance, only criminals are subject
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to a similar extent of surveillance, considerations of fairness recommend a rejection or, 
at least, a relaxation of the athlete surveillance.
This sort of concern with fairness engages different aspects of the various potential 
privacy harms noted above, but focuses primarily on those harms that are significantly 
stronger in the whereabouts context; surveillance and intrusion. In addition to such 
concerns about fairness between population groups, the Rasmussen case highlights a 
further source of value underlying arguments for protections against privacy harms 
in the whereabouts context. The value of trust, in various sorts of personal, commer­
cial, and official relationships, forms the basis for the English common law doctrine 
of breach of confidence. English common law, in other words, provides potential rem­
edy in court for any instances with details analogous to those of the Rasmussen case. 
This illustrates the perceived value of trust, with regard to the aforementioned sorts 
of relationships, generally. It also indicates the perceived importance of ensuring that 
sufficient regulation is in place to safeguard this trust, in order to maintain a viable 
relationship between elite athletes and their various ADOs.
Given the specific privacy harms relevant to the whereabouts context, as listed above, 
the primary values underlying arguments for protection against those harms are then, 
in the case of surveillance and intrusion, fairness between social groups, and, in the case 
of breach of confidence, trust in contractual relationships.
6.2.2 Values Opposing Privacy Protection
There are a variety of factors supporting the imposition of whereabouts requirements 
in their current form, i.e. opposing extended protections against the privacy harms to 
which they give rise. One important vindication of WADAs work is the widespread 
policy support it receives through the ratification, by various countries, of the 2003 
Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport and the 2005 UNESCO Interna­
tional Convention against Doping in Sport, as discussed in chapter 2. To reiterate, the 
Convention stipulates that signatories are required to “commit themselves to the princi­
ples of [WADAs WADC],” through such mechanisms as legislation, regulation, policies, 
and administrative practices.49 Similarly, WADAs WADC requires all governments to 
“take all actions and measures necessary to comply with” the Convention.50
49International Convention against Doping in Sport, art. 4.
50WADA, WADC2, § 22.1.
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It is important to recognize that, as a result of this state of affairs, all discussion re­
garding the values supporting WADAs whereabouts requirements take place against a 
backdrop assuming something like their general validity by fiat. Government signato­
ries are asked to adhere to the principles of WADAs WADC, by various means, thereby 
presumably providing a climate of increased tolerance toward the various existing and 
possible future rules and regulations of WADA. It is, for instance, difficult to conceive 
of a successful implementation of something equivalent to WADAs whereabouts re­
quirements on, say, academic university staff51 Whatever the underlying cause of any 
difference in attitudes between the two cases, the UNESCO Convention is nevertheless 
likely to increase support for WADAs stipulations, at the cost of certain privacy harms 
that might, under less politically charged circumstances, have been more strongly ob­
jected to.
In any event, it is also important to recognize that even where the critics here consid­
ered attack what they see as the injustice and disproportionality inherent to an impo­
sition of WADAs whereabouts requirements, they nevertheless claim to support anti- 
doping work generally. That is, there is no dispute, in this case, regarding the validity of 
WADAs goals of doping-free sport, only a dispute regarding the acceptability of their 
means of seeking to achieve those goals. Regardless, insofar as the latter are a means 
of achieving the former, the underlying values will be the same for both. These values 
are shared by both proponents and critics of the requirements, but the two camps differ 
in the former taking the values to be sufficiently powerful to override, to at least some 
extent, the values noted above in favor of increased privacy protections for elite ath­
letes. While the values themselves are not generally in dispute, their relative weighting 
against countervailing values is.
The WADC2 refers to the value underlying anti-doping work as the “spirit of sport,” 
a phenomenon it considers collectively constituted by a number of specific individual 
values:
• Ethics, fair play and honesty
.  Health
• Excellence in performance
51 Although such a scenarios is (humorously) considered in Holm, “The 36th Meeting of the Pay and Con­
ditions Committee of the Union of Philosophers, Sages and Other Luminaries (UK University Branch), 
or Doping and Proportionality.”
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• Character and education
• Fun and joy
• Teamwork
• Dedication and commitment
• Respect for rules and laws
• Respect for self and other Participants
• Courage
• Community and solidarity52
According to WADA, its anti-doping program seeks to preserve these “intrinsic val­
ues.” Many of the values are relatively vague, but they can be plausibly viewed as derived 
from, or at least centered around, the first two values in the list. There is a fundamental 
concern that, on the one hand, doping upsets the balance of fairness otherwise pre­
sumed to exist between competitors, and, on the other hand, that doping is harmful to 
the health of athletes.
The former concern, about fairness between competitors, is interesting insofar as 
it is, in the whereabouts context, weighed against fairness between social groups. The 
two forms focus on different aspects of fairness, comparing and contrasting different 
phenomena; regulatory demands on different subsets of people in a society versus the 
extent to which an athlete is able to achieve certain sporting results without recourse 
to something like “artificial stimulation.” In fact, fairness can function as a comparator 
of any of a number of phenomena, such that it might, for instance, be claimed that 
natural differences in biological abilities between competing athletes are unfair, or that 
disparities in the financial investment in their respective training regimens are unfair.53 
These sorts of notions of fairness can be pushed further, to the point that performance 
enhancement, at least given certain restrictions, is sometimes espoused as a means of 
“levelling the playing field” between vastly differing natural endowments, i.e. in favor 
of, rather than opposed to, fairness between athlete competitors.54
52WADA, W A DC 2,14.
53For the former, see e.g. Tannsjd, “Genetic Engineering and Elitism in Sport”; Foddy and Savulescu, 
“Ethics of Performance Enhancement in Sport,” 515; for the latter, see e.g. Savulescu, Foddy, and Clay­
ton, “Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport,” 667; Foddy and Savulescu, “Ethics 
of Performance Enhancement in Sport,” 515.
54 Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton, “Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport,” esp. 
667-68.
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Nevertheless, it remains plausible to presume that doping between otherwise more 
or less equally matched competitors can, everything else being equal, upset many peo­
ples strongly held notions of fairness in competitions. I will leave the requisite strength 
of the everything-else-equal-clause unspecified, and only mention it to highlight the 
further difficulties such a position must deal with. For current purposes, I am satisfied 
to take the claim of doping as upsetting fairness between competitors at face value, and 
use it, in the following chapter, as a contrast to the claims of whereabouts requirements 
as upsetting fairness between social groups. These are the two primary values of contrast 
in the whereabouts context.
In addition, however, there are also the secondary values of trust in contractual rela­
tionships and athlete health. The latter is, like the issue of fairness between competitors, 
a difficult issue to properly ascertain. Elite athletes generally compete at a level that re­
quires extraordinary physical feats, which are exerting to the point that participation in 
elite-level sports can seriously increase the risk of various illnesses and injuries.55 Addi­
tionally, it is not entirely clear that forms of doping that enable athletes to recover from 
exertion or injury quicker than would otherwise be possible are detrimental, rather than 
beneficial, to their health. Again, however, I am satisfied, for the sake of argument, to 
take the claims of the negative impact of doping on athlete health at face value, and as­
sume their validity as a value to be contrasted, in the whereabouts context, with those 
values underlying the opposition of the whereabouts requirements.
55See e.g. Gleeson, “The Scientific Basis of Practical Strategies to Maintain Immunocompetence in Elite 
Athletes”; Nieman, “Exercise Effects on Systemic Immunity”; Freeman et al., “Sports Injuries”; Harp and 
Hecht, “Obesity in the National Football League.”
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Ha v in g  e s t a b l is h e d  a n  a c c o u n t  of privacy for the context of elite athlete whereabouts requirements, the question of the requirements’ legal and eth­ical acceptability remains to be determined. By looking at the contextually 
relevant harms and values, I conclude (a) that WADAs whereabouts requirements face 
specific legal difficulties, in the UK, with respect to the contextually relevant forms of 
surveillance and intrusion; and (b) that the requirements are only ethically acceptable 
in relation to sports with a sufficiently high risk of doping. As a result, the imposition 
of the whereabouts requirements on elite athletes is, at least in certain specific respects, 
both legally and ethically unacceptable.
7.1 A Brief Recapitulation
The implementation of WADAs revised whereabouts requirements has given rise to 
the claim that the requirements invade the privacy of elite athletes in an unacceptable 
manner.1 I will refer to this as the privacy-invasion claim. The claim, as it stands, is far 
from certain, for various reasons. First and foremost, it is, in many instances, unclear 
whether the claim is intended to be understood in legal or ethical terms, or perhaps 
both.
1The claim, in other words, consists o f the negative answer to the original research question: In relation to 
elite athlete privacy, are WADA’s current whereabouts requirements acceptable?
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Where the emphasis is on legal considerations, the strength of the privacy-invasion 
claim will depend on the geopolitical jurisdiction in which it is invoked. Legally estab­
lished protections of privacy differ from one country or region to another. The appraisal 
of the claim will therefore differ in accordance with the relevant or chosen legal context. 
It may, for instance, turn out that the whereabouts requirements in fact violate a legally 
protected notion of the privacy of elite athletes in country A, but not in country B, due 
to differences in their respective law. And even where the legal context is restricted 
sufficiently to obviate any need for such comparisons—as here, given the focus on UK 
law—it is nevertheless uncertain what scope to give this sort of general talk about p ri­
vacy. Various UK laws, for instance, rely on something like the protection of privacy 
as an underlying value. Sometimes this is evident in the wording of the law, while at 
other times it only becomes evident in the courts application of the law to individual 
cases. Are such instances nevertheless to be considered in determining the success of the 
privacy-invasion claim? Or, to rephrase, at what point does a legal instance have such 
a tenuous connection to privacy that it can be ignored in assessing the legal strength of 
the claim?
The context of legal practice provides a relatively straightforward answer: it is less 
about the concepts one chooses to invoke, and more a matter of determining which 
forms of legal redress have a chance at successful outcome in court, however the latter 
is defined; i.e. what sorts of claims can be made to stick in relation to the whereabouts 
requirements? But this is unsatisfactory, from a jurisprudential and conceptual stand­
point, where the interest lies in determining the legal strength of the privacy-invasion 
claim itself. The fact that there are conceivably various legal problems with the where­
abouts requirements does not thereby imply that all such problems necessarily concern 
the privacy of elite athletes.
Similar considerations apply where the emphasis in the privacy-invasion claim is 
instead on ethical issues. In such cases, the strength of the claim will depend on the 
particular sort of account of privacy upon which one chooses to rely, which will, in 
turn, demarcate the relevant areas of ethical investigation. But differing accounts of 
privacy might result in differing assessments of the privacy-invasion claim, making it 
difficult to determine the ethical strength of the claim. And regardless of the sort of 
account of privacy relied on, it is still conceivable that there are ethical problems with 
the whereabouts requirements that have nothing to do with privacy, however one has
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chosen to define it; it would be incorrect to assume that all ethical problems pertaining 
to the whereabouts issue necessarily concern privacy as such.
Either way, in relation to both the legal and the ethical interpretations of the privacy- 
invasion claim, a definitive assessment of strength can not be provided without a clearer 
account of what exactly privacy consists in; i.e. a specification of those issues that belong 
under the rubric of privacy, and those that do not.
In the previous chapter I defined privacy, in relation to the whereabouts context, 
as the non-realization of any of a specified list of contextually relevant privacy harms. 
On this account, an invasion of (as opposed to a mere threat against) privacy occurs 
only once at least one of the contextually relevant privacy harms is realized. But even 
where such an invasion of privacy can be identified, it is a separate question to what 
extent the invasion might nevertheless be considered legally or ethically acceptable, in 
light of further justificatory considerations. For the privacy-invasion claim to hold, it 
is sufficient to determine just one instance of legally or ethically unacceptable privacy 
invasions in the whereabouts context.2
I argued, also in the previous chapter, that insofar as one of the underlying values 
opposing the privacy harms in the whereabouts context was that of fairness between so­
cial groups, the question of acceptability does not arise for those contextually relevant 
privacy harms that do not differ in any meaningful sense between the (British) where­
abouts context and the context of British society generally. If the realization of some 
contextually relevant privacy harm is considered sufficiently acceptable in the latter 
case, and is taken to apply with equal force and specificity in both contexts, then there is 
no compelling reason to maintain that it is not equally acceptable in the former. This is 
the case for the contextually relevant privacy harms of interrogation, aggregation, data 
insecurity, secondary use, public disclosure, and blackmail.
The interest here lies instead with those contextually relevant privacy harms whose 
acceptability is less analogous and certain. These are the harms that are unique, in some 
way, to the whereabouts context, whether due to their strength or breadth in that con­
text. This also corresponds to the underlying concerns arising from the whereabouts 
context; when people complain about WADAs whereabouts requirements invading the
2Semi-formally, the claim that WADAs whereabouts requirements are legally and ethically acceptable in 
relation to privacy takes the form of a universal generalization. Showing this to be false requires just 
a single instance of existential instantiation demonstrating that the requirements are, in fact, legally or 
ethically unacceptable in relation to privacy in some particular instance.
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privacy of elite athletes, they mean to indicate that there is something extraordinary 
about the requirements, and their concomitant harms, that suffices to justify resisting 
their imposition. They are, in this sense, disanalogous to similar privacy harms for the 
general public, to the extent that they warrant further investigation. This is the case, I 
argued, for the possible harms of surveillance, intrusion, and, possibly, breach of confi­
dence. It is to these possible harms, and their legal and ethical acceptability, that I now 
turn.
7.2 Legal Acceptability
Establishing the legal acceptability of WADAs whereabouts requirements in the UK 
requires two things. First, it is necessary to identify those contextually relevant privacy 
harms that merit legal attention. These will consist of the harms that either (a) vio­
late specific instances of law in a well-established manner; or (b) differ sufficiently from 
prior cases to necessitate original jurisprudential analysis. Having established the harms 
to be further investigated, it remains to assess their legal standing. This is to be done, 
in what follows, by (a) identifying those instances of law that pertain to the harms in 
question; and then (b) establishing the extent to which those instances of law can be 
made to support or oppose the imposition of the harms. Where pertinent legal princi­
ples come into conflict, there may be no simple answer to this question. Legal analysis 
ought, however, at the very least to establish the relevant principles in any such instance, 
in order to thereby facilitate legal evaluation of specific future instances.
7.2.1 Surveillance
The harm of surveillance in the whereabouts context arises from the extensive cognitive 
burdens placed on the athletes. First, they are pressured to adhere to specified norms 
of behavior, namely those forbidding practices involving some form of doping. This is, 
in itself, unsurprising; most surveillance scenarios display an alignment of behavior to­
ward the generally acceptable, or at least away from the explicitly forbidden, and this 
is often cited as justification for the general acceptability of surveillance practices. Sec­
ond, however, the athletes are also required to adhere to their own prior specifications 
regarding their whereabouts information. That is, athletes must abide by, or revise in
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advance, the whereabouts information they have submitted to their relevant ADOs. In 
order for either of these two options to be practically feasible, athletes must actively 
keep in mind or regularly remind themselves of the specific information they have sub­
mitted, to thereby ensure that they do not miss any potential no advance notice out- 
of-competition doping tests. Given the strict liability presumed in WADAs WADC2, 
this entails that elite athletes are, to a greater degree than in any analogous surveillance 
scenarios, under severe pressure to ensure that they conform not only with the specified 
norms of behavior, but also with their own prior commitments.
There are various areas of law that might be taken to apply to such issues of surveil­
lance. Perhaps most prima facie applicable, RIPA 2000 sets out legal limitations to 
covert surveillance of individuals by public bodies in the UK, primarily as a means of 
enabling law enforcement agencies to investigate suspected criminal activity. Although 
the UK NADO, UK Anti-Doping (UKAD), is a UK public body, it is not known to 
have utilized any of the powers of RIPA 2000 in order to perform any covert surveil­
lances. This is not surprising, given that the work of ADOs is not tied, by the WADC and 
the 1ST, to covert surveillance of the sort regulated by RIPA 2000. There are arguably 
significant problems with an ADO implementing such unknown covert surveillance 
techniques as are normally utilized in criminal investigations, not least insofar as there 
are no such provisions in the official anti-doping regulations. But, as stated, there is no 
indication that this is currently the case.
A more promising legal approach would be to bring an action against the where­
abouts requirements on the basis of CE human rights law, specifically the ECHR article 
8 right to private and family life. The ultimate merit of any such approach will, however, 
depend on a number of successive factors.3 First, given that the HRA 1998 limits action 
based on ECHR human rights complaints to public authorities—which the act declares 
have a positive obligation to maintain the rights—the applicability of the law will be 
determined by the status of the relevant ADO; that is, whether or not it constitutes a 
public authority, in the sense of the HRA 1998. Even if this is not found to be the case— 
i.e. that the ADO is not found to have any positive obligation under the HRA 1998—it 
may still be possible to utilize the moderate horizontal effect of the law to claim ones 
ECHR rights in court. This will, however, only be possible where one has succeeded in 
bringing an action based on something other than those rights.
3Cf. Pendlebury and McGarry, “Location, Location, Location.”
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By whatever means, once such an ECHR case is in court, there are two steps to evalu­
ate in relation to the article 8 right to private and family life, as concerns the whereabouts 
requirements. The first step consists of establishing whether or not the requirements en­
gage the right, that is, if they fall within the scope of the right declared in article 8.1 of 
the ECHR (as interpreted through, among other things, Strasbourg jurisprudence). The 
second step, which only becomes relevant if this is found to be the case, consists of es­
tablishing whether the violation of article 8.1 might nevertheless be justified in terms 
of the qualifications noted in article 8.2. Doing so consists of 3 substeps: (a) determin­
ing whether or not the violation serves a legitimate objective; (b) determining whether 
or not the violation is a sufficiently effective means of enabling that objective; and (c) 
determining whether or not there are any viable (and less harmful) alternatives.4 Only 
once all these elements have been determined will it follow whether or not WADAs 
whereabouts requirements are legally compatible with article 8 of the ECHR. It is to 
these factors I now turn.
Whether or not ones ADO counts as a public authority in the UK, for the sake of 
the HRA 1998, depends on the nature of the ADO in question. According to the leg­
islation, a public authority is defined as including “(a) a court or tribunal, and (b) any 
person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.”5 These admittedly 
vague specifications are qualified in various different ways, but for present purposes it 
is sufficient to note the following: most IFs, insofar as they are not based in the UK, will 
not count as public authorities within the scope of the HRA 1998. UKAD, demonstra­
bly does; the UK government counts UKAD as an executive non-departmental public 
body (NDPB), which it defines as a body “typically established in statute and carry­
ing out executive, administrative, regulatory and/or commercial functions.”6 For this 
reason, it is possible for athletes to claim their ECHR rights directly against UKAD, 
although they are unable to do the same against most IFs. In the latter case, the ECHR 
rights are only possible to claim horizontally, i.e. in relation to some other non-ECHR- 
related cause of legal action. It is uncertain to what extent doing so is a viable means 
of claiming ones ECHR rights against the whereabouts requirements; at the very least, 
it would be significantly more difficult to convince the courts of the merit of such a
4I borrow this division of justificatory factors from Pendlebury and McGarry, “Location, Location, Loca­
tion,” 71-74.
5HRA 1998, § 6.3.
6Cabinet Office, Public Bodies 2012, 1,60.
182
7.2. Legal Acceptability
case, compared to the positive ECHR obligations UKAD has in virtue of its status as an 
NDPB.7
On the assumption, then, that the most plausible basis for a successful action against 
the whereabouts requirements—in relation to article 8 of the ECHR—would be aimed 
against UKAD, the subsequent question concerns the extent to which the whereabouts 
requirements engage the article 8 right. Determining this issue will, of course, depend 
on the account of privacy on which one relies. For present purposes, the focus therein 
lies on the surveillance of individuals by an organization. The ECtHR has declared that 
surveillance constitutes an “interference” with article 8 of the ECHR.8 This is also in line 
with common judgments about the whereabouts requirements generally; namely, that 
the surveillance they entail is disproportionate to the goals of WADA.
The crucial question, however, concerns the extent to which such an interference 
might nevertheless be justified, in terms of at least one of the qualifying clauses of arti­
cle 8.2 of the ECHR, particularly that concerning the “protection of health or morals” 
The three issues identified above as pertaining to the question of justification are the ex­
tent to which it serves a legitimate objective, the extent of its effectiveness, and whether 
or not there are any viable (less harmful) alternative possibilities. As regards the first 
of these, I have already noted, in the foregoing chapter, that I take the legitimacy of 
WADAs underlying whereabouts-related values—particularly those concerning fair­
ness between competitors and athlete health—at face value, assuming their validity for 
the sake of argument. This is also entailed by the initial declaration of the thesis, in 
chapter 1, that I am assuming the general validity of the goal of doping-free sport. These 
assumptions, however, are not spurious; the content and scope of adherence to the goal 
of doping-free sport—in relation to both political and legal positions in the UK—is sub­
stantial. Government support of UKAD, UK ratification of the UNESCO International 
Convention against Doping in Sport, the anti-doping work undertaken by the political 
establishment in the run-up to and for the course of the 2012 London Olympic Games, 
all signify that there exists significant and widespread political support of WADAs anti- 
doping stance.
In the UK context, then, there exists a broad consensus on the legitimate objectives 
of anti-doping work generally. Insofar as the whereabouts requirements contribute to
7Cf. Pendlebury and McGarry, “Location, Location, Location,” 65-70.
8See e.g. Copland v. UK [2007] ECHR 62617/00, 5 41-44.
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this end, they derive their legitimacy from it. This issue, concerning the contribution of 
the whereabouts requirements to the goal of doping-free sport, constitutes the second 
factor in evaluating the justification of the requirements within the scope of article 8.2 
of the ECHR. As noted in previous chapters, WADA maintains that no advance no­
tice out-of-competition testing is crucial to the elimination of out-of-competition dop­
ing practices. This is arguably correct, insofar as surveillance provably entails a chilling 
effect on whatever is considered delinquent behavior within a given cultural context. 
Much like CCTV seems correlated with a decrease in antisocial behavior, so out-of­
competition doping testing—as made possible by the whereabouts requirements—is ar­
guably correlated with a decrease in doping practices. Some have, however, challenged 
this claim. EU Athletes (EEAA)—a federation of European players associations and 
athlete unions—have maintained that unless and until WADA can provide statistics 
supporting the claim of an effective chilling effect on such doping practices, their claim 
remains at best unproven.9 This is, however, a highly difficult claim to determine, in­
sofar as there are no reliable statistics to compare the situations before and after the 
imposition of the whereabouts requirements. Regardless of the effectiveness of current 
out-of-competition doping testing (EEAA indicates that it seems to be ten times less 
effective than in-competition testing in catching dopers),10 it may nevertheless be that 
the existence of the testing acts as a powerful form of deterrence, such that out-of­
competition doping practices might substantially spread were it removed. In the face 
of such speculative considerations, however, it is perhaps preferable to instead assess 
whether out-of-competition doping testing might reasonably be more effective at elim­
inating such practices than alternative policies.
This question constitutes the third factor to be determined in assessing the justifi­
cation of the whereabouts requirements in terms of ECHR article 8.2. If there are no 
sufficiently viable alternatives to out-of-competition doping testing, then the practice 
will be as effective as can be under the circumstances, regardless of how effective that 
may be in terms of real numbers. There are some potential alternative future develop­
ments within this domain, but as of yet they remain uncertain or limited in important 
respects. So, for instance, Trimega Laboratories—a private UK company—claim to have 
developed a method to test for a variety of banned substances through chemical analysis
9 EEAA, WADA Code Review, 62-63.
10 Ibid., 62.
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of individuals’ hairs.11 This is purported to entail not only a significantly less invasive 
method of testing (the removal of a single hair), but to also have the benefit of allowing 
individual historical analysis (given that the effects of the substances tested for remain 
in the hair for a matter of months). It remains to be seen to what extent such a method 
might prove sufficiently reliable to utilize in anti-doping work, but if so, it might ar­
guably obviate the need for whereabouts requirements altogether. There are, of course, 
remaining questions about the method; can one test hairs from anywhere on the body, 
or must they be from, say, the head? And if so, is it impossible to test those individuals 
who shave their heads? Until these sorts of issues can be satisfactorily determined—and 
until there are well-established tests for a majority of drugs, including in smaller above­
trace amounts—it is uncertain whether or not these sorts of developments constitute 
viable alternatives to the present system of out-of-competition doping testing.
In the absence of any such currently well-established alternatives, the political pres­
sure in favor of strict anti-doping measures—from both outside and within the UK— 
make it difficult to ascertain the extent to which the whereabouts requirements might 
be justified in a court case testing them against article 8 of the ECHR. As a result, the 
legal acceptability of the requirements in relation to these issues remains indeterminate.
7.2.2 Intrusion
The EU enforces the stipulation of legal limits, within its member states, on the maxi­
mum amount of time that any employed individual can spend working.12 As noted in 
chapter 3, these limits include the stipulation that individuals are due a certain amount 
of time—on a daily, weekly, and annual basis—when they are free from the obligations 
of their work. On the other hand, WADAs whereabouts requirements specify that all 
elite athletes who belong to the RTP of their IF or NADO are required to submit, as part 
of their whereabouts information, a daily sixty-minute time slot during which they will 
be available, at a specific location, for no advance notice out-of-competition doping 
testing.13 Some claim that the two conflict, such that the whereabouts requirements can 
not be considered legal in the UK or EU.14
u Trimega Laboratories, Hair Drug Testing.
12EWTD 2003; WTR 1998.
13WADA, IST3,§ 11.3.
14See e.g. Halt, “Where Is the Privacy in WADA’s ‘Whereabouts’ Rule?”
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To see whether or not such a claim has any legal merit, it is first necessary to estab­
lish whether the working time limitations are at all applicable to professional athletes. 
The ECJ case of UEFA v. Bosman15 tested the extent to which regulations of sport could 
be considered subject to EU law. More specifically, the case concerned a professional 
Belgian footballers desire to transfer to a new French football club at the end of his 
contract with a Belgian club. As the French club refused to pay the “transfer fee” (a 
means of generating profit in the trade of players) levied by the Belgian club, the lat­
ter refused to let Bosman go. As a result of the situation, he suffered reduced wages, 
and proceeded to file a suit against the Belgian club at the ECJ for restraint of trade. 
The court found in his favor, arguing that sport was regulated by EU trade law, at least 
insofar as “it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Treaty [on the Functioning of the European Union].”16 This, the court maintained, ap­
plied to the “activities of professional or semi-professional footballers, where they are 
in gainful employment or provide a remunerated service,” that is, where they are in a 
paid employment relationship with their club.17
As a result of the ruling in Bosman, highly-ranked football players in the EU now 
have significantly more freedom to choose between clubs once their contract periods 
end. And, more pertinent to the issues herein, the ruling also demonstrates that at least 
some sporting regulations—such as those concerning employment and gainful trade— 
can be made subject to EU law. A separate issue, however, concerns the extent to which 
anti-doping regulations, specifically, might fall within the same category.18
This question was treated in another ECJ case, Meca-Medina v. Commission o f the 
European Communities,19 which concerned two swimmers who had tested positive for 
nandrolone and subsequently been suspended from competition for four years by FINA. 
Following a failed appeal to CAS, the swimmers filed a suit against FINA and the IOC at 
the ECJ, claiming that the suspension constituted a violation of their freedom to provide 
remunerated services.20 Although the case was initially rejected—among other things 
on the the basis that anti-doping rules were “sporting aspects of a sport,” as opposed
15[1995] ECR1-04921.
16Ibid., § 73.
17Ibid., § 74.
18Cf. Halt, “Where Is the Privacy in WADAs ‘Whereabouts’ Rule?” 280-81.
19 [2006] ECR 1-06991.
20 Ibid., §§ 10-16.
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to “economic aspects of a sport”—the claimants nevertheless succeeded in being heard 
on appeal. Although ultimately finding in favor of the defendants, the ECJ nevertheless 
clarified its stance on anti-doping regulations, maintaining that,
the penal nature o f  the anti-doping rules at issue and the m agnitude o f  the penal­
ties applicable if  they are breached are capable o f  producing adverse effects on  
com petition because they could, if  penalties were ultimately to prove unjustified, 
result in  an athletes unwarranted exclusion from sporting events, and thus in im ­
pairm ent o f  the conditions under which the activity at issue is engaged in. It fol­
lows that, in order not to be covered by [specific prohibitions] laid down in [the 
Treaty on  the Functioning o f  the European U nion], the restrictions thus im posed  
by those rules m ust be lim ited to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct 
o f  com petitive sport.21
Anti-doping rules can, in other words, be the subject of legal action at the European 
level, at least where they violate specific EU trade rights. Included in this are such di­
rectives as the EWTD 2003.22 To briefly reiterate the details from chapter 3, the EWTD 
2003 stipulates that workers are entitled to a rest period of at least eleven consecu­
tive hours during every twenty-four-hour period, an additional rest period of at least 
twenty-four consecutive hours during every seven-day period, and at least four weeks of 
paid annual leave.23 The daily sixty-minute time slot of the whereabouts requirements 
will overlap some of these rest periods. Specifically, it will necessarily occur during the 
twenty-four hours of consecutive rest every week, as well as during the minimum four 
weeks of paid annual leave.
The “rest period” in the directive is interpreted as any period that is not working 
time.24 Therefore, the question of the legal acceptability of WADAs whereabouts re­
quirements relative to working time limitations—at least for those athletes who qualify 
as “workers” for the purposes of the law, that is, who are employed—turns on the ques­
tion of whether or not the daily sixty-minute time slot qualifies as work or as rest.
The most relevant analog to the daily sixty-minute time slot is doctors who are “on 
call,” such that they may be required to work (and therefore need to take certain precau­
tions, such as maintaining the ability to work), but need not be. The question whether
21 Ibid., § 47.
22Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007, art. 153.
23EWTD 2003, arts. 3, 5, 7.
24Ibid., art. 2.2.
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being on call, in this manner, is considered to be working time or not has been ad­
dressed in ECJ case law. The case of Simap v. Conselleria,25 which considered whether 
or not Spanish doctors on call were working or not, concluded the following:
Time spent on call by doctors in primary health care teams m ust be regarded in its 
entirety as working time, and where appropriate as overtim e,... if  they are required 
to be present at the health centre. If they m ust merely be contactable at all times 
when on call, only tim e linked to the actual provision o f  primary care services 
m ust be regarded as working tim e.26
A similar form of reasoning can be applied to the whereabouts context. WADA stip­
ulates that affected athletes must be (physically) contactable during their daily sixty- 
minute time slots, in order to be available for no advance notice out-of-competition 
doping testing. This is analogous to the manner in which doctors must remain con­
tactable and able to work while on call. In both situations, individuals are subject to cer­
tain limitations in regard to what might be termed their “suitability for work”; doctors 
on call are expected to remain in the vicinity, and to maintain their professional judg­
ment unimpeded by alcohol or drugs, while athletes on call during their sixty-minute 
slot are expected to maintain their professional status by not doping.
However, if employed athletes are not actually tested during their daily sixty-minute 
time slot, then much like the doctors who are on call without actually being called in 
to their place of work, it is unlikely that the ECJ would consider them to be working. 
Hence, in order to abide by the EWTD 2003, WADA and the various concerned AD Os 
need only ensure that such elite athletes are not tested too frequently, even if they main­
tain the requirement for the provision of a daily sixty-minute time slot. WADA (or an 
ADO) could hypothetically fall foul of the directive, by for instance testing an employed 
athlete during the daily time slot seven days in a row. Given the concerns over optimal 
resource allocation for anti-doping testing, as well as restrictions on how soon an ath­
lete can be tested again following a missed test, however, it is not currently plausible 
that any athletes would be subject to such treatment.
Nevertheless, there are potential problems with the whereabouts requirements when 
considering the granting of a minimum of four weeks’ annual leave. In order to comply, 
WADA, or the relevant ADO, would need to ensure not only that there was a minimum
25[2000] ECR1-07963.
26Ibid., f  52.
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period of four weeks during which any given athlete was not tested, but this would also 
need to coincide with a time period during which the same athlete was not, ostensibly, 
training or competing; i.e. not working. As a result, the time period in question would 
presumably be known to athletes in advance, thereby providing them with upwards of 
four weeks of potential doping opportunities, were they so inclined. In addition, insofar 
as annual leave is taken to apply to situations where an individual worker is neither 
working nor on call, the four weeks of annual leave, if granted, would obviate the need 
to submit whereabouts requirements during that time period.
Unlike article 8 of the ECHR, EU working time limitations are not formulated in 
a qualified manner. The EWTD 2003 stipulates certain “minimum safety and health 
requirements for the organisation of working time,” while article 7 of the directive, on 
annual leave, declares that all member states,
shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to paid an­
nual leave o f  at least four weeks in accordance with the conditions for entitlem ent 
to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice.27
It is therefore unlikely that the ECJ, if faced with a legal challenge to WADA’s where­
abouts requirements on the basis of the working time restrictions, would perform a 
balancing of arguments in favor of the requirements. Unless and until elite athletes 
are legally disincluded from the “conditions for entitlement to” the annual leave—and 
Bosman entails that it would not be an easy task to convince the ECJ of any merit to do­
ing so—the provision of four weeks’ annual leave remains a “minimum requirement” 
for employed athletes in the EU.
For these reasons, at least for those athletes who can legally be considered employees, 
WADAs whereabouts requirements, as they currently stand, violate their legal right to 
a specific amount of resting time, during which they are free from the obligations of 
their work. Recognizing this, and adjusting the regulations thereafter, need not affect 
WADAs and the various ADOs’ anti-doping work to a great extent on a practical level; 
a similar strategy for testing out of competition as is currently in place could still occur, 
while nevertheless ensuring that it would adapt to existing legislation in practice. The 
primary exception to this is the stipulation for a minimum of four weeks’ annual leave. 
It is understandable if WADA is hesitant to introduce rules that might be seen as giving
27EWTD 2003, art. 7.
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a free pass to doping, if only for a limited time period during the year. But not doing so is 
to ignore the existing legislation. In terms of employed athletes in the UK and their right 
to maximum working time limitations, at least, WADAs whereabouts requirements are 
not legally acceptable.
7.2.3 Breach of Confidence
As noted in chapter 3, English common law has a well-developed legal tradition re­
garding breach of confidence. As a result, it is difficult to conceive of a case like that 
of Michael Rasmussen in Denmark not being legally reprimanded in the UK, at least 
where brought before a court. WADAs regulations at the time stipulated that the where­
abouts information Rasmussen had provided was to be kept confidential. The fact that 
the information was nevertheless released to a journalist entails that there was a breach 
of confidence.
It is worth rehearsing the nature of the common law on breach of confidence, notably 
that it allows, from Prince Albert onward, a claim to be brought against an individual 
or organization responsible for a public disclosure, even if they have no direct con­
nection to the original breach of confidence itself. For instance, in Barrymore v. News 
Group Newspapers Ltd.,2* the plaintiff had been engaged in an extra-marital homosex­
ual affair with another man, who had subsequently provided details of the affair to The 
Sun newspaper. Barrymore sued the paper for breach of confidence, and the court con­
curred, maintaining:
W hen people enter into a personal relationship o f  this nature, they do not do so for 
the purpose o f  it subsequently being published in The Sun, or any other newspaper.
The information about the relationship is for the relationship and not for a wider 
purpose.29
The purported breach of confidence in this case applied to the third party newspaper. 
Although the information had already been divulged by the former lover to journalists 
(the original breach of confidence), and was therefore, to all intents and purposes, al­
ready known to individuals outside Barrymores closest circle of family and friends, the
28 [1997] FSR600 (Ch.)
29 Ibid., 602.
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defendant in the case was not the former lover, but The Sun, where the details of the 
affair had been published.
This is representative of the English common law on confidence, where the provision 
of personal information in confidence to another, although it may decrease one s privacy 
with respect to that information and recipient, will not suffice for a claim that the privacy 
of the information is thereby lost, having been made public.30
There is, however, no specific consideration of legal acceptability in relation to 
breach of confidence as regards WADAs rules and regulations themselves. Insofar as 
they expressly forbid such breaches of confidence of the personal information of ath­
lete whereabouts information, they comply with the law. Were an instance such as that 
which befell Rasmussen to arise in England, however, it would almost certainly entail 
legal action, with a great chance of success.
7.3 Ethical Acceptability
Unlike in the legal situation, there is no recourse to consensually established ethical 
precepts from whence one might undertake an assessment of the ethical acceptability 
of the whereabouts requirements in general. Given the general disagreement on ethi­
cal values, their relative weights, and their applicability to different sorts of situations, 
establishing any such ethical acceptability instead requires a determination of how to 
best balance the contextually relevant underlying values against each other. This is anal­
ogous to the manner in which the UK courts approach certain well-established value 
conflicts involving privacy harms.
As already noted, it is generally recognized that a right to free speech conflicts with 
a right to keep personal information from being published in the media. But there is no 
prima facie preference, in legal practice, for one of these rights over the other. Instead, 
the result of a particular case will depend on the specifics of that case. So, for instance, 
where celebrity x  has been the subject of an unwanted investigative tabloid exposure 
in newspaper A, the courts might find in favor of the celebrity, while where celebrity y  
has been the subject of an unwanted investigative tabloid exposure in newspaper B, the
30See e.g. Franchi v. Franchi [1967] RPC 149 (Ch.) 152.
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courts might instead find in favor of the newspaper, due to differences in the salient and 
relevant details.31
As noted in the previous chapter, the specific values underlying support for the pri­
vacy harms arising from the whereabouts context are, primarily, fairness between com­
petitors and athlete health. The specific values underlying opposition to the same pri­
vacy harms are, primarily, fairness between social groups and, at least in the case of 
breach of confidence, trust between elite athletes and their ADOs. For the sake of argu­
ment, I grant all these values as valid. Rather than the validity of the values themselves, 
then, the central question here concerns the extent to which different specific features of 
different instances affect the relative weighting of the values, and how the different pos­
sible constellations of weightings impact considerations about the ethical acceptability 
of WADAs whereabouts requirements.
7.3.1 Fairness Between Competitors
The central ethical value conflict in the whereabouts context is between two different 
forms of fairness. The first contends that fairness between competing athletes—i.e. en­
suring that the playing-field is as “lever as possible—suffices to justify the imposition 
of the requirements on the athletes. The second contends that fairness between social 
groups—i.e. ensuring that no particular social group is subject to regulations that are 
out of proportion with those that apply generally to a broader context—suffices to jus­
tify a rejection of the same requirements. By focusing on different aspects of fairness, 
the two values yield diametrically opposed conclusions about the whereabouts require­
ments.
The first value, fairness between competing athletes, is used to justify the where­
abouts requirements in something like the following manner. Where athletes choose to 
dope out of competition, they will, everything else being equal, have an unfair advan­
tage over those competitors who have not similarly doped out of competition, in the 
sense that they will be in a better position to win the competition with a lesser over­
all level of exertion than their competitors (or, alternatively, win with a greater margin 
with the same overall level of exertion as their competitors). These competitors might 
be undoped because they do not have access to the same doping technologies, or they
31 Cf. A v. B; Campbell; Von Hannover; Mosley [2008].
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might be undoped because they prefer not to dope, for whatever reason (such as per­
sonal moral beliefs, health concerns, etc.).
There might be instances of in-competition doping. Strictly speaking, these are not 
allowed by the everything-else-equal-clause of the scenario, but they are worth consid­
eration nevertheless. There are already mechanisms in place to make in-competition 
doping more difficult to successfully get away with, such as automatic testing of all 
medalists at the most recent Olympic Games in London.32 While presumably not per­
fect in implementation, this testing nevertheless minimizes the risk that an athlete is 
competing against others who are benefitting from very recent use of some illicit per­
formance-enhancing technology.
The whereabouts requirements are presented as an analogous means to this of ensur­
ing the same sort of risk-minimization for the phenomenon of doping out of competi­
tion. By ones ADO keeping a close eye on the behaviors and habits of ones competitors, 
the imposition of the requirements functions as a form of insurance against the risk of 
an athlete needing to compete against others who are benefitting from non-recent use 
of some illicit performance-enhancing technology.
The central ethical variable, in the relative weighting of the value of fairness between 
competitors in the whereabouts context, concerns the relative prevalence of doping out 
of competition between different sporting contexts. Where the relative prevalence of 
such doping is high, the relative weight of the value as a justification for the imposition 
of the whereabouts requirements is correspondingly high. Where the relative preva­
lence of doping out of competition is instead sufficiently low, this justification evap­
orates. In a hypothetical instance in which no doping out of competition occurs, the 
value of fairness between competitors as a justification for the imposition of the where­
abouts requirements has no force. On the contrary, in such a hypothetical instance, the 
whereabouts requirements are altogether redundant; they do not protect either fairness 
between competitors or athlete health, since there is no doping to threaten them in the 
first place.
In practical terms it is, of course, near impossible to satisfactorily assess the preva­
lence of doping in any given instance. Since it is ostensibly against the rules, then wher­
ever it occurs, it occurs to some degree of secrecy and seclusion. There are no official 
numbers on the extent of doping among elite athletes, only rough estimates based on
32IOC, 1,000-Strong Anti-Doping Unit Fighting to Keep the Games Clean.
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what certain subsets of those athletes voluntarily divulge, or what WADA and the var­
ious ADOs are able to establish through their various testing procedures.33
As a result, it is necessary to look for other measures of the prevalence of doping. 
The most promising approach, in this respect, is presumably to investigate the risk of 
doping, relative to a given sporting context. This is promising for a number of reasons. 
First, it is plausible to assume that the risk of doping in a given sporting context is likely 
to at least roughly correspond to the actual prevalence (or, perhaps, prevalence if there 
were no rules against it) of doping within that context. If there is more to be gained 
in competition by doping out of competition, then there is, in all likelihood, a greater 
chance that competitors will seek to take advantage of this by doping out of competition 
wherever they consider themselves likely to get away with it.
Second, WADA already stipulates that IFs and NADOs undertake this sort of as­
sessment of doping risks in the various sports, disciplines, and nations over which they 
have jurisdiction, in order to thereby better allocate scarce anti-doping resources where 
they are seen to have the most significant impact. It is, in other words, already part of 
anti-doping work to evaluate precisely what these sorts of relative risks between sport­
ing contexts are. This is, for instance, the basis for WADAs stipulation that a NADO 
focus its out-of-competition doping testing resources on those sports where the risk of 
doping is considered sufficiently high.34 It is also evident in WADA’s stipulation that IFs 
determine their own criteria for athlete inclusion in their respective RTPs, so as to en­
sure that they subject a sufficient amount of the elite athlete population to unannouced 
out-of-competition doping tests:
Each IF shall define the criteria for Athletes to be included in the international 
Registered Testing Pool for its sport, and shall publish those criteria as well as a
list o f  the Athletes m eeting those criteria The criteria used should reflect the IF s
evaluation o f  the risks o f  O ut-of-C om petition doping in that sport W hile such
criteria (and therefore the num ber o f  Athletes in the Registered Testing Pool) m ay  
vary from sport to sport, an IF m ust be able to dem onstrate it has m ade a proper 
assessm ent o f  the relevant risks and has adopted appropriate criteria based on the 
results o f  that assessm ent.35
As an example, the LAAF includes 538 individual elite athletes in its most recent 
RTP, while the World Curling Federation (WCF) includes only thirty-five in its respec-
33See e.g. Lentillon-Kaestner and Ohl, “Can We Measure Accurately the Prevalence of Doping?”
34WADA, IST3, §§ 4.3.1,11.2.2.
35Ibid.,§ 11.2.1.
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tive RTP.36 These numbers correspond roughly to the relative risk of out-of-competition 
doping in each sport (offset against their respective popularities), as do the respective 
criteria for inclusion. Athletes competing in athletics stand to gain a significant compet­
itive edge through the illicit out-of-competition use of, say, steroids or, in at least some 
instances, EPO. As a result, the IAAF includes not only its “top-performing athletes” in 
its RTP, but also athletes who are, for instance, serving periods of ineligibility, or whom 
the IAAF “wishes to target for Testing.”37 Athletes competing in curling, however—as 
with most other precision sports, such as archery and shooting—stand to gain very little 
from doping out-of-competition (although they may still stand to benefit from certain 
forms of in-competition doping). As a result, the WCF limits its RTP to those athletes 
who “won Gold, Silver and Bronze medals at the World Curling Championships 2012 
(Men & Women) and are still competing,” in addition to those who “won Gold or Silver 
medals at the World Wheelchair Championships 2012 and are still competing.”38 
This disparity in the risk of doping out of competition is also visible in the focus on 
different sports in the NADOs. So, for instance, although Canada has nine individual 
athletes listed among the thirty-five who are part of the WCF’s RTP, none of these ath­
letes are included in the RTP of the Canadian NADO, the Canadian Centre for Ethics 
in Sport (CCES).39 Of the only three individual Canadian athletes listed among the 538 
who are part of the IAAF s RTP, all three are included in CCES s RTP, in addition to 
another eighty-nine athletics athletes who are not part of the IAAF s RTP.40 The risk of 
doping out of competition in athletics, by these measures at least, is very much higher 
than the risk of this form of doping in curling.
These considerations demonstrate that the value of fairness between competitors will 
have significantly less ethically justificatory force, for the purpose of WADAs where­
abouts requirements, in those sporting contexts where the risk of doping out of compe­
tition is sufficiently low. In fact, WADA, IFs, and NADOs already recognize this gen­
eral state of affairs, in, for instance, focusing more of their efforts on out-of-competition 
doping testing in the case of athletics over that of curling. As this state of affairs reflects, 
the differing natures of the two different sports result in very different anti-doping
36IAAF, IAAF Registered Testing Pool; WCF, Registered Testing Pool 2012-2013.
37 IAAF, IAAF Anti-Doping Regulations, § 2.11.
38 WCF, Registered Testing Pool 2012-2013.
39 CCES, CCES Registered Testing Pool.
40 Ibid.
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requirements. Everything else being equal, there are significantly stronger reasons to 
believe that the whereabouts requirements are acceptable, on the basis of the value of 
fairness between competitors, in relation to athletics than there are in relation to curl­
ing. By way of generalization, there are significantly stronger reasons to believe that the 
whereabouts requirements are acceptable, on the basis of the value of fairness between 
competitors, in relation to some sports (such as those requiring explosive strength or 
extended stamina—the sort of physical demands that can be greatly improved by dop­
ing) than there are in relation to others (such as those requiring careful and measured 
precision).
7.3.2 Fairness Between Social Groups
The second form of fairness relevant to the whereabouts context—namely that between 
social groups—is used to justify opposition to those privacy harms that are unique to 
the context. Fairness between social groups will not, of course, recommend protection 
against privacy harms in only one context of two, if the harms are shared in both. In such 
a case, considerations of fairness can just as easily result in either of two conclusions: 
either the harms ought to be protected against to an equal extent in both contexts, or 
they ought to be implemented to an equal extent in both contexts. This highlights a 
relatively simple point of coherence; where the privacy harms in two different contexts 
differ, in some ethically irrelevant way, the inconsistency can be overcome either by 
removing the harms in both contexts, or by imposing them in both contexts. Either 
way, the result will be fairness between the contexts, in relation to the privacy harms in 
question.
It is, however, not sufficient to only compare contexts, given that an individual con­
text can be construed in a theoretically fanciful or perverse manner. To consider fairness 
between the whereabouts context and such a fanciful theoretical construct is not as il­
lustrative of general ethical acceptability as it will be to consider, again, fairness between 
the whereabouts context and the context of society generally. Only the latter contrast 
permits strong ethical justification for protection against some privacy harm or other; 
if the harm is allowed in the whereabouts context, but not in society generally, then 
unless there are sufficiently ethically relevant differences to account for the differences 
in treatment, there is a strong prima facie reason to reject the harm.
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As a result, the weight of the value of fairness between social groups, in the where­
abouts context, will correlate with the extent to which different instances of the where­
abouts context, and the context of society generally, differ in their imposition of the 
privacy harms. The harms may still be acceptable, of course, where the values support­
ing them are sufficiently strong in comparison, but where this is not the case, the harms 
will be unacceptable.
As noted in the previous chapter, it is difficult to find any analog—in terms of scope 
and severity—to the whereabouts-relative harms of surveillance and intrusion in the 
more general context. The harms are, simply, out of proportion with those comparable 
harms that apply to the general public.
This is, furthermore, also the case across the various instances of the whereabouts 
context; i.e. across different sporting contexts. The whereabouts requirements apply, 
as per WADAs stipulations, to all elite athletes competing at the top of their respec­
tive fields. Although there will be a difference, as discussed in the previous section, in 
the amount of individual athletes subject to the requirements relative to any individual 
sport, wherever the athletes are subject to them, the requirements apply in full. So for 
those 538 athletes who form IAAF s RTP, as well as for those thirty-five athletes who 
form WCF s RTP, the same requirements are imposed: quarterly whereabouts submis­
sions, including all manner of location information, in addition to a daily sixty-minute 
time slot when the athlete must be available for no-advance-notice out-of-competition 
doping testing.41
ft is arguably the case that the IAAF spends a larger portion of its financial resources 
on out-of-competition anti-doping work than the WCF, insofar as the former has a 
significantly larger pool of individual athletes to monitor and test than does the latter. 
This will, of course, depend on the percentage, rather than the absolute number, of IF 
members who make up the RTP (assuming that this is a reasonably reliable indicator 
of cost of out-of-competition anti-doping work versus IF financial resources generally). 
But even if it is assumed that the requirements on IAAF are greater than those on WCF, 
there is no difference to those individual athletes who happen to be included in either of 
their respective RTPs; they will be required to adhere to precisely the same set of rules, 
regardless of their particular sporting background. The weight of the value of fairness 
between groups therefore applies to precisely the same degree to the individuals who
41 WADA, 7ST3, § 11.3.
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form part of any official ADO RTP, regardless of the specific sporting context to which 
they belong.
This raises an interesting point. W hen balancing the values of fairness between com­
petitors and fairness between social groups, in the whereabouts context, the weight of 
the former varies across sporting contexts, while the weight of the latter stays fixed. 
This means that fairness between competitors might outweigh fairness between social 
groups in one sporting context, such as athletics, but not in another, such as curling. In 
fact, if one assumes the risk of out-of-competition doping to be close to nil in the latter, 
then it follows that there is a corresponding near-nil weight to the value of fairness be­
tween competitors as a justification for the imposition of the whereabouts requirements 
in any such case.
7.3.3 Health and Trust
There are, however, further considerations of value, prior to drawing any final con­
clusions about the ethical acceptability of the whereabouts requirements. The first of 
these concerns athlete health. Assuming, as per the previous chapter, that doping out 
of competition is in conflict with athlete health, it then follows that higher rates of out- 
of-competition doping will correlate with an increasing weight for the value of athlete 
health as a source of justification for the imposition of the whereabouts requirements, 
and the resulting privacy harms.
The value of athlete health, in the whereabouts context, is therefore tied to the preva­
lence of doping out of competition in a given sporting context, in the same manner as 
the value of fairness between competitors. Where there is little or no doping out of com­
petition, there are correspondingly few or low out-of-competition doping-related risks 
to athlete health, relative to the context. As already noted, since prevalence of doping 
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of certainty, risk of doping 
may take its place in a value-estimation of the sort being undertaken here. And, again 
as for the value of fairness between competitors, the weight of the value of athlete health 
will, in relation to whereabouts, vary with the risk of doping between different sporting 
contexts.
For this reason, although fairness between competitors and athlete health both work 
in tandem to provide ethical justification for the imposition of the whereabouts require­
ments, wherever the risk of doping out-of-competition is sufficiently low, there will be
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a correspondingly low weight to the justification so provided. In a case like that of pre­
cision sports (with their presumed near-nil risk of out-of-competition doping), then, 
neither fairness between competitors, nor athlete health, nor the two in combination, 
presumably suffice to counterbalance the concerns emanating from the value of fairness 
between social groups.
As a result, after a careful balancing of the values at stake, it can be concluded that 
where the risk of doping out of competition is sufficiently low—such as, presumably, 
in most precision sports—there is sufficient ethical justification for protection against 
the privacy harms resulting from the imposition of the whereabouts requirements to 
reject the latter. That is, in cases like these, where the risk of doping falls below some 
reasonable threshold, the requirements are not ethically acceptable, and, as such, where 
the particular sporting context permits, the privacy-invasion claim succeeds. This is a 
serious problem for the perceived mandate of WADA; to maintain its ethical status, the 
organization needs to reconsider the specifics of its policy, in order to allow for where­
abouts requirements that are more sensitive to the various different sporting contexts.
This conclusion is strengthened further in any instance where WADA, or one of the 
many AD Os, is seen to be failing by its own regulations, for instance by engaging in the 
sort of breach of confidence evident in the Rasmussen Tour de France case. Although 
that case arguably constitutes an isolated incident, it is nevertheless important in the 
sense that it contributes to expectations, at least among affected athletes, about the pos­
sible behavior of their AD Os. If athletes perceive such behavior as tolerated by the very 
same organizations that impose a set of ethical standards upon them, they will, over 
time, lose their faith in the overall ethical credibility of the system. That is to say, im ­
posing certain ethical standards on athletes, while nevertheless failing to adhere to the 
same set of ethical standards oneself, is likely to undermine the mandate required by 
WADA to achieve its overall goal of fighting doping in elite sport by undertaking effi­
cient anti-doping work. Objections to its system are likely to increase proportionately 
to the incidence of such cases.
This is important merely in the following sense. As of yet, the Rasmussen case seems 
to exhibit relatively unprecedented behavior in relation to the work of ADOs. But it has 
not led to sanctions within any of the ADOs that could conceivably have been responsi­
ble for the original breach of confidence. As a result, the Rasmussen case itself does not 
noticeably affect considerations regarding the ethical acceptability of the whereabouts
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requirements. But where the incidence of analogous cases increases, it will become all 
the more difficult for WADA to provide ethical justification for its work, insofar as the 
incidences will negatively affect the ability to claim such ethical justification in the first 
place.
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C o n c l u s i o n
In  t h e  f o r e g o in g  a c c o u n t , I have concluded that WADAs whereabouts require­ments are probably not legally acceptable, in relation to (certain aspects of) the extent of the surveillance and intrusion that they entail. Nor are they ethically 
acceptable, in those sports with a sufficiently low risk of doping. This final chapter pro­
vides a retrospective summary account of the argument relied on to reach these con­
clusions, as well as a brief overview of the specific policy recommendations that follow 
from them. In addition, I consider the recent changes to the whereabouts requirements 
suggested in WADAs latest draft 1ST (a part of their second and still ongoing review 
of the WADC  and International Standards). Although the changes are positive, their 
ultimate implementation remains, for the time, undetermined.
8.1 Summary
WADAs whereabouts requirements have given rise, through the demands that they 
place on elite athletes, to various complaints. Thse include the complaint that they in­
vade the privacy of the affected athletes in an unacceptable manner. The claim can be 
interpreted as a legal or an ethical claim. Where understood as the former, the strength 
of the claim will depend, in particular, on the legal jurisdiction in which it is invoked; 
differing laws between jurisdictions entail that the whereabouts requirements might be 
legally acceptable in one but legally unacceptable in another. Where understood as the 
latter, the strength of the claim will depend, in particular, on the concept of privacy
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in mind; certain interpretations of the concept may entail ethical acceptability, while 
others may entail the opposite.
Since my interest has been in the specific privacy-related elements of the complaints 
against the whereabouts requirements, both the legal and the ethical issues require a 
closer specification of the nature of the concept of privacy. There are various legal and 
ethical issues with the whereabouts requirements that have little or nothing to do with 
privacy, much as there are various legal and ethical privacy issues for elite athletes that 
have little or nothing to do with the whereabouts requirements. This thesis has focused 
exclusively on the intersection of these two domains, namely those issues arising in 
relation to the combination of WADAs whereabouts requirements and the privacy of 
elite athletes. But drawing any conclusions about this particular domain necessitates a 
prior specification of the relevant scope of privacy.
To keep the legal question within a tolerable scope, I have further restricted my legal 
investigations to the jurisdiction of the UK (and, wherever common law traditions are 
concerned, England). The resulting research questions have then been formulated as 
follows: (a) Do WADA’s current whereabouts requirements constitute a legally acceptable 
invasion o f the privacy o f elite athletes in the UK? (b) Do WADAs current whereabouts 
requirements constitute an ethically acceptable invasion o f the privacy of elite athletes gen­
erally?
As already noted, in order to answer these questions, it is crucial to first determine 
the appropriate content and scope of privacy. The philosophical discussion of these mat­
ters stems, to a large extent, from concerns about the expanding scope of the US legal 
concept of privacy, as witnessed in the Griswold line of Supreme Court cases. Funda­
mentally, scholars disagree about whether privacy is restricted to matters of personal 
information (thereby rejecting the privacy rationale in Griswold), or if it might be able to 
accommodate more (thereby allowing the privacy rationale in Griswold). In investigat­
ing the nature of the dispute between such narrow and broad accounts of privacy, I have 
maintained that they stem from separate and incompatible views on such methodologi­
cal questions as the proper weight to accord the common use of a term. These problems 
are important, and significant, in the sense that they entail serious obstacles for any 
person attempting to make a rational and justified choice between competing accounts 
without simlutaneously necessitating an investigation of the myriad methodological is­
sues impinging on that choice.
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Given the nature of the thesis topic—i.e. concerns about global sport policy—I have 
maintained that it is unpreferable to require such extensive methodological considera­
tions in order to attend to the concerns in question. Equally, however, it is philosoph­
ically unacceptable to simply presume the superiority of some account of privacy over 
others. Instead, I have suggested side-stepping these difficulties altogether, by opting 
for a contextual account of privacy that includes in the concept that which individu­
als in any given context denote by the term, in order to thereby seek to establish the 
underlying normative concerns to assess them on their own terms, regardless of the 
extent to which they fit into traditional accounts of privacy. Doing this sort of thing 
is, of course, a conceptually risky endeavor; the emotive appeal of privacy entails that 
many individuals may be content to use the term to denote all manner of things. Such 
conceptual inflation risks undermining that very same emotive appeal, by watering the 
concept down in letting it refer to an overly broad range of phenomena.
As a result, I have suggested certain limitations on any contextual account of pri­
vacy. First, I have argued for a view of privacy as the absence of certain harms to the 
person, where the harms in question are determined by the context in question. If the 
harms are likely in the context, I have said that privacy is threatened. If the harms are 
realized, I have said that privacy is invaded. If the harms are absent altogether, privacy, 
at least in relation to those specific contextual harms, is fully intact. Second, I have ar­
gued for a view of privacy as directly concerning conflicting values between people in 
society. More specifically, in any case where privacy is raised as a concern of some sort, 
I have argued that there will be different underlying (contextual) values that both sup­
port and oppose protection against the harm concerned. So, for instance, while certain 
values concerning autonomy might be used to oppose unknown covert surveillance of 
individuals in a society, other values concerning keeping the country safe from ter­
rorism might be used to support the same form of surveillance. Once these values are 
properly identified, and the contextual variables affecting their potential weights in spe­
cific instances have been determined, it is possible to establish their respective strengths 
against each other in any given instance of the context in question, thereby determining 
whether the contextual privacy harms are acceptable or not in relation to that particular 
instance.
Given this schema, I have argued that there are a number of privacy harms and un­
derlying values that pertain to the whereabouts context. Of these, however, only two
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harms—concerning surveillance and intrusion—were found to be significantly dispro­
portionate to similar harms not normally entailing particular concern in the broader 
context of British society generally. Given that the central and foremost underlying 
value supporting the whereabouts privacy invasion claim is a specific concern that the 
whereabouts requirements are disproportionate to the broader context of society gener­
ally, it was deemed necessary to investigate only these harms and their attendant values, 
in order to establish the extent of, respectively, their legal and ethical acceptability. Due 
to the specifics of the Michael Rasmussen Tour de France case, I also investigated the 
impact of breach of confidence concerns on the whereabouts requirements.
The law on privacy in the UK is a diffuse, patchwork affair, dictated to alternating 
extents by common law traditions and principles, parliamentary legislation, and vari­
ous international legal treaties to which the UK is subject, particularly in its standing 
as a member of the CE and the EU. In relation to surveillance, intrusion, and breach 
of confidence, the most relevant areas of law were identified as those concerning the 
ECHR human right to private and family life, EU law on maximum working time, and 
the English equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, respectively (although the last 
was shown not to arise in any problematic form for the requirements themselves, only 
for breaches of confidence explicitly against WADAs own regulations). In relation to 
the ECHR right, it was found that insofar as UKAD constitutes an NDPB, it is directly 
affected by the right through the HRA 1998, and, as such, could have a lawsuit brought 
against it by individuals in the UK for a breach of that right. Given that the right is 
qualified, however, and particularly in light of the UK’s obligations as a signatory to 
UNESCO’s International Convention against Doping in Sport, it is uncertain what the 
precise outcome of any such suit would ultimately be. The UK is, as many other coun­
tries, deeply invested in the fight against doping in sport, and it is therefore uncertain to 
what extent such considerations might impact on the qualification of the ECHR right 
to private and family life in relation to elite athlete doping issues.
EU law on maximum working time, however, constitutes an important, if some­
what limited, legal restriction to WADAs whereabouts requirements. Specifically, the 
law stipulates, among other things, at least four weeks of paid annual leave for all work­
ers in the EU. For those athletes who qualify as workers (e.g. those employed as part of 
a professional sports team), the requirement that they must provide their whereabouts 
for every day of the year without exception contradicts EU and UK law, and is therefore
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legally unacceptable. This constitutes an important problem for WADA, insofar as four 
weeks is a substantial period of time during which individual athletes could potentially 
benefit greatly from out-of-competition doping; it is understandable that the organiza­
tion is unwilling to be seen to issue any such free pass. Nevertheless, as things currently 
stand, it is difficult to establish how WADA might avoid such concerns without simul­
taneously contravening the EU law on maximum working time.
In addition, as regards the ethical dimension of the topic, I derived a functional ac­
count of the values to be balanced against each other in any given sporting instance. 
First, the values of fairness between competitors and athlete health, which each sup­
port the imposition of the whereabouts requirements (despite its attendant harms), 
were established to fluctuate across sporting contexts, depending on the risk of doping 
within the sport in question. Where the risk is high, the values provide greater justi­
ficatory strength for the imposition of the requirements. But where the risk is low or 
non-existent, the values provide little or no such justification; if there is no risk of dop­
ing in a sport, fairness between competitors and doping-related concerns about athlete 
health as reasons for the imposition of harsh whereabouts requirements have no norma­
tive force. Second, however, the value of fairness between social groups, which opposes 
the imposition of the whereabouts requirements (because of its attendant harms), was 
instead seen to be fixed across sporting contexts. Insofar as the requirements have the 
same content and scope in all relevant cases, and apply to the same extent to all elite 
athletes regardless of sport, there is no variation in its justificatory strength for the view 
that the whereabouts requirements are unacceptable.
Ultimately, then, regardless of the particular merit ascribed to the underlying values 
in question, it can be established that there are probably sporting contexts involving 
a high risk of doping in which the (constant) value of fairness between social groups 
has less justificatory force than the contrasting (fluctuating) values of fairness between 
competitors and athlete health, thereby rendering the whereabouts requirements ethi­
cally acceptable. But there are also sporting contexts involving such a low risk of doping 
that the (constant) value of fairness between social groups is almost guaranteed to have 
more justificatory force than the contrasting (fluctuating) values. Wherever one finds 
it reasonable to set the threshold, the whereabouts requirements are, in their current 
form, ethically unacceptable in any sporting context that falls below that threshold.
The final answer to each of the research questions is therefore a qualified “no”. In
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the legal case, there may (but need not necessarily) be human rights concerns, but at 
least for those athletes who qualify as workers the requirements are unacceptable. In the 
ethical case, the requirements are also unacceptable, in relation to all sporting contexts 
in which the risk of doping is sufficiently low.
8.2 Policy Recommendations
There are many potential ways in which WADAs whereabouts requirements could be 
reformulated in order to accommodate these concerns. The human rights concerns 
could arguably be mitigated, to at least some extent, by slightly milder requirements, 
without thereby foregoing the perceived necessity of extensive no advance notice out- 
of-competition testing. This could be achieved in a variety of ways, but a plausible can­
didate for such a resolution would be some manner of distinguishing between elite ath­
letes within the RTP, in something like the manner currently implemented by the ICC 
in relation to professional cricketers. So, for instance, WADA might stipulate a division 
of all athletes currently in the RTP into two separate player pools, where the higher 
pool consists of (something like) all athletes ranking above some reasonably high cut­
off point (significantly higher than most criteria for inclusion in current RTPs) rela­
tive to the sport in question, together with those athletes who have committed some 
form of major or minor doping offense within a certain past time range, and the lower 
pool consists of all other athletes in the current RTP. If, then, the full whereabouts re­
quirements were taken to apply to the higher pool, the lower pool might be required 
to provide something like, say, their whereabouts information five days a week, from 
Monday to Friday, instead of every day of the week. Such a division between player 
pools is strongly in line with WADAs current emphasis on ensuring that no advance 
notice out-of-competition doping test resources are allocated where they are seen to be 
most likely to have an impact.
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, although WADAs goal of doping-free sport 
may be laudable in itself, limited resources entail a need to effectivize wherever WADA 
seeks to have any significant impact. It is not clear that reasonable distinctions, stipu­
lated by WADA, between different player pools, would not be able to provide at least 
some such effectivization. In practice, this is already the case in every ADOs criteria 
for inclusion in their RTP, together with the further possibility of alternate lower-level
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player pools subject to milder requirements. These are, however, rarely utilized in prac­
tice. As a result, a central stipulation from WADA itself, establishing a certain amount 
of player pools, as well as their concomitant rules for inclusion, would arguably provide 
the incentive necessary for such implementation. Although this would not remove the 
whereabouts burdens from all elite athletes, the full requirements would only apply to a 
small subset of those currently affected; a state of affairs that is arguably much easier to 
defend in relation to human rights concerns. Given the qualified nature of the ECHR 
right to private and family life, a requirement for full whereabouts information—applied 
only to the absolutely highest echelons of a sport together with previously established 
dopers—would be significantly easier to defend in terms of the articles “protection of 
health or morals”-clause than is the current practice of applying the requirements to a 
large number of athletes regardless of actual intentions to submit them to any no ad­
vance notice out-of-competition doping tests.
As regards maximum working time, WADA has no immediately available options if 
it seeks to abide by the relevant laws in the EU. The extent to which a global organiza­
tion need or ought to directly concern itself with local laws and regulations is of course 
an open question, but the fact remains: if an employed athlete were to file a lawsuit 
against, say, UKAD, on the basis of the EWTD 2003, then given the lack of any provi­
sions excepting athletes from standard EU trade rights such as the EWTD 2003 (and 
particularly in light of the ruling in Bosman, that sporting organizations are subject to 
largely the same sort of economic and trade considerations as non-sporting organiza­
tions), it is highly likely that the courts would rule in favor of the athlete. In order to be 
considered legally acceptable, at least in the UK, WADAs whereabouts requirements 
must include provisions for four weeks’ annual leave for all employed athletes.
Finally, the ethical concern could be mitigated by an official recognition of the vary­
ing vulnerabilities to doping between different sports. In fact, the preconditions for this 
already exist as part of the IST3. As noted in chapter 2, each ADO with testing jurisdic­
tion is responsible for the development of a “Test Distribution Plan,” which includes, 
among other things, an evaluation—for each sport, discipline, or country—of the po­
tential risk of doping. That is to say, WADA recognizes the inherent differences between 
different types of sports, and further recognizes that this warrants treating them, in at 
least certain respects, in a different manner. Where the risk of doping out of competition 
is high, WADA stipulates that an ADO ought to invest correspondingly more resources
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in no advance notice out-of-competition doping testing, and ought to include a larger 
number of athletes in its RTP. Where the risk of doping out of competition is low, the 
opposite considerations apply.1
At the same time, however, the same whereabouts requirements apply to all athletes 
who are part of an ADOs RTP. Regardless of the risk profile for out-of-competition 
doping in their particular sport or discipline, those athletes will nevertheless be subject 
to the same exact requirements.2 In its original IST1, WADA allowed ADOs to stipu­
late different whereabouts requirements, different definitions of whereabouts failures, 
and different sanctions for such failures.3 The system resulted, among other things, in 
disagreements on these matters between ADOs sharing testing jurisdiction of athletes. 
As a result, the 2009 WADC2, and its concomitant International Standards, sought to 
“harmonize” the whereabouts rules, by making them uniform across all sporting con­
texts.
It would, however, be a relatively straightforward issue to create, for instance, a tiered 
approach, according to which different sports are classified into different categories de­
pending on their specific risk profile. The categories—whether three or eight or any 
other reasonable number in amount—could then be provided with a specific set of har­
monized whereabouts requirements relevant to particular contexts, both as regards the 
content of the requirements and the scope and severity of any subsequent punishments. 
This would permit the flexibility that is lacking from the current requirements, without 
giving rise to the inconsistencies arising from the I ST Vs stipulation that ADOs deter­
mine such issues largely on their own.
8.3 Upcoming Revisions
WADAs WADC and International Standards are currently undergoing the final phase 
of their second major review, with the aim of finalizing a third, revised version of the 
WADC (fourth, in the case of the 1ST), WADC3, by November 2013, to be formally 
implemented from January 2015 onward. The code review process has invited submis­
sions for review considerations, from any interested parties, in several phases, the first
JWADA, IST3, §§ 4.2-4.3,11.2.
2Ibid.,§ 11.3.
3WADA, WADC1, §§ 2.4,10.4.3; WADA, IST1, §§ 4.4, 14.3.
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of which began in January 2012.4 After each submission phase, WADA has produced a 
draft document proposing certain revisions to their regulations. Although all the sub­
mission phases have now passed, it is nevertheless illuminating to investigate the latest 
draft version of the 1ST, the upcoming IST4.
Specifically, the IST4 falls in line with several of the suggestions considered above. It 
(helpfully) treats the issue of whereabouts in an altogether separate annex, and although 
many of the elements remain the same as in the IST3 (such as the general requirements 
for all athletes in an ADO s RTP to provide whereabouts information), others have been 
significantly revised.
First, although the regulations still stipulate an anti-doping rule violation arising 
from any combination of three missed tests or filing failures, it has reduced the rele­
vant time period from eighteen to twelve months, meaning that any such whereabouts 
failures will “expire” six months earlier than they do under the current system.5 Sec­
ond, the requirements for whereabouts information can be waived during competition 
periods by those ADOs who are “satisfied that [they have] enough information from 
other sources to find the Athlete for Testing on In-Competition dates.”6 This releases 
those athletes who compete in tournaments where their successes from one day to the 
next influence their subsequent whereabouts from the need to constantly update their 
whereabouts information. Each of these two stipulations aims to reduce the current 
burdens on athletes, and is therefore, in relation to the foregoing discussion, a welcome 
development.
There are also more significant revisions. For one, the draft IST4 allows a differ­
ent distribution of testing between those sports with high versus low risks of doping. 
Under the current regulations, ADOs are required to utilize both in-competition and 
out-of-competition doping testing, with the ratio of each dictated by the specific rele­
vant doping risk profile. Under the draft regulations, however, an allowance can “very 
exceptionally” be made, to remove the requirement for out-of-competition doping test­
ing altogether in the “small number of sports and/or disciplines where it is determined 
in good faith there is no material risk of doping during Out-of-Competition periods.”7
4WADA, Code Review Plan.
5WADA, IST4, § 1.1.5.
6Ibid., § 1.3.2.
7 Ibid., § 4.4.1.e.ii.
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Furthermore, and in addition to the above, the draft regulations specify that where­
abouts information ought only to be collected to the extent that it facilitates no ad­
vance notice out-of-competition doping testing; where this is not the case, the requested 
whereabouts information is deemed superfluous, and therefore unnecessary, at least in 
part. More specifically, WADA recommends a tiered approach, where an ADO includes 
in its RTP only those athletes from whom it “plans to collect three or more Samples per 
year,” and where the ADO deems that requesting their full whereabouts information is 
the “only way to conduct such Testing effectively and efficiently and with No Advance 
Notice”8 For all those athletes who do not match these criteria, WADA recommends 
lower-level player pools consisting of lesser whereabouts requirements, as determined 
by the relevant ADO.
Although these changes are highly commendable, particularly insofar as they mit­
igate many of the legal and ethical concerns noted above, there are nevertheless still 
other concerns with them. For one, the provision that ADOs themselves determine how 
to categorize their athletes, along with the sort of whereabouts information to request 
from all the non-RTP player pools, risks generating similar problems of incommensu­
rable whereabouts practices between different ADOs as did the IST1. Although WADA 
has attempted to mitigate the likelihood of this by now specifying that ADOs who share 
testing jurisdiction over an athlete must recognize each other’s findings in relation to 
that athlete, there is nevertheless an inherent risk that vastly differing categorization 
schemes between different ADOs will lead to claims of unfair treatment between ath­
letes belonging to different IFs or NADOs. It would arguably have been preferable to 
see WADA develop clear stipulations in regard to a certain number of tiers or categories 
for sports, divided by their doping risk profiles, as opposed to just specifying the regula­
tions applicable to the very highest level of athletes, and leaving the remaining decisions 
to each individual ADO.
It is commendable to see a specification of the exact threshold value for inclusion 
of an athlete in an ADOs RTP (namely, that the ADO intends to test that athlete at 
least three times within any twelve months). It would have been more commendable 
to see at least some amount of proposed threshold values for lower tiers of athletes, 
with related respective (increasingly lesser) whereabouts requirement stipulations. As 
noted, the draft regulations, if implemented, risk the incommensurability and perceived
8WADA, IST4, § 4.6.3.
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unfairness resulting from the IST1, with a further downstream risk of a strong counter­
reaction, in the form of a return to the severity of the IST2 and IST3. Within global 
anti-doping regulation, it would be preferable to aim for a degree of stability in this 
respect, rather than risk setting the pendulum of general athlete opinion swinging back 
and forth with each new iteration of the regulations.
That being said, it is not certain whether or not or to what extent the current draft 
regulations correspond to the final IST4. Although WADA is transparent in the code 
review submissions it receives (storing everything in publicly available archives on its 
website), it is far from transparent in relation to the actual process of determining which 
of the submissions it ultimately places particular emphasis on. The precise decision­
making procedures are not accessible or described in any detail, and, as a result, it is 
impossible to predict to what extent the current draft changes will remain in the final 
document, until it is published later this year. And even so, the next iteration of WADAs 
regulations will only come into effect at the beginning of 2015. Until then, the current 
regulations, with their inherent legal and ethical privacy problems, remain.
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